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Procedural Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions about procedural justice are remarkably persistent. From the Court of
Star Chamber in the fourteenth century1 to Guantanamo Bay in the twenty-first,2 the
common-law legal tradition is no stranger to the notion that procedural rights may be
sacrificed on the altar of substantive advantage. Legal sophisticates will hardly be
surprised to learn that academics in the utilitarian tradition have argued that procedural
fairness can be reduced to the calculation of costs and benefits,3 including, perhaps, a
taste for participation.4 Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have
suggested that the most basic procedural rights, notice and an opportunity to be heard,
may be denied if the balance of interests does not favor them.5
But the ascendancy of consequentialist reasoning in the courts and the academy has
not laid the question of procedural justice to rest. Whenever life, liberty, or property is
taken without affording the affected individual a meaningful opportunity to participate
in the decision making process, the cry of procedural unfairness is heard. The thesis of
this article is that such cries are grounded in reason as well as passion. “Yes,”
procedural justice is concerned with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of
adjudication, but, “no,” not solely with costs and benefits. Rather, procedural justice is
deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of
meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of
action-guiding legal norms. Meaningful participation requires notice and opportunity
to be heard, and it requires a reasonable balance between cost and accuracy.
1

Frank Riebli, Note, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English Tribunal
in the Supreme Court's Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807 (2002);
CORA LOUISE SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER iii (Burt Franklin ed., 1969)
(1900) (finding references to Star Chamber as early as 1356); William Hudson, A Treatise of the
Court of Star Chamber, in COLLECTANEA JURIDICA, 1-241 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1980) (1792)
(stating that Star Chamber dates from the Twelfth Century reign of Henry II); see also infra Part
V.A.4, “Three Thought Experiments.”
2

Gherebi v. Bush, ___ F.3d ____, 2003 WL 23010235 (9th Cir. Dec 18, 2003); Michael
Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive Detentions and
Torture, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1513 (2003); K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy Toward
Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 662 (2003).
3
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 228 (2002); see also Louis
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES,
307 (1994).
4

See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass
Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996).
5

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (using a balancing approach to resolve
question whether denial of an opportunity to be heard violates due process); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (using a balancing approach to resolve
question whether notice of proceeding was required).
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My case for these simple and intuitively plausible claims is elaborated in the form
of a theory of procedural justice for a system of civil dispute resolution. It is a
commonplace of procedure scholarship to observe that theories of procedural justice
are “thinly developed.”6 My aim is to begin the process of remedying this defect by
providing a fully articulated and defended theory of procedural justice for a system of
civil adjudication.
A. Where to Begin? Ex Ante and Ex Post Perspectives
Where can we begin? We need a point of entry into the question, “What makes a
procedure just?” One obvious way to approach the question is to take up the ex post
perspective.7 Imagine that a legal proceeding is over and done with; a final judgment
has been entered. From, the ex post perspective, we care about the outcomes of civil
proceedings. Some outcomes are substantively just; others are unjust on the merits.
Some judgments are legally correct; others are in error. Some findings of fact are true;
others false. We want outcomes that are substantively just, judgments that are legally
correct, and findings that are factually true.
What then about procedures? Do they matter and, if so, why? Without further
reflection, one might be attracted to the view that, while outcomes matter in a deep
way, procedures do not. “What real difference does a supposedly fair procedure
make,” we might ask, “if it results in an unjust outcome? What solace can procedural
justice be to someone who has suffered a substantive wrong?”8 Posing the questions in
this manner suggests an answer: only substantive outcomes really count, and only
substantive rules or their application can truly be said to be just or unjust. This answer
deflates the claims of procedural fairness and cautions against “the ugly spectre of

6

Robert Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 488-89 (2003); see also Kaplow & Shavell, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 3, at 228 n.6 (noting the lack of developed theories of procedural
justice); Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643, 1646-47 (1985) (noting that fairness arguments about procedure are limited and
narrow).
7
See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice--Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997)
(distinguishing between the ex post and ex ante perspectives on procedural justice).
8
For a very clear example of this sort of argument, see Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice
and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1046-47 (2003) (“If the issue is framed as one of
"procedural justice," then decision-makers might argue that they have solved the "fair treatment"
problem through the creation of procedures that ensure participation of all groups in decisionmaking processes. It is not clear, however, that procedural requirements enhancing public
participation will necessarily lead to substantive decisions that are more responsive to public
opinion. While enhancing participation procedures to equalize opportunities is an important step
in creating the preconditions for political justice, it provides no guarantee that the substantive
decision will embody political justice.”).
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Procedural Justice
procedural rights.”9 The implication is that the very notion of procedural justice as an
independent criterion of fairness is empty.
Even if we were to accept this deflationary view of procedural justice as our starting
point, it would not follow that procedures are unimportant. If we begin with criteria for
a just outcome, then it follows that our system of dispute resolution should be designed
to decide controversies in accord with these criteria. From the bare premise that
outcomes count from the ex post perspective, we can derive a minimal notion of
procedural justice. A perfectly just procedure would guarantee correct outcomes; a
procedure would be more or less fair or just insofar as it approximates this ideal. If we
take the rules of substantive law (torts, contracts, property, and so forth) as applied to
the facts (the state of the world) as the criteria for just outcomes, then the ideal
procedure would discern the truth about the facts and apply the law to those facts with
one-hundred percent accuracy. From the modest premise that outcomes count, we can
derive the view that procedural justice is a function of accuracy.
There are, however, obvious problems with this simple theory. Even from the ex
post perspective, formal legal outcomes, such as judgments for plaintiffs and
defendants, are not the only effects of adjudication. Dispute resolution systems impose
costs on the parties to the dispute and on society at large. If we enlarge our view of
outcomes to encompass all of the costs and benefits imposed by the litigation system,
then our view of procedural justice will be enlarged as well. An outcome that includes
a damage award that reflects an accurate application of the substantive law to the facts
might nonetheless be unjust if the plaintiff who was entitled to prevail had to pay more
in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment. A dispute resolution system that
achieved one-hundred percent accuracy would be viewed as monstrously unfair if it
required each disputant to devote her entire life to a painstaking process of fact-finding
and consumed the great bulk of the social product to finance the enterprise.10 The
addition of these uncontroversial premises to our modest assumption that outcomes
count yields the conclusion that even from the ex post perspective a fair procedure
must, at a minimum, strike a fair or reasonable balance between the benefits of accurate
outcomes and the costs imposed by the system of procedures.11
9

Randy E. Barnett, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market”: Comment, 3 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 427 (1979).
10

Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1975) (“It should
be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, that at some
point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the
cost of providing such protection, and that the expense of protecting those likely to be found
undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving.”).
11

The claim made in text requires qualification. It might be argued that the costs of accuracy
(and, for reasons that are established below, see infra Part V, The Value of Participation) are
external to the concept of procedural justice. On this view, procedural fairness is one thing and
the costs of procedure quite another. For an analagous argument in the context of distributive
justice,
see
G.A.
Cohen,
Rescuing
Justice
from
Constructivism,
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1534/JDG/cohen2.pdf (visited January 29, 2004). The assumption

3
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Procedural perfection is unattainable: no conceivable system of procedure can
guarantee perfect accuracy. Approaching procedural perfection is unaffordable: a
system that achieved the highest possible degree of accuracy would be intolerably
costly. Even the application of an elaborate system of error correction mechanisms (for
example, a system with motions for new trial, appeals, and for a some types of errors,
collateral attacks) will result in many cases with substantively unjust outcomes—
lawsuits in which fact finding went awry or the applicable rule of law was not correctly
identified. Litigants themselves make procedural mistakes that thwart their own
substantive rights. And litigants are bound by erroneous judgments that are truly final,
beyond all further correction of mistake. This is a fact about procedure in the actual
world, which we might call the fact of irreducible procedural error.
So far, our view of procedural fairness has been entirely ex post. But the ex post
view is incomplete for many reasons. Not the least of these is the fact that final
judgments are not the end of the story. From the ex ante perspective, the role of law is
to provide a mechanism for the coordination of human conduct. Substantive rules of
law define rights and responsibilities that provide reasons for action. Property law tells
us who has what dominion over which resources. Tort and criminal law define our
obligations towards others. Contract law enables us to create and enforce new
obligations. Law is action-guiding. From the ex post point of view, however, it
appears that the action-guiding work of law is done by substance and not by procedure.
Is that conclusion correct?
To test the adequacy of the ex post view of procedural fairness, we need to ask the
following question: can the substantive law perform its action-guiding function without
the aid of procedure? Given certain idealizing (counterfactual) assumptions, the
answer to this question would be “yes.” Were we to assume (a) that citizens have
perfect information about the state of the world and the content of the laws, (b) that the
content of the laws is fully specified, and (c) that each and every citizen viewed the law
and the facts impartially, then the rules of substantive law could perform their actionguiding function without the aid of a system of procedure. In the actual world,
however, none of these three idealizing assumptions holds true; instead, the actual
world is characterized by three problems of compliance with substantive legal norms:
(1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality.12 Notice that these three

underlying this argument is that procedural justice should answer to the morally relevant
properties that are internal to procedure. Morally relevant properties external to procedure may
well be relevant to the question what should be done, all things considered, but are outside the
domain of procedural justice. Even on this view, however, it could be argued that procedural
systems impose direct costs that are properly considered as internal to procedure. Such direct
costs include, for example, the monetary and nonmonetary cost of participation in the procedural
system—time spent, attorneys’s fees, filing fees, and so forth.
12
Cf. RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998) (discussing analagous problems
of knowledge, interest, and power).
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problems would hold, even if citizens saw themselves as obligated by the content of the
substantive legal norms.
Each of these three problems requires a few words of explanation: in what ways
does the actual world differ from the idealized world of perfect information, fully
specified laws, and impartiality. First, the actual world is characterized by the problem
of imperfect knowledge of law and fact. No one citizen has perfect information about
the content of the law or the state of the world. Indeed, each of us knows only a small
fraction of the information that would be required for perfect compliance with our legal
obligations. Moreover, given human capacities, knowledge is local; different parties to
a dispute may each possess different information about the facts. Without some
process that can supply the parties to a dispute with a common understanding of the
law and the facts, even citizens who attempt to use the law to coordinate their behavior
may be unable to do so.
Second, the actual world is characterized by the problem of incomplete specification
of legal norms. Legal rules are constructed using the tools provided by natural human
languages. For rules to guide conduct, they must be comprehensible, and hence, they
must be framed in relatively general and abstract language. As a consequence, the
substantive law is inherently incomplete and ambiguous. Without a procedure whereby
its content can be specified and disambiguated, different citizens will inevitably have
different views about the content of the law.
Third, the actual world is characterized by the problem of partiality. Citizens are
inevitably partial to their own interests, to the interests of the friends and families, and
to the interests of causes and ideologies to which they are committed. The problem of
partiality interacts with the problem of incomplete information about law and fact and
the problem of incomplete specification of the law. So, citizens will be likely to form
views about the content of the laws and the state of the world that favor the interests to
which they are partial. Without a procedure whereby conflicting partial perspectives
can be reconciled, different citizens will inevitably disagree about which actions the
law requires.
Given these the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and
partiality, legal disputes will arise. And the converse is also true, with perfect
knowledge, complete specification, and impartiality, almost every dispute could
settle.13 From the ex post perspective, the role of procedure is to resolve these disputes,
but from the ex ante point of view, procedure has another role—to guide action after
the formal legal proceedings have ended and the judgment has become final.14 This is
the real work of procedure—to guide primary conduct after the judgment is rendered.
The real work of procedure does not begin until the trial is over, the appeals exhausted,
13

“Every dispute could settle” is an exaggeration. Settlement might be thwarted if the legal
system provided incentives for delay, e.g. if the defendant was not required to pay the plaintiff
pre-judgment interest. More generally, a procedural system can (but need not) provide perverse
incentives to litigate a frivolous case or defense.
14
This point is inspired by George Smith, Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market, 3 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 405 (1979).
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and the judgment has become final. Legal proceedings communicate information about
law and fact to parties and others. Legal proceedings specify the content of general and
abstract legal rules. Legal proceedings provide authoritative resolutions of the
differences in perspective generated by partial interests. Procedure provides the
information, specificity, and impartiality that is required for citizens to conform their
behavior to the requirements of law.
This point can easily be missed. The action-guiding role of procedure is not always
transparent. Indeed, in the context of criminal procedure, the action-guiding role of
procedure is almost totally opaque. One might easily imagine that the role of a system
of criminal procedure is to impose just punishments, and that direct application of the
coercive power of the state is the necessary and sufficient means to this ends: criminal
defendants are coerced by force, not guided by legal norms specified by a procedure.
But we should not overgeneralize from the criminal context: on the civil side, there are
contexts in which the action-guiding role of procedure is crystal clear. One such
context is the declaratory civil judgment.15 In an action for declaratory relief, no
coercive order issues; rather, the judgment simply declares what the legal rights and
obligations of the parties are. Declaratory judgments can guide action without
coercion, precisely because they provide information about law and fact that can
overcome the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and
partiality.16
The action-guiding role of procedure is important because it undermines an
assumption that is implicit in the ex post view of procedural fairness. The ex post view
assumes that there is a sharp division between the action-guiding role of substantive
law (the rules of torts, contracts, and property) and the dispute-resolving role of
procedural law (the rules of jurisdiction, pleading, discovery, trial, appeal, and
preclusion). Once this assumption is exposed by the move to the ex ante view, we can
begin to appreciate that the real work of procedure may be every bit as action-guiding
as is the work of substance. As we shall see, the action-guiding work of substantive
law is inextricably entangled in the action-guiding work of procedure.

15

See E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 12-13 (2d ed. 1941)(The more highly
organized a society becomes, the less occasion there is to display force in order to secure
obedience to its decrees and adjudications. . . . The mere authoritative declaration of the
reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties sufficies to insure obedience.); see generally
Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment--A Needed Procedural Reform, Part I, 28 YALE L.J. 1
(1918); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, in 5 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR LECTURES ON LEGAL
TOPICS 243, 245 (1928); Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment--A Needed Procedural Reform,
Part II, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918); Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights--The
Declaratory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1917); Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized Legal
Advisors of the People, 54 AM. L. REV. 161 (1920); Note, Developments in the Law: Declaratory
Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949).
16
Coercion is in the background, of couse. I am not claiming that coercion is never required
for civil adjudication to do its work of guiding action.
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For adjudicative procedure to perform its action-guiding function well, procedures
and their outcomes must be regarded as legitimate sources of authority for officials,
third-parties, and litigants. If adjudication works, the losing party will regard the
judgment as authoritative and binding—i.e. as providing good and sufficient reason to
pay the judgment or obey the injunction. If adjudication fails and the losing party
resists enforcement, then further procedures are required. Remedial proceedings will
require either officials (a sheriff or marshal) or third parties (a bank or employer) to
regard the outcome of an adjudication as a source of legitimate authority—e.g. as good
enough reason to confiscate property, turn over bank accounts, or garnish wages. If a
system of procedure is widely regarded as a source of legitimate authority, then it will
succeed in guiding action. If the system is seen as illegitimate or without authority,
then the system may fail.
What is our basis for regarding procedures as the source of outcomes that are
legitimately authoritative? One possible answer to this question might proceed as
follows. We might begin with the assumption that the substantive rules of law are
themselves legitimate. An accurate outcome could then derive its legitimate authority
from the legitimacy of the underlying substantive rule. If a legitimate substantive rule
of property law plus the true state of the world would result in awarding title to
Blackacre to Smith, then a judgment that awards Blackacre to Smith might be said to be
legitimate. Call this account of the legitimate authority of procedure, the derivative
theory.
But the derivative theory of procedural legitimacy immediately runs into an
obstacle in the form of the fact of irreducible procedural error. As an official or a third
party, I cannot know whether any particular verdict is accurate or not. I may have
reason to believe that it is highly likely that the verdict is accurate. But, then again, I
may not, for example, if I have some independent knowledge of the case. Litigants
usually have independent knowledge of the merits of the proceedings to which they are
parties. As a losing litigant, I may, even after discounting for my own self interest,
have a well-founded belief that the judgment against me is in error. Moreover, losing
litigants will not always be able to discount for their self-interest, and hence will
frequently have an ill-founded belief that unfavorable judgments are in error.
So a system of procedure cannot always confer legitimacy on outcomes by
providing either objectively or subjectively adequate assurance that the outcomes the
system produces are correct or even likely to be correct. The fact of irreducible
procedural error raises what we might call the hard question of procedural justice: How
can we regard ourselves as obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a
judgment that we believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive
merits? The deflationary view of procedural justice, which claims that procedural
justice can be reduced to justice in outcomes, cannot easily provide an answer to this
question. When we know the outcome to be unjust, the justice of the outcome cannot
be the source of its legitimate authority. This conceptual point has a crucial corollary:
only just procedures can confer legitimate authority on incorrect outcomes.
Untangling the complex strands of argument that contain an answer to the hard
question of procedural justice is the enterprise undertaken in this article. But even at
this early stage, we can glimpse the broad outlines of an answer. We can regard
7
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ourselves as legitimately bound by an erroneous judgment if it results from a procedure
that affords us a meaningful opportunity to participate in a process that strikes a
reasonable balance between the goal of accurate outcomes and the inevitable costs
imposed by any system of dispute resolution. Procedural justice is the route to
reconciliation with substantive error. Adjudicative procedures create legal norms, and
like other norm creating procedures, rights of participation are essential to their
legitimacy. This idea—which we shall call “the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis”—
will be explicated in due course.17
B. A Roadmap to the Argument
This Article responds to the challenge posed by the hard question of procedural
justice. That theory is developed in several stages, beginning with some preliminary
questions and problems. The first question—what is procedure?—is the most difficult
and requires an extensive answer: Part II, “Substance and Procedure,” defines the
subject of the inquiry by offering a new theory of the distinction between substance and
procedure that acknowledges the entanglement of the action-guiding roles of
substantive and procedural rules while preserving the distinction between two ideal
types of rules. Part III, “The Foundations of Procedural Justice,” lays out the premises
of general jurisprudence that ground the theory and answers a series of objections to
the notion that the search for a theory of procedural justice is a worthwhile enterprise.
These two sections set the stage for the more difficult work of constructing a theory of
procedural legitimacy.
That work begins in Part IV, “Views of Procedural Justice,” which investigates the
theories of procedural fairness found explicitly or implicitly in case law and
commentary. After a preliminary inquiry that distinguishes procedural justice from
other forms of justice, Part IV focuses on three models or theories. The first theory, the
accuracy model, assumes that the aim of civil dispute resolution is correct application
of the law to the facts. The second theory, the balancing model, assumes that the aim
of civil procedure is to strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of
adjudication. The third theory, participation model, assumes that the very idea of a
correct outcome must be understood as a function of process that guarantees fair and
equal participation. In Part V, “The Value of Participation,” the lessons learned from
analysis and critique of the three models are then applied to the question whether a
right of participation can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either its
effect on the accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication. The most important
result of Part V is the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis: it is (usually) a condition for the
fairness of a procedure that those who are to be finally bound shall have a reasonable
opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

17
The Participatory Legitimacy Thesis is developed and defended in Part V, “The Value of
Participation,” infra.
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The central normative thrust of Procedural Justice is developed in Part VI,
“Principles of Procedural Justice.” The first principle, the Participation Principle,
stipulates a minimum (and minimal) right of participation, in the form of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, that must be satisfied (if feasible) in order for a procedure to
be considered fair. The second principle, the Accuracy Principle, specifies the
achievement of legally correct outcomes as the criterion for measuring procedural
fairness, subject to four provisos, each of which sets out circumstances under which a
departure from the goal of accuracy is justified by procedural fairness itself. In Part
VII, “The Problem of Aggregation,” the Participation Principle and the Accuracy
Principle are applied to the central problem of contemporary civil procedure—the
aggregation of claims in mass litigation. Part VIII offers some concluding observations
about the point and significance of Procedural Justice.
II. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
The first question that any theory of procedural justice must face is the obvious one:
“What is procedure?” The second question follows directly from the first: “How can
procedure be distinguished from substance?” Without some account of the substanceprocedure distinction, the subject-matter of such a theory of procedural justice is not
well-defined. But as we all know, the substance and procedure problem is a tough nut
to crack. This purpose of this section is to put the theory of procedural justice on a
solid foundation by providing a fully adequate account of the nature of procedure and
the ways in which it is distinguishable from substance.
A. Substance and Procedure through the Lens of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
The distinction between substance and procedure distinction can be approached
from many directions. We might attempt to begin a priori conceptual analysis, starting
with general and abstract concepts of substance and procedure. Or we might begin a
posteriori by compiling a list of legal rules that ordinary legal usage counts as
procedural in nature—then moving inductively to general definitions. Yet another
possible starting point is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins,18 the case that gave rise to the familiar idea that when federal courts hear
state law claims, they are obligated to apply state substantive law but may apply the
federal rules that are procedural in nature. Erie and its progeny created a task for
courts and commentators—establishing criteria that sort substance from procedure.
Every lawyer educated in American procedure knows that this task created an enduring
18

304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie literature is vast. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722-25 (1974); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the
State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998) [hereinafter Freer, Some Thoughts];
Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989); Martin H. Redish &
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91
HARV. L. REV. 356, 364-65 (1977).
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problem for judges and lawyers. Justice Reed’s concurring opinion in Erie stated that
problem succinctly: “The line between procedure and substance is hazy.”19 Hazy,
indeed—as generations of American law students have learned to their chagrin. More
than sixty years of Erie jurisprudence has yet to result in any clear consensus on the
line between substance and procedure.
1. Why Start with Erie?
The Erie doctrine is notoriously complex and obscure; moreover, Erie is linked to
considerations of federalism that are tangential to procedural justice. Nonetheless, Erie
and its progeny have produced a substantial body of judicial opinion and scholarship
that addresses the question “What is procedure?” in a wide variety of concrete contexts.
Moreover, because Erie has been the context in which the substance and procedure
problem has arisen for procedure scholars in the United States, it provides a common
conceptual vocabulary that is well suited to the task at hand.20 Any discussion of
substance and procedure that does not start with Erie will nonetheless be interpreted by
American judges, layers, and legal academics with Erie’s legacy in mind. In a sense,
the question—“What is procedure?”—begins with Erie—whether we like it or not.
Although proceduralists associate inquiry into the line between substance and
procedure with Erie, that case itself did little more than introduce the problem. Erie
addressed the question whether federal courts could substitute their own judgments
about the content of the common law for the judgments of state courts. Justice
Brandeis’s Opinion for the Court answered this question in the negative: “there is no
general federal common law.”21 The majority opinion in Erie uses the word
“substantive” only once,22 and does not discuss procedure at all. The relationship
between substance and procedure, however, was the subject of a famous sentence in
Justice Reed’s concurring opinion: “The line between procedure and substance is
hazy,” goes the passage quoted in part above, but “no one doubts federal power over
procedure.”23 So what is the line between substance and procedure? Or if these two
sets are overlapping, what makes a legal rule substantive, procedural, both, or neither?

19

Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).

20

Of course, there are other important contexts. Closely related to the vertical choice of law
context in Erie is horizontal choice of law. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 122
(1971) (“A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be
conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the
case.”); see also Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can
Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999). The locus classicus is Walter Wheeler
Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
21

304 U.S. at 78.

22

See id.

23

Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
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More radically, must we accept Linda Mullenix’s conclusion, that the line between
substance and procedure “is inherently unresolvable.”24
2. The Inadequacy of Intuitionist Formalism
One approach to the substance-procedure distinction is the claim that “substance”
and “procedure” have intuitively accessible meanings.25 We know that torts, contracts,
and property, are substance—these paradigm cases might serve as a premise for our
reasoning. We could then add another premise: we know that jurisdiction, pleading,
joinder, and discovery are procedures—again, we have paradigm cases. This general
approach illustrated by Richard Freer in the following passage: “[W]hatever
"substantive" means, it clearly encompasses the standard of tort liability to an invitee,
which was at issue in Erie.”26 Moreover, when courts are required to distinguish
substance and procedure, they often fail to provide any criteria for their
classifications.27 From these premises, we might conclude that the line between
substance and procedure can be drawn in a fashion analogous to Justice Potter
Stewart’s method for sorting pornography into the categories of works that are obscene
and those that are not: we may know it when we see it.28 We might call this approach
to the substance and procedure problem “intuitionist formalism.”29
Whatever the virtues of intuitionist formalism as a decision procedure for practical
purposes, it will not do for the purpose of defining the scope of a theory of procedural
justice. That purpose requires more than a set of paradigm cases of procedural and
substantive rules. And it requires more than an ability to do ad hoc sorting of particular
procedures. Why? Because a theory of procedural justice must be formulated in

24

Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997).
25

The distinction between substance and procedure might be understood as purely nominal.
A nominalist theory of procedure would hold that a given legal rule is procedural if and only if
we call it “procedural.” If it is the case that the two sets of legal rules (substance and procedure)
are nothing more than names given to arbitrary collections, then it should follow that there can be
no adequate theory of procedural justice.
26

Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. at 1102.

27

Id. at 1108-1110.

28

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).
29

Michael Moore calls this aproach “the paradigm case theory,” which he sees as a
“conventionalist theory of meaning.” See Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 295 (1985).
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abstract and general terms,30 the content of a theory of procedural justice necessarily
requires a domain of application.
Moreover, there are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of intuitionist formalism as a
practical decision procedure. If Erie has any lesson, it is that Justice Reed’s
observation—the line between substance and procedure is hazy—has been vindicated
by experience. No one familiar with the cases is likely to concur with the observation
that we can sort substance from procedure because “we know it when we see it.” Quite
the contrary, the lesson of Erie is that we often fail to see it even when we know it.
Many of the settled issues in Erie jurisprudence remain hazy even after they are
resolved.31
Nonetheless, our intuitions (or better “considered judgments”) about particular
cases are certainly relevant to the inquiry at hand. An adequate theory of substance and
procedure must account for ordinary language and for the settled judgments of
competent legal practitioners (scholars, judges, and lawyers). A theory of substance
and procedure must either count pleading and joinder as procedural and classify the
duty of care in negligence as substantive or offer a compelling explanation as to why
our considered conviction about these paradigm cases is in error.
3. Outcome Determination: Ex Ante and Ex Post
Does the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence have anything to teach us about
substance and procedure? The first place to look is surely the case in which the Court
itself first attempted to develop a deep answer to the question, Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York.32
Outcome Determination: Ex Post from Termination. Simplifying greatly, the issue
in York was whether a state statute of limitations or the federal equitable doctrine of
laches would determine the question whether an action for breach of fiduciary duty
would be time-barred; the former doomed the claim, while the latter allowed it to go

30

This is not to say that we could not offer microtheories that address the fairness of
particular procedures. For example, we could articulate a microtheory of procedural fairness that
took pleading rules as its domain. Such a theory would require criteria for what counts as a
pleading rule, but it would not necessarily require an answer to the question whether and why
pleading rules are procedural in nature. One might produce a microtheory for each and every
legal rule that our intuitions counted as procedural. The set consisting of these microtheories
might then be said to comprise a “theory of procedural justice,” but it would be more natural to
say that if microtheories are the best we can do, then there is no macrotheory of procedural
justice.
31
Examples are numerous. Statutes of limitations are considered substantive for Erie
purposes, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), but intuitive formalism suggests
the opposite result—that limitations periods are procedural rather than substantive in nature.
32

326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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forward.33 Given Justice Reed’s statement in Erie, one might think that this question
would turn on the question whether statutes of limitations should be classified as
substantive or procedural. Justice Frankfurter’s Opinion for the Court in York suggests
that this question is not well framed:
Matters of 'substance' and matters of 'procedure' are much talked about in
the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole
domain of law. But, of course, 'substance' and 'procedure' are the same keywords to very different problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure'
represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending
upon the particular problem for which it is used. . . . And the different
problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are in common use in
connection with situations turning on such different considerations as those
that are relevant to questions pertaining to ex post facto legislation, the
impairment of the obligations of contract, the enforcement of federal rights in
the State courts and the multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws.34
Frankfurter’s suggestion is that the terms “substance” and “procedure” take on different
meanings in different contexts. What is substantive in one context may be procedural
in another. If that were all that Frankfurter said, then York might suggest that the
search for a general theory of procedural fairness is doomed to failure, but that is not all
he said:
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a
matter of 'procedure' in some sense. The question is whether such a statute
concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as
recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem,
namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a State court?35
The italicized clause might provide us with a test for the line between “substance” and
“procedure.” That is, we might say that if a legal rule is outcome determinative ex post
from the point of view of the termination of the litigation, then the rule is substantive,
but if a legal rule did not determine who won or lost from the ex post perspective, then
it is procedural. In York, the choice between the federal equitable doctrine of laches
and the state statute of limitations was outcome determinative; under the former rule,
33
Id. at 100-101; see also id. at 107 (stating “this case reduces itself to the narrow question
whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit because there is
diversity of citizenship between the parties.”).
34

Id. at 108.

35

Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
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the action should have been allowed to go forward, but under the latter rule, the action
would have been barred.
Is this an adequate criterion for the sorting of legal rules into the categories of
substance and procedure? The answer is “no,” for reasons that are adumbrated in Chief
Justice Warren’s opinion in Hanna v. Plumer.36 In Hanna, the plaintiff brought a statelaw claim in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The defendant was
served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which allowed process to be left
at the defendant’s home with a responsible person. Under Massachusetts law, in-hand
service was required. Is the choice between these rules outcome-determinative? Chief
Justice Warren answered:
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is
applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point 'outcomedeterminative' in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply, respondent
prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs, the litigation will
continue. But in this sense every procedural variation is 'outcomedeterminative.' For example, having brought suit in a federal court, a plaintiff
cannot then insist on the right to file subsequent pleadings in accord with the
time limits applicable in state courts, even though enforcement of the federal
timetable will, if he continues to insist that he must meet only the state time
limit, result in determination of the controversy against him.37
Why does every procedural variation seem outcome-determinative, post hoc, from the
perspective of the termination of litigation? The assumption upon which the reasoning
of Hanna rests is that procedural rules are enforced through outcome-affecting
rulings.38 That is, if you fail to serve process in compliance with the service of process
rule, the sanction is that your action is dismissed. If you fail to plead in accord with the
pleading rules, then you are subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
(or a demurrer). If you fail to properly join a defendant, you claim against that
defendant will not be heard. This criticism of the York outcome-determination test is
generally considered to be decisive. For our purposes, the point is that outcomedetermination from ex post perspective of the termination of the litigation will not serve
as the criterion for what counts as procedure for the purpose of a theory of procedural
justice. In that context, the proper formulation of the test would be whether a given

36

380 U.S. 460 (1965).

37

380 U.S. at 468-69 (emphasis added).

38

There is an ambiguity in this formulation. Some rulings affect the outcome of a particular
civil action, but do not preclude the claim. For example, a dismissal based on jurisdiction
(personal or subject-matter) may terminate the immediate civil action, but the claim may be
refiled in another court. The general rule is that claim preclusive (res judicata) effect is only
given to judgments that are “on the merits.” See Lawrence Solum, Claim Preclusion or Res
Judicata, 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 1997).
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procedural rule could affect the outcome of the litigation. Application of the test will
yield the conclusion that the set of procedural legal rules is empty.39
Outcome Determination: Ex Ante from Initiation. If Hanna v. Plumer provides the
rationale for rejection of the ex post outcome determination test, it also articulates a
substitute test. Rather than asking whether a given legal rule is outcome-determinative
ex post, we can instead whether it is outcome-determinative ex ante from the point of
view of the initiation of the action. As Chief Justice Warren put it:
Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules
would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum. Petitioner, in
choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where application of
the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule
would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served.40
The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test seems a more promising
candidate for a general test of the line between substance and procedure. Our
considered judgment is that the rules of tort, contract, and property law are substantive.
And these rules are outcome determine from the point of view of a litigant choosing a
forum, ex ante at the time litigation is initiated.
Consider the following example. Suppose there is a case where the choice is
between two standards for the duty of care in negligence law. One jurisdiction
employs Judge Learned Hand’s test and balance the cost of precaution against the
injury discounted by the probability of its occurrence (the B<PL formula). Another
jurisdiction asks whether the level of care falls below that of the ordinary citizen (the
median level of care in the relevant community). For a wide range of cases, these
standards of care will be identical, but where they differ, the choice between them will
be outcome determinative from the ex ante perspective.
The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test also fits well with our
considered judgments about the paradigm cases of procedure. For example, service of
process, pleading, and joinder rules are considered procedural, but it would seem that
none of these is outcome determinative from the point of view a litigant choosing a
forum. Take the Hanna case as an example. So long as the service of process rule is
announced in advance, the plaintiff can comply with whatever rule is in effect.

39
More precisely, the proposed test makes the classification of a legal rule as substantive or
procedural depend entirely on the method by which the rule is enforced. Thus, pleading rules
become substantive if enforced by dismissal and procedural if enforced by fines. Measured
against our considered judgments, the ex post outcome-determination test is still inadequate.
Pleading rules and joinder rules are paradigm cases of procedural rules, whether they are
enforced by dismissal or by monetary sanctions.
40

380 U.S. at 469 (footnotes omitted).
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4. A Critique of Ex Ante Outcome Determination
Despite the first-blush attractiveness of Hanna’s ex ante version of the outcome
determination test, it is, in the end, wholly unsatisfactory for our purposes. Ex ante
outcome determination fails as the criterion for sorting rules into substance and
procedure for at least four reasons: (1) it fails to account for the existence of procedural
rules with substantive purposes, functions, and effects; (2) it cannot account for the ex
ante outcome-determinative nature of rule variations that systematically affect
accuracy; (3) it is unable to account for the ex ante outcome-determinative nature of
rule variations that systematically affect procedural costs; (4) it classifies forumselection rules (e.g. venue and jurisdictional rules) as substantive. Each of these points
deserves comment.
Procedural Rules with Substantive Purposes, Functions, and Effects. The first
failure of ex ante outcome determination is that it fails to account for the fact that
substantive rules can easily be cast in procedural guise. One way to illustrate this fact
is to examine the text of the Rules Enabling Act, the federal statute that authorizes the
Supreme Court to create rules of procedure and evidence for the federal trial courts.41
The Act provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.42
Section (a) of the Rules Enabling Act empowers the Supreme Court to create “general
rules of practice and procedure” while section (b) prohibits the Court from making
rules that “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights.” If substance and
procedure were two mutually exclusive categories, then 2072 (b) would be mere
surplusage. But as Paul Carrington succinctly expressed the point, “the terms
"substance" and "procedure" are not mutually exclusive.”43 That is, it is possible for a
procedural norm to alter a substantive right.
41

Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); see
also Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1282-86 (2002) (discussing the substance/procedure dichotomy and the federal rules
scheme).
42

28 U.S.C. § 2072.

43

Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke
L.J. 281, 287; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 471.
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How can procedure modify substance? Consider a simple hypothetical: suppose
that a pleading rule requires that plaintiffs provide the sort of detailed and
particularized information in their complaint that is usually under the control of the
defendant. Drawing on the model of Rule 9(b), which requires that fraud must be plead
with particularity, we could imagine a rule that requires a level of particularity that is,
in practice, unattainable. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
provides pleading rules44 for securities fraud actions that are far more difficult for
plaintiffs to meet than the transsubstantive rules of pleading contained in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.45 If the pleading burden is raised high enough, the effect
may be to change the substance of the law. A claim that cannot be successfully pled is
in one sense, no claim at all. Borrowing terminology from Professor Meir Dan
Cohen,46 the point is that rules of procedure provide decision rules (directed at
officials, e.g. judges) which can change the meaning of the conduct rules (directed at
ordinary citizens) with which they are associated. This change in meaning may take
time, because substance-affecting rules of procedure less transparent to the public than
are rules of substantive law. But as time passes and legal advice translates the
substance-affecting, procedural decision rules for those whose conduct is at issue, rules
of procedure may well become de facto rules of conduct.
Before proceeding any further, we should note that this criticism of the ex ante
outcome-determination test is not aimed at the usefulness of the test for Erie purposes.
Rather, our point is that this test cannot, by itself, provide the criterion by which we
define substance and procedure. Why not? Because the ex ante outcome-determination
test does not distinguish between the category of procedural rules with substantive
44

See, e.g., William D. Browning, Comment on 'The New Securities Fraud
Pleading Requirement,' 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1996); William S. Lerach & Eric Alan
Isaacman, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (1996); Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading
Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001); Elliott J. Weiss, The New
Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 675 (1996); Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193
(1998); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the
Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
903 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996); Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser,
Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 That the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998).
45

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 & 9.

46

Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).

17

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art2

20

Solum:

Lawrence Solum
effects and the category of purely substantive rules. This point is illustrated by Figure
One, below.
Figure 1: Substance and Procedure
Purely
substantive
rules

Purely
procedural
rules

Procedural rules with
substantive effects

Accuracy Effects. There is a second reason for rejecting the ex ante outcome
determination test: that test misclassifies rule variations that systematically affect the
accuracy of a system of procedure. Consider the following hypothetical. A litigant is
given the choice of two systems of procedure. The first system has hyper-technical
pleading rules and allows for almost no pretrial discovery. The second system has
simplified pleading rules and provides for extensive pretrial discovery. Assume for the
purposes of the hypothetical that the first system places a very high premium on
lawyering skill, and hence that it systematically produces inaccurate results in cases
where the litigant with the worse case on the merits has the better lawyer. This system
might well be viewed as outcome-determinative from the point of view of a plaintiff
choosing a forum. For example, a plaintiff with a weak case on the merits but a superb
lawyer might prefer system one, whereas a plaintiff with a strong case on the merits but
a weak lawyer might prefer system two.
The point of the hypothetical is that procedural systems may vary in systematic and
predictable ways with respect to accuracy. Because accuracy effects can be outcome
determinative from the ex ante point of view, they would be classified as substantive by
the Hanna ex ante outcome-determination test. But this result is inconsistent with
many of our considered pre-theoretical judgments about the line between substance and
procedure. Discovery and pleading rules do not automatically become substantive
because they can systematically affect accuracy. This conclusion needs to be qualified.
If the rules of discovery or pleading are substance specific, so that they disfavor (or
favor) particular plaintiffs with particular kinds of claims, then they can become quasisubstantive in nature. But setting this qualification to the side, we can conclude that
simply because procedural improvements can make the system more accurate in a
predictable way, we should not say that the difference between the less accurate
procedure and the more accurate procedure is a difference of substantive law.
Procedural Costs. The third failure of ex ante outcome determination is closely
related to the second. Some procedural systems are more costly than others, and this
18
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fact may be viewed as outcome-determinative from the point of view of a litigant
choosing a forum. As a plaintiff, if I must choose between two procedural systems, an
expensive system which will require that I expend more than the value of the claim to
get relief and a cheap system which will permit me to pursue my claim to judgment
without such an expenditure, then, from my point of when I am choosing a forum, this
choice is outcome determinative. Procedural systems impose a variety of costs,
including directly-charged fees, the costs of representation, and the costs imposed by
discovery.
Even though litigation costs may be outcome determinative from the point of view
of a litigant choosing a forum, it does not follow that costs transforms procedure into
substance. Once again, the outcome determination test seems to produce a false
positive for substance, sweeping in variations that are procedural in nature.
Forum-Selection Rules. The fourth failure of ex ante outcome determination is very
specific but nonetheless quite telling. Rules of jurisdiction and venue are paradigm
cases of procedural rules, but they are, of course, outcome determinative from the point
of view of a litigant choosing a forum. If the court lacks venue or jurisdiction, you
claim will be dismissed. Once again, the ex ante outcome-determination test fails to
sort properly.
Summary. In sum, Hanna’s ex ante version of the outcome determination test
simply is not appropriate for the job of sorting substance from procedure. As Justice
Harlan wrote in his Hanna concurrence:
In turning from the 'outcome' test of York back to the unadorned forumshopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like
oversimplification, for a simple forum-shopping rule also proves too much;
litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the
advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before
a supposedly more favorable judge.47
Both procedural rules and substantive rules may seem outcome-determinative from the
point of view of a litigant choosing a forum.
5. Primary Conduct and Litigation Conduct
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna suggests yet another approach to the
substance-procedure dichotomy. Harlan wrote:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a
state or a federal rule, whether 'substantive' or 'procedural,' is to stay close to
basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect

47

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional
system leaves to state regulation.48
The key phrase is “primary decisions respecting human conduct” and this test, although
never endorsed explicitly by the Supreme Court, has been influential in the Erie
context.49
The meaning of Harlan’s phrase can be explicated by a metaphor. Procedure, we
might say, regulates conduct inside the courtroom. Substance, on the other hand,
regulates conduct outside the courtroom.50 Of course, this is only a metaphor. By
“inside the courtroom,” we mean to refer not only to the literal courtrooms, but also to
clerks’ offices, conference rooms where depositions are taken, lawyers’ offices where
pleadings are drafted, and so forth. By “outside the courtroom,” we mean to refer to
the full range of human conduct (from driving automobiles to selling real estate and
entering into contracts); of course, such primary conduct may, as a matter of fact, take
place inside a courtroom—where torts may be committed, property sold, and contracts
made. The topographic metaphor—inside and outside the courtroom—stands for a
larger distinction.
So what distinction stands behind the metaphor? Serving process, drafting
complaints, and taking depositions are just as much “human conduct” as speeding,
buying a home, or entering into personal services contract. What marks out the latter
as “primary” (Harlan’s word)? The danger of circularity is apparent. We cannot use
“procedure” or “process” (or “substance” or “substantive”) to mark the distinction—
those are the terms for which we are seeking meaning.
But a second look at the metaphor is nonetheless revealing. Courts (as well as other
adjudicative institutions, such as administrative tribunals or arbitration firms) are
themselves identifiable. We know which institutions are courts are which are not. We
do know what lawsuits (or civil actions) are, and we know under what conditions
individuals (or firms or other entities) become parties to disputes and hence we also
know when individuals (or firms or other entities) are not engaged in litigation. So
when we speak of litigation related conduct, we are not begging the substanceprocedure question. Rather, we are appealing to relatively certain and stable usages
48

Id.

49

For example, Judge Richard Posner equates “substantive” with “designed to shape conduct
outside the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial
process.” S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th
Cir. 1995). Posner does not cite Harlan, but the connection is obvious as has been noted by
Professor Freer. See Freer, Some Thoughts, 76 Tex. L. Rev. at 1661. For a discussion of the
influence of Harlan’s formulation, see Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place:
Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 975 n. 33 (1996);
see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
46 n.200 (1985).
50
This is the metaphor that Posner adopts in the passage quoted in footnote 49. See S.A.
Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 310.
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that do not depend directly upon the answer to the substance-procedure question. And
once we are able to identify the contexts in which litigation (or arbitration, etc.) occurs,
we then have what we need to apply Harlan’s primary conduct test. A rule of law is
procedural if its function is to regulate adjudication-related conduct. A rule of law is
substantive if its function is to regulate conduct that occurs outside the context of
adjudication. A rule of law is both substantive and procedural if its function is to
regulate both kinds of conduct. Rules that have both procedural and substantive
functions may, nonetheless, have a function that it dominant or characteristic.51
There is yet another technique for explicating the meaning of Justice Harlan’s
phrase, “primary decisions respecting human conduct.” When looking at the outcomedetermination test, we employed two perspectives—ex post (looking back from the end
of litigation) and ex ante (looking forward from the point just before litigation has
begun). We can, however, move the ex ante perspective back in our stylized
chronology of a dispute—to the point in time that precedes the conduct that gave rise to
the dispute. In other words, we can look at a dispute ex ante from the point in time
before the accident occurred, before the contract negotiations began, etc. From that
perspective, we can ask the question whether the legal rule in question would have
altered the ways the parties to dispute would behave before litigation commenced.
From this perspective, we might say that substantive rules are those that would alter
pre-dispute conduct52 (“primary conduct”).
51

In the text, I used the word “function” in a crucial role, and I have chosen that word rather
than two others: “effect” and “purpose.” We might define the line between substance and
procedure by referring to the effects of legal rules: tort law effects primary conduct; pleading
rules effect litigation-related conduct. Or we might draw the same line by inquiring into the
purpose of legal rules: contract law is intended to regulate agreements outside of the litigation
context, whereas joinder rules are intended to affect the way lawsuits are put together and taken
apart. “Function” is a sort of weasel word, which takes rules themselves as having a purpose or
telos, which end is revealed in part by the effects that the rule has. The choice between effect,
purpose, and function is not trivial, but for our purposes, we need not tarry long over this point.
It may turn out that all three notions (function, purpose, and effect) are needed, and when the
three diverge, the line between substance and procedure becomes ambiguous. That possibility,
however, does not threaten the distinction. Many concepts are ambiguous in particular contexts,
but that does not prevent them from being useful.
52

The emphasis on “pre-dispute conduct” brings out an important fact about the relationship
between procedure and conduct that occurs after the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
of the lawsuit but before a complaint is filed. During this period, the parties may interact in a
variety of ways: a demand letter may be dispatched, a settlement offer made and rejected, or
informal mediation may occur. These activities take place “in the shadow of the law,” both
substantive and procedural. When parties settle, they calculate their expected liability or
expected recovery minus litigation costs. In a very real sense, this bargaining takes place “in the
shadow of procedure.” Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Search
Term Begin Shadow Search Term End of the Search Term Begin Law Search Term End : The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 993-95 (1979); Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans
Brown, & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of
Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992).
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The ex ante perspective of a person deciding how to act before a dispute arises was
employed by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as an argument for the
application by a forum of its own procedural rules to a dispute in which the substantive
law may be that of a different jurisdiction:
Parties do not usually give thought to matters of judicial administration
before they enter into legal transactions. They do not usually place reliance on
the applicability of the rules of a particular state to issues that would arise only
if litigation should become necessary. Accordingly, the parties have no
expectations as to such eventualities, and there is no danger of unfairly
disappointing their hopes by applying the forum's rules in such matters.53
The Restatement paints with a brush too broad. In fact, rules of judicial administration
can directly affect the way that litigants behave before disputes arise. Strict pleading
rules may actually have the function (effect and/or purpose) of assuring potential
defendants that they can engage in certain conduct with the confidence that claims
based on such conduct will be dismissed at an early (and relatively low cost) stage of
litigation.
B. A Thought Experiment: Acoustic Separation of Substance and Procedure
So far, our approach to the substance and procedure question has been theoretically
cautious and mostly doctrinal—closely tied to the development of the Erie doctrine in
the context of concrete cases with particular facts. But before we proceed further, we
need to acquire a firm grasp on the abstract and general distinction (such as it is)
between substance and procedure. Such a grasp is elusive, precisely because of the
entanglement of substance and procedure. What is needed is a thought experiment that
will allow us to see substance and procedure in a simplified legal environment that
avoids the complex particularity of the actual legal world. If the actual world of
substance and procedure is a jungle, overgrown by intertwined strands of substance and
procedure, we need a desert landscape in which substance and procedure stand out in
splendid isolation.54
The requisite thought experiment posits a possible world in which citizens know
only the content of the substantive law, and only legal officials know the content of the
procedural law. We will explore the thought experiment in two stages, informal and
formal. The informal version aims to make the possible world of the thought
experiment vivid and simple enough for an immediate intuitive grasp. The formal
version aims to make this possible world precise and transparent.
53

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 122 Comment a (1971).

54

Cf. Willard van Orman Quine, On what there is, 2 REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS (1948)
reprinted in WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: LOGICOPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 4 (1953) (source of “desert landscapes” metaphor).
The irony in
borrowing the desert landscapes metaphor from Quine in the context of introducing possible
worlds talk flows from Quine’s commitment to ontological minimalism.
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1. The Informal Thought Experiment: The Cone of Silence
Start with the informal thought experiment. Imagine a possible world in which
legal institutions (judicial, legislative, and executive officials) are acoustically
separated from ordinary citizens (families, workers, businesses, churches, and so
forth). It helps me to picture the government complex—the executive office building,
the legislative assembly hall, the court of justice, and so forth—covered by a gigantic
cone of silence, 55 which prevents any information passing from legal institutions to
ordinary citizens or vice versa, with only a few exceptions. What are the exceptions?
First, a code of conduct (e.g. contract, criminal, property, and tort rules) is promulgated
by the legislature and allowed to pass through the cone of silence to the outside world,
where each citizen commits the code to memory. Second, information relevant to
particular legal disputes (e.g. documents, deposition transcripts, exhibits, and
witnesses) is allowed to pass through the cone into the legal system, where it is
processed by legal representatives and judges using a code of procedure. Third and
finally, judgments (orders to pay money damages, injunctions, and order for
incarceration) pass through the cone into the outside world. To those outside the cone
of silence, the system of adjudication is a black box (information flows in, statutes and
judgments flow out). The rules governing the operation of the courts inside the cone
are the rules of procedure. The rules governing the conduct of ordinary citizens outside
the cone are the rules of substance. Because of the acoustic separation between the
institutions of adjudication and the outside world of parties, disputes, and facts, the
categories of substance and procedure are well-defined and mutually exclusive.

55

The “cone of silence” is borrowed from Get Smart, an 1960s television sitcom, as depicted
below:

See Get Smart Photo Gallery, at http://www.cinerhama.com/getsmart/innovations.html (visited
January 7, 2004).
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2. The Formal Thought Experiment: The Possible World of Acoustic
Separation
This informal version of the thought experiment can be made precise by carefully
defining the conceptual tools used and by precisely specifying its conditions. To build
the formal version, we need to avail ourselves of three conceptual tools: (1) H.L.A.
Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules, (2) acoustic separation
between conduct and decision rules, and (3) possible worlds semantics. Each of these
three ideas requires brief explication:
•

Primary rules and secondary rules. The first conceptual tool is the
distinction between primary and secondary rules, made famous by
H.L.A. Hart in his magisterial book, The Concept of Law.56 Hart’s
distinction “discriminate[s] between two different though related
types”57 of rules:
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered
the basic of primary type, human beings are required to or
abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.
Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or
secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings
may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of
the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in
various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations.58
Secondary rules, in Hart’s sense, encompass the rules of contracts
and trusts, which permit private individuals to create, modify, and
extinguish primary obligations. And the set of secondary rules
encompasses the rules that define the powers of legislatures and
administrative agencies—powers to make general laws and rules that
create, modify, and extinguish both primary obligations and
secondary rules. Finally, and for our purposes crucially, secondary
rules allow adjudicators (courts and administrative tribunals to
determine the incidence and control the operation of other primary
and secondary rules in particular cases.

•

Acoustic separation between conduct rules and decision rules. The
second distinction that we need to formalize our thought experiment

56

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).

57

Id. at 80-81.

58

Id. at 81.

24

Published by Digital USD, 2004

27

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
is the idea of acoustic separation between conduct and decision
rules. The idea of acoustic separation is itself a metaphor made
more vivid by the picture of a cone of silence. Formulated in a more
rigorous way the idea of acoustic separation specifies domains
between which certain kinds of information does not flow. Here is
Dan-Cohen’s formulation of the idea of acoustic separation:
The general public engages in various kinds of conduct,
while officials make decisions with respect to members of
the general public. Imagine further that each of the two
groups occupies a different, acoustically sealed chamber.
This condition I shall call "acoustic separation." Now think
of the law as a set of normative messages directed to both
groups. In such a universe, the law necessarily contains two
sets of messages. One set is directed at the general public
and provides guidelines for conduct. These guidelines are
what I have called "conduct rules." The other set of
messages is directed at the officials and provides guidelines
for their decisions. These are "decision rules." 59
Dan-Cohen’s formulation is evocative but not formally complete.
“Acoustic separation” is insufficient, since information could flow
between the realms of conduct and decision through visual,
electronic, or other means. The formal requirement is that no
information regarding decision rules should pass from the one zone
to the other.
•

59

Possible worlds. In the actual world, there is only limited acoustic
separation between the officials addressed by rules of decision and
procedure, on the one hand, and citizens addressed by rules of
conduct and judgments, on the other. Our thought experiment
requires that we posit a hypothetical situation or possible world60—to
use the notion made famous by Leibniz61 and developed by the

Dan-Cohen, supra note 46.

60

See JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002) (providing a comprehensive introduction to
the issues raised by the philosophical idea of possible worlds).
61

The idea of possible worlds was introduced by Leibniz. See GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON
LEIBNIZ, The Theodicy in LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 509-11 (Philip P Weiner ed. 1951). Leibniz's
used the idea of a possible world in answer to the argument against the existence of good from
the problem of evil. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. Id. "World" here refers to the whole universe
through time and not just the planet Earth.
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contemporary philosophers Saul Kripke62 and David Lewis.63 The
point of thought experiment is not that that the actual world could
become this possible world at some point in the future. Nor does the
thought experiment require that the world of the thought experiment
be consistent with the laws of natural science and human psychology
and sociology that obtain in the actual world. The world of the
thought experiment is simply one that resembles the actual world,
except that acoustic separation obtains as specified. So long as we
can imagine this possible world as required by the though
experiment, further questions, such as the precise mechanism by
which acoustic separation would operate, need not be answered.
The formal thought experiment can be stated in a stripped-down version, which
contains the key features, but abstracts from the complex details of actual legal
systems. So, we can posit a possible world with the following characteristics:
1.
2.

There is a single political entity, the State.
All general rules of law are promulgated by a single unicameral legislature and
integrated into a Code.
3. All dispute resolution is accomplished through a unified judiciary which
consists of a single trial court, with a single judge and no jury. All legal
proceedings terminate in a judgment, which is an order that requires specific
actions by the parties to a dispute. All litigation costs including attorney’s fees
are borne by the state.
4. The Code is divided into four parts:
i. Part I is the Constitutional Code, which consists of secondary rules that
confer power on the legislature to enact, modify, or terminate provisions of
the Code.
ii. Part II is the Code of Conduct, which consists entirely of conduct rules that
are addressed to citizens, including primary rules (e.g. criminal prohibitions)
and secondary rules (e.g. contract law).
iii. Part III is the Code of Decision, which consists of decision rules addressed
to legal officials, which attach legal consequences (e.g. liabilities or
punishments) to violations of the primary and secondary rules either
contained in or authorized by Part II.
iv. Part IV is the Code of Adjudication, which consists of rules for conduct of
dispute resolution by the unified judiciary specified above. These rules
include (a) conduct rules for the legal representatives of parties to civil and
criminal procedures and (b) decision rules for judges that define the actions
the judges shall take in response to each possible action that could be
62

See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (rev. ed. 1981).

63

See DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986).
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5.

6.

7.

8.

undertaken by the legal representatives for the parties. These rules are
designed so that the relevant facts and provisions of the Code of Decision
are accurately presented to the judge.
The Constitutional Code requires the four part division of the Code that is
specified above and further specifies that all legal rules that aim at the
regulation of conduct shall be included in the Code of Conduct and that content
of the Code of Decision shall conform to the Code of Conduct. The
Constitutional Code also requires the Code of Adjudication to maximize
accuracy, e.g. to maximize the extent to which findings of fact are in
conformity with the state of the world and the extent to which the law is
correctly applied to the facts. Legislators do in fact conform to the provisions
of the Constitutional Code.
The Code is fully specified. For every possible action by citizens the code
permits, forbids, or requires the action and/or the code specifies that the action
can be permitted, forbidden, or required by a contract. For every possible
action by the legal representatives of parties in the course of representation, the
code specifies a legal consequence. Every possible action by legislative,
judicial, and executive officials is either required, prohibited, or permitted by
the Code.
Each natural person is either a citizen or an official. The class of officials
includes members of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as
lawyers and their staffs. Officials act only in their official capacity and act in
full compliance with the provisions of the code.
There is acoustic separation between substance and procedure, specified as
follows: (a) each citizen knows the content of Part II of the Code, but no citizen
is aware of the content of Parts I, III, or IV of the Code; (b) legislative and
executive officials are aware of the whole content of the Code; (c) judicial
officials and lawyers are only aware of the content of Parts I, III, and IV of the
code; (d) citizens have no knowledge of the content of legal proceedings with
one exception: parties to a dispute do know the content of the judgments of
their legal proceeding, and (e) citizens make no attempt to infer the content of
the Constitutional Code, the Code of Decision, or the Code of Adjudication
from the information they possess about the outcome of individual
adjudications.

The thought experiment can be made more concrete by imaging a particular case:
Ben drives negligently and hits Alice’s automobile. The Code of Conduct
contains a provision that specifies that negligent drivers will pay
compensation to their victims. Alice contacts her legal representative—by
passing a message through the barrier establishing acoustic separation.
Behind the barrier, Alice’s legal representative then initiates a proceeding
against Ben in the Court as specified by Code of Adjudication. Also pursuant
to the Code of Adjudication, Ben and Alice’s lawyers prepare pleadings,
conduct discovery, participate in a trial, and so forth—resulting in findings of
27
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fact and conclusions of law that accurately represent the state of the world and
the content of the Code of Decision. Information regarding Ben and Alice’s
conduct flows into the Court, but the proceedings take place in secret, without
information concerning their content flowing to Alice, Ben, or other citizens.
At the end of the proceedings, the judge applies the law to the facts and issues
a judgment requiring Ben to pay Alice $500 in damages. The judgment passes
through the barrier and is then communicated to Ben and Alice. Ben pays
Alice the $500.
In the world of acoustic separation between substance and procedure, we have no
difficulty drawing a precise bright line between substance and procedure. The
substantive law is divided into two parts, the Code of Conduct and the Code of
Decision.64 The procedural law is contained in the Code of Adjudication. Provisions
are sorted into the Parts of the Code by reference to (1) the audience to whom they are
addressed, and (2) the purposes for which they are enacted. Because of the provisions
of the Constitutional Code and the fact of acoustic separation, no provision of the Code
of Adjudication has any substantive effects or purposes. Because no officials are
citizens, the substantive law only affects adjudication through the Code of Decision.
So the pleading rules that govern Ben and Alice’s dispute are purely procedural.
The standard of care, on the other hand, is divided into two parts—a rule in the Code of
Conduct that is available to Ben and Alice and a rule in the Code of Decision that is not
available to Ben or Alice, but is available to attorneys and judges.
3. Implications of the Thought Experiment
Of course, the actual world is not the world of acoustic separation of substance and
procedure. For example, in the actual world, the Code of Conduct and the Code of
Decision are generally conjoined in a single set of provisions which are simultaneously
addressed to both citizens and officials. In the actual world, there is no guarantee of
acoustic separation. Citizens can become aware of the content of the procedural rules
and decision rules. In the actual world, legislatures can attempt to influence primary
conduct by citizens by varying the rules of procedure. Moreover, procedural rules may
have the unintended consequence of affecting conduct to the extent that they produce

64

The Code of Conduct is clearly substantive in the sense that it is aimed at the regulation of
primary conduct. The Code of Decision, however, is aimed at regulating the decisionmaking
processes of judges. Our thought experiment assumes, however, that the content of the two
codes are matched. Thus, if there is a provision in the Code of Conduct that says, “Murder is
prohibited,” then there will be a matching provision in the Code of Decision that states, “If some
person P, commits murder, then P shall serve a twenty year sentence in a prison.” Because
provisions of the Code of Decision regulate litigaton-related conduct, there is an important sense
in which they are also procedural. This point is explored below. See infra Part II.C.2,
“Procedural Substance” (discussing procedural functions of rules of decision).
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“inaccurate” results that can be systematically predicted. In the actual world, substance
and procedure are entangled.
Nonetheless, the thought experiment performs important functions for theorists who
wish to analyze the procedural and substantive dimensions of actual rules in which
these two dimensions are entangled. For any particular entangled rule, we can imagine
how that rule might be disentangled in the world of acoustic separation. By
disentangling mixed rules into discrete rules of conduct, decision, and adjudication, we
can identify their substantive and procedural aspects. The thought experiment gives us
a conceptual tool that allows us to see the strands of substance and procedure in
entangled rules clearly.
In other words, the thought experiment provides a rigorous way of “inquiring if the
choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct 65—to use Justice Harlan’s felicitous phrasing. That the method is rigorous
does not imply that it provides a determinate answer for every case. When we look at
the history of actual rules, their functions (purposes and effects) may be difficult to
discern. This is an epistemological problem—a problem that stems from our
incomplete knowledge of legislative purpose and causal relationships in the actual
world. This kind of epistemological problem may be of substantial practical
significance, but this does not entail that it undermines the ontological status of the
distinction between substance and procedure that is revealed by the thought
experiment.
Some further explanation is required. The view advanced here is that the line
between substance and procedure is an idealization. Useful application of the
idealization to the actual legal rules requires knowledge about the world. When that
knowledge is unavailable, we may have cases in which the characterization of an actual
rule as procedural or substantive is impossible as well as cases in which the strands of
substance and procedure cannot be untangled. Nonetheless, even in these cases the
thought experiment provides a means of identifying the knowledge that would be
decisive were it to become available.
The thought experiment performs another important function be providing a
mechanism by which we can distinguish form and function in the context of the
distinction between substance and procedure. In the world of the thought experiment,
procedural form maps perfectly onto procedural function, and substantive form
likewise maps perfectly onto substantive function. In the actual world, where acoustic
separation and purity of procedural intention are counterfactual, perfect mapping does
not hold. Nonetheless, the thought experiment provides a fairly precise and
analytically rigorous mechanism for identifying the formal and functional dimensions
of a given legal rule. In the actual world, we might then classify legal rules using a
two-by-two matrix:

65

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Table 1: Form and Function
Form
Substantive
Pure substantive
rule.

Substantive
Function

Procedural

Substantive form
with procedural
function.

Procedural
Procedural form
with substantive
function.
Pure procedural
rule.

This distinction between form and function is reflected in actual practice: for example,
legal rules are divided into “Codes of Procedure” (e.g. the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure) and “Codes of Conduct” (e.g. the California Criminal Code).
Finally, we should bear in mind that the point of the thought experiment is not to
provide a device that will allow actual rules to be sorted into rules of substance and
rules of procedure—although in some cases a rough and ready approximation of such
sorting may serve practical purposes. Quite the contrary, the point of the thought
experiment is to allow us to see more clearly how substance and procedure are
thoroughly entangled in the actual rules of existing legal systems.
C. The Entanglement of Substance and Procedure
The idea that substance and procedure are not mutually exclusive is a familiar one.
Justice Frankfurter wrote in the York case, “Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’
represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the
particular problem for which it is used.”66 The New Jersey Supreme Court has opined
that “it is simplistic to assume that all law is divided neatly between ‘substance” and
‘procedure.’”67 As Scott Matheson put it, “Law is the product of interaction between
substance and procedure, but the relationship between the two is more subtle and
complex than simply their joinder in litigation.”68 And finally, Frank Easterbrook
wrote: “Substance and procedure are intimately related. The procedures one uses
determine how much substance is achieved, and by whom. Procedural rules usually are
just a measure of how much the substantive entitlements are worth, of what we are
willing to sacrifice to see a given goal attained.”69
66

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).

67

Busik v. Levine 63 N.J. 351,364, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973).

68

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Personal Defamation Cases: The Impact of
the First Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 215 (1987).
69

Easterbrook, Substantive Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112-13.
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If the idea that substance and procedure are entwined is well accepted, the task that
remains is to explicate that entanglement with the aim of clarifying rather than
muddying the distinction between substance and procedure. What are the modes of
entanglement? How do substance and procedure overlap and interact? My answer to
these questions proceeds in steps. The initial step involves sorting the obvious cases of
overlapping substance and procedure into two heuristic categories: (a) substantive
procedure and (b) procedural substance. The initial category includes rules of law that
are primarily procedural in form, but have a procedural function: these are rule of
substantive procedure. The other category includes rules of law that are primarily
substantive in form, but have a procedural function: these are rules of procedural
substance. The next step is an exposition of the core idea of the entanglement thesis:
procedure is an essential component of the action-guiding function of substantive law.
1. Substantive Procedure
The idealization of a pure rule of procedure is premised on the assumption that
procedural rules regulate the sphere of adjudicative institutions—the courtroom, the
clerk’s office, the activities of attorneys. Similarly, the idealization of a pure rule of
substance posits that the function the substantive law is to regulate primary conduct—
the whole whirl of human activity outside adjudicative contexts. These idealizations
allow us to identify the formal and functional characteristics of substance and
procedure. For example, pleading rules are procedural in form, because they address
the litigation process and not primary conduct. But rules that are formally procedural
may have a substantive function. There are two types of rules that we might call
“substantive procedure.” Type one involves deliberate use of procedural forms to
modify substantive decision rules. Type two involves the action-guiding role of
procedures that particularize general legal norms. Let’s begin with type one, the
simplest case of substantive procedure.
Substantive Procedure: Type One—Procedural Rules with Intentionally Substantive
Functions. In the world of acoustic separation, procedural rules are ill-suited to the
function of regulating primary conduct—citizens cannot modify their behavior to
accord with procedural variations because they are acoustically isolated from the
adjudicative institutions. In the actual world, however, policymakers can take acoustic
leakage into account and manipulate procedural forms in order to achieve substantive
goals.70
A familiar example of a substantive rule cast in procedural form is the parole
evidence rule—which excludes oral evidence of the content of a written contract. The
“parole evidence rule” has the form of a rule of evidence, but it functions as a
substantive rule of law. To confirm this conclusion, we can perform the thought
70

See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. Leonetti, & Austin W. Bartlett, The Substantive
Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1999); Pamela J. Stephens,
Manipulation of Procedural Rules in Pursuit of Substantive Goals: A Reconsideration of the
Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1131 (1993).
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experiment of disentangling the substantive and procedural elements of the rule.
Suppose we thought that the parole evidence rule truly was a rule of evidentiary
procedure. In that case, the parole evidence rule would appear solely in the Code of
Adjudication in the possible world of acoustic separation. Contracting parties would be
unaware of the rule, and hence might try to modify or supplement their written
agreements by oral statements. On this interpretation, the parole evidence rule would
fail to perform its substantive function. The actual parole evidence rule is addressed to
contracting parties: the rule informs the parties that in the case of an integrated writing,
oral modifications or supplements do not have legal force. That is, the parole evidence
rule is a secondary rule (in H.L.A. Hart’s sense of “secondary”) of substantive law.
The parole evidence rule tells citizens what they must do to modify the primary rules of
conduct provided by a contract. Thus, in the world of acoustic separation, the parole
evidence rule would have two components: (1) a provision in the Code of Conduct—
addressed to contracting parties; (2) a provision in the Code of Adjudication—
addressed to judges. No special rule of evidence would be required, because parole
evidence of oral supplements or modifications would be excluded by the general rule of
relevance.
Another important example of a rule with substantive function and procedural form
is provided by the pleading provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA)71 and its sibling, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).72
The Reform act modifies the transsubstantive rules of pleading provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure73 in Rule 8(a)(2) and 9(b). Rule 8(a)(2) embodies the
principle of “notice pleading” and requires only a short and plain statement showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.74 Rule 9(b) provides that allegations of fraud must
be made with “particularity.”75 The general pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) requires
only a minimal level of factual detail.76 Even Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud be
71

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). See generally Note, What Congress Said About the Heightened
Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (1998); Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-By-Case Approach to Pleading
Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2265
(1999).
72

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(1998) (codified in scattered portions of 15 U.S.C.); see also David M. Levine & Adam C.
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's
Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1 (Nov. 1998); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:
Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL LAW REV. 1 (1998).
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See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002);
Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1749
(1998).
74

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

75

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

76

See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 9 (providing only sketchy information in model complaint
for negligence).
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pled “with particularity” was interpreted to allow plaintiffs to allege fraud by
specifying only the statement or conduct that was the basis of the allegation.77 Not all
false statements are fraudulent, and in the context of a securities fraud action,
predictions of future success may give rise to allegations of “fraud by hindsight” when
a business experiences unanticipated turbulence in the stream of commerce. But
defending securities fraud actions is expensive and the fact that the action is pending
may create uncertainties that interferes with the defendant firm’s ability to raise capital.
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit extensive and time-consuming
discovery and pretrial motion practice, claims that would eventually be defeated on the
merits may nonetheless alter primary conduct—e.g. the kinds of statements made on
behalf of firms to potential investors. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide tough standards for summary judgment78 and directed verdicts.79
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act adopts pleading standards that are
much tougher than those provided by Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b). For example, if the
complaint alleges a state of mind, it must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”80
Commentators on the Reform Act have observed that this language seems designed for
a substantive purpose. For example, Leslie M. Kelleher observes,
Partisan rule reformers recognized the importance of a particularity
requirement to the outcome of a case and bypassed the Advisory Committee
completely, taking their proposals for procedural amendments directly to
Congress. The strict pleading requirement of the PSLRA . . . is designed to
favor defendants over plaintiffs in securities lawsuits, not to implement some
carefully planned vision of the procedural system.81
And Professor Kelleher concludes:
The PSLRA is a clear illustration of the latest stage in the politicization of
procedure. With the PSLRA, Congress has gone further than ever in providing
procedural benefits to a particular group in order to vindicate the substantive
goals of the Act. As Congress and partisan lobbyists have discovered the
usefulness of procedural provisions in effectuating substantive purposes, the

77

See Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.Pa.1976) (reasoning that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) is satisfied if there is a sufficient identification of the circumstances constituting
fraud to allow a defendant to adequately answer the plaintiff's allegations).
78

FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

79

FED. R. CIV. P. 50.

80

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
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Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 60 (1998).
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hazy line between substance and procedure has been blurred further, and we
should expect to see even more instances of statutory procedural provisions.82
The PSLRA act is just one of many examples of type one (functionally substantive
rules cast in procedural form).83 The essential structure of this type of entanglement of
substance and procedure can be analyzed using the model of acoustic separation. What
the PSLRA does is to use procedural rules (i.e. rules that would be found in the Code
of Adjudication) to indirectly modify substantive decision rules (i.e. rules found in the
Code of Decision). Because of acoustic leakage, these modifications can have the same
effects as changes in the substantive conduct rules (i.e. the Code of Conduct).
Substantive Procedure: Type Two—Particularized Conduct Rules. The second type
of substantive procedure is more fundamental and pervasive than the first. Every civil
action involves procedures that are substantive in the sense that they function to
communicate particular rules of primary conduct—in other words, procedures that are
“action guiding.” The standard picture of substance and procedure is that substantive
rules of law function to guide primary conduct (outside the litigation process) whereas
procedural rules function to guide litigation-related conduct. But the standard picture
omits an important action-guiding function of procedure—the particularization of
general legal norms. Our exploration of type two of substantive procedure can begin
with examples and then proceed to a more abstract analysis.
A very clear example of the particularization function is provided the declaratory
judgment.84 Declaratory judgments have two critical features: (1) a declaratory
judgment takes a general legal rule and applies it to a particular factual context, and (2)
a declaratory judgment can resolve a dispute by guiding primary conduct. A
declaration that A’s work does not infringe B’s copyright enables A to enter into an
agreement with C to distribute the work; the opposite outcome would communicate a
message to C that distribution of the work would be contrary to law. A declaratory
judgment acts as a kind of particularized statute or ex post facto law; whereas statutes
declare obligations in general and abstract form, declaratory judgments legislative for
particular individuals (or entities) on particular occasions.
Declaratory judgments provide a particularly perspicuous example of actionguiding particularization of general legal norms, but they are not the only example.
Injunctions perform the same function, supplementing the declaration of rights with a
coercive order backed by the force of punishment. The action guiding function of
damage awards is not always as clear, because, on the surface, damage awards appear
to operate backwards (ex ante). Sometimes this is the case: sometimes a damage award
only guides action to the extent that it requires an act of payment in satisfaction of the
82

Id. at 61.
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See Parness, Leonetti, & Bartlett, supra note 70. (listing as examples (1) federal securities
claims, (2) New Jersey and Georgia professional malpractice claims, (3) medical malpractice
claims, (4) requests for punitive damages, (5) childhood sexual abuse claims, and (6) federal civil
rights claims).
84

See supra n. 15 (collecting sources on declaratory judgments).
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judgment. But this is not always the case. Sometimes a damage award guides behavior
by informing the parties (and others) about their particular legal obligations toward one
another. Similarly, the doctrines of claim preclusion (or res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel) guide action by making judgments, findings, and
rulings explicitly binding on parties in contexts outside the four corners of a particular
civil action.85
These examples of the action-guiding particularization of general legal norms are
not accidental or exceptional. In the introduction, we established that the actual world
is characterized by three problems of compliance with substantive legal norms: (1) the
problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality.86 The possible world of
acoustic separation of substance and procedure allows us to appreciate the significance
of procedure’s particularization function. When I laid out the conditions that specify
acoustic separation, I stipulated that action-guiding outcomes (declaratory judgments,
injunctions, and damage awards) could pass through the acoustic barrier. This
specification was necessary for law to function effectively. If citizens were not allowed
to learn of judgments, then the substantive law would effectively be crippled by the
problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality. This fact
leads to an important conclusion about the relationship between substance and
procedure: even an idealized model of substance and procedure requires procedures to
play the substantive role of action-guiding particularization of legal norms. This
conclusion is important because it demonstrates the essential entanglement of substance
and procedure.
2. Procedural Substance
The entanglement of substance and procedure takes another form. Rules that are
substantive in form may serve procedural functions. In the world of acoustic
separation, courtrooms are insulated from the general rules of primary conduct. In the
real world, rules aimed at primary conduct also regulate the litigation process. There
are two types of procedural substance. Type one involves particular conduct rules that
directly impact the litigation process. Type two involves the more general relationship
between conduct rules and decision rules.
Procedural Substance: Type One—Formal Conduct Rules with Intentionally
Procedural Functions. In the world of acoustic separation of substance and procedure,
the Code of Conduct does not impinge on the system of adjudication. In the actual
world, no acoustic barrier prevents application of general rules of primary conduct to
85

The doctrine of issue preclusion, for example, has the effect of transforming factual and
legal determinations in every case into the functional equivalent of declaratory judgments. What
is “declared” in a summary judgment, verdict, finding of fact, or concluson of law in a prior
adjudication, becomes binding on the parties to that adjudication.
86

See supra, Part I.A, “Where to Begin? Ex Ante and Ex Post Perspectives. »
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litigation-related behavior. Given this fact, procedural functions can be performed by
rules cast in substantive guise. Among the many examples of such rules are criminal
statutes prohibiting obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and destruction of
evidence and the tort of spoliation of evidence.87 These rules are substantive in form—
criminal law and tort law are classified as substantive—but these substantive rules have
procedural functions, deterring the destruction of evidence and correcting the injustices
caused by procedural irregularities.
Procedural Substance: Type Two—Particularized Decision Rules. In the world of
acoustic separation, what we ordinarily call the substantive law was divided into two
parts,
the
Code
of
Conduct addressed to citizens and the Code of Decision addressed to judges. But the
actual world of litigation does not involve this sort of acoustic separation. In the actual
world, the articulation of the substantive law by appellate courts (as opposed to
legislatures) always takes place in a particular procedural context.
One such context is the motion for judgment as a matter of law (the demurrer in
some state systems or the 12(b)(6) motion in federal court).88 Whether a demurrer is
granted depends on the substantive law (the rules of conduct and decision), but the
articulation of standards for granting or denying a demurrer will be phrased in terms of
pleading. The pleading of some facts may be required for a particular cause of action;
the pleading of other facts will defeat a claim.
Another context is the decision of a summary judgment motion.89 Whether a
summary judgment motion is granted depends on the substantive law, but the
articulation of the standards for granting such motions will require appellate courts to
decide when “a genuine issue of material fact” exists and when it doesn’t.
Operationally, summary judgment standards will require that affidavits, documents, or
discovery responses containing certain types of facts be put before the court. Once
again, the substantive law is translated into standards for resolution of a procedural
question. Structurally, summary judgment is similar to motions for judgment as a
matter of law (directed verdict of judgment notwithstanding the verdict).90
A final example of the translation of substance into procedure is the jury
instruction. Rules governing jury instructions are clearly procedural in the sense that
they regulate conduct inside the courtroom. The rules governing jury instructions
translate rules of conduct and decision into rules of procedure. When an appellate
court reviews a trial court’s jury instruction, it performs a dual function. On the one
hand, it reviews the substance of the instruction de novo. On the other hand, it reviews
the form of the instruction for an abuse of discretion. This dual standard of review
87

See generally JAMIE GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN, & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE (John Wiley & Sons 1989); Stephen Marzen & Lawrence Solum, Truth and
Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L. J. 1085 (1987).
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FED. R. OF CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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FED. R. OF CIV. P. 56.
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FED. R. OF CIV. P. 50.

36

Published by Digital USD, 2004

39

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
reflects the entanglement of substance and procedure that is inherent in the process of
instructing a jury. Jury instructions are procedures, but they are procedures that
transform the abstract and general principles of substantive law into concrete and
particular guidelines for deliberation.
D. The Entanglement Thesis
We are now in a position to appreciate the various modalities of entanglement
between substance and procedure. Rules that are formally procedural nonetheless
perform substantive functions, e.g. the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act or
declaratory judgments. Rules that are formally substantive perform procedural
functions, e.g., the spoliation tort or the substantive standards for demurrers or
summary judgments. Table 2 summarizes the modalities of entanglement.
Table 2: Modalities of Entanglement

Type I

Type II

Substantive Form
Procedural Function
Type I: Formal Conduct
Rules with Intentionally
Procedural Functions
Example: Spoliation tort

Procedural Form,
Substantive Function
Type I: Procedural
Rules with Intentionally
Substantive Functions
Example: PSLRA

Type II: Particularized
Decision Rules
Example: Particularized
standard for summary
judgment

Type II: Particularized
Conduct Rules
Example: Declaratory
judgment

In both the case of substantive procedure and the case of procedural substance,
entanglement comes in two types. The first kind of entanglement (Type I) is most
easily recognized. When a legislature intentionally uses a procedural form to achieve a
substantive end, the entanglement between substance and procedure becomes
unmistakable. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the spoliation tort both
involve a deliberate crossing of the line between substance and procedure. Type I
entanglement is important because it draws our attention to the fact that substantive
forms can be used to achieve procedural ends and vice versa.
But the second type of entanglement (Type II) is more fundamental and pervasive.
Type II entanglement implicates every rule of procedure and every substantive law.
Every legal proceeding is the source of particularized conduct rules. Every rule of
substantive law is transformed into rules of pleading, summary adjudication, and jury
instructions. Type II entanglement involves two kinds of particularization. First,
general and abstract conduct rules are transformed into particular resolutions of claims
and issues resulting in judgments that announce or imply standards of conduct that are
37
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concrete and contextualized to individual cases. Second, general and abstract rules of
procedure are transformed into particular standards for the resolution of motions for
judgments on the pleadings, summary judgment, and jury instructions.
The pervasiveness of particularization involved in Type II entanglement is a
necessary feature of any system of adjudication. In the introduction, we explored the
reasons why particularization is necessary. Abstract and general rules must be applied
to concrete and particular facts and procedural histories. And this process of
application must respond to the three problems that we have identified: (1) the problem
of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of
legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Type II entanglement is the inevitable
byproduct of the particularization required to overcome the problems of imperfect
knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality. Without Type II entanglement, the
rubber would not meet the road—that is, general and abstract rules would not be
applied. Although I have expressed this idea in a novel framework, my core thesis has
been expressed by others in a variety of ways. Geoffrey Hazard puts it this way:
“Substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.”91
The entanglement thesis is simply the idea that the entanglement of substance and
procedure required by the application of abstract rules to concrete cases is a pervasive
feature of adjudication. This thesis can be confirmed by consulting our thought
experiment of acoustic separation between substance and procedure. In the world of
acoustic separation, Type I entanglement disappears. The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act could not achieve its goals in a world where those who issue securities
were completely unaware of the operations of the adjudication process; an attempt to
enact such a provision would violate the constitutional requirement that all conduct
rules be promulgated in the Code of Conduct. But even in the world of acoustic
separation, Type II entanglement would be pervasive. This is reflected in the fact that
the acoustic separation between substance and procedure cannot be made complete in
any possible world without magical connections between primary actors and the courts.
For the system to work, facts must flow from the world of conduct into the world of
adjudication and judgments must travel in the reverse direction.
E. Substance and Procedure Restated
Justice Reed’s Erie concurrence was premised on a picture of the relationship
between substance and procedure. Substance was one thing, and procedure another—
although the line between the two might be hazy. The development of Erie doctrine
involves a series of attempts to operationalize this distinction—to render that which is
hazy, clear. The outcome-determination test (in both its original form and as
reinterpreted in Hanna) may have merit as a test for the resolution of Erie problems,
but it is an utter failure for the purpose of distinguishing substance and procedure. A
91
Geoffrey Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action on Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307
(1973)

38

Published by Digital USD, 2004

41

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
more promising approach for that task was suggested by Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Hanna—premised on the notion that substantive law regulates primary conduct and
procedural law regulates the adjudicative process. But Harlan’s suggestion runs into
the problem of entanglement—as exemplified by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, which intentionally uses procedural forms to achieve substantive goals.
The thought experiment of acoustic separation of substance and procedure allows us to
precisely characterize this kind of entanglement by comparing actual legal rules to the
form that they would take in a world where the system of adjudication was isolated
from the realm of primary conduct. The thought experiment allows us to distinguish
the various modalities of entanglement between substance and procedure, resulting in a
typology of substantive procedure and procedural substance. A closer examination of
the types of entanglement yielding the conclusion that one source of entanglement—the
need to particularize general rules of substance and procedure—is ineliminable, even
through use of the thought experiment of acoustic separation.
The upshot of our investigation is not a deconstruction of the distinction between
substance and procedure. Quite the contrary, the thought experiment of acoustic
separation yields a precise analytic tool for appreciating procedural forms and
functions. But this conceptual apparatus also allows us to appreciate the ineliminable
and inherent entanglement of substance and procedure. For the purposes of a theory of
procedural justice, the important conclusion is that procedures particularize abstract
and general substantive rules. That is, the real work of procedure is to provide
particular action-guiding legal norms.
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
We have begun to lay the foundation for a theory of procedural justice by giving an
account of the nature of procedure. This Part of the essay completes the foundation by
laying out the jurisprudential assumptions of the theory of procedural justice. The trick
is to say enough about jurisprudential foundations to make the substance of the theory
clear while avoiding unnecessary forays into the thorny and intractable problems of
legal philosophy. This foundational work begins in Section A, “The Jurisprudential
Framework for the Theory,” which briefly sketches a plausible relationship between
Procedural Justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. In Section B,
“The Role of Public Reason,” I introduce an important qualification of Dworkin’s
view: political morality requires legal justifications to rely on public reasons, with the
implications that the theory of procedural justice introduced here must be grounded in
arguments that are accessible to the public at large. Finally, in Section C, “Some
Objections to a Theory of Procedural Justice,” I consider some of the most prominent
objections that have been made to theoretical approaches to law in general and to a
theory of civil procedure in particular.
Some readers may be willing to go along with my project, and forgo the discussion
of foundational questions that is found in this Part of the essay. If you prefer to do so,
turn to page 49, for Part IV, entitled “Views of Procedural Justice.”
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A. The Jurisprudential Framework for the Theory
My aim is to develop a theory of procedural justice and not a theory of general
jurisprudence. Theories of general jurisprudence are enormously controversial, and
there is reason to doubt that such controversies will ever be resolved. My aim,
therefore, is to avoid the question: What general normative theory should guide the
law? Instead, I simply sketch one general theoretical framework, using that framework
for convenience of exposition. The general approach that I will adopt is interpretive.
That is, the theory of procedural justice that is offered here is intended to fit and justify
the existing procedural landscape. This approach is, of course, familiar from the work
of Ronald Dworkin.92
Dworkin’s own elaboration of his theory utilizes a heuristic device, an imaginary
judge named Hercules. In the early essay, “Hard Cases,” Dworkin posited that
Hercules was confronted with a hard case, one in which the settled law did not provide
a clear answer.93 In our context, we imagine that Hercules is faced with a case of first
impression concerning an issue of procedural due process, the right to a fair procedure
contained in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution. To decide this hard case, Hercules must construct a theory
of procedural due process. We might imagine that his decision-making proceeds in two
steps. First, he identifies the theories that fit the constitutional text as well as the
already decided cases: Hercules asks, “Which theories of procedural justice are
consistent with the langue of the due process clause, its history, and the general
contours of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process cases?” Second, from among
these theories he selects the theory that provides the best supporting reason for due
process doctrine as a matter of political morality: Hercules asks, “Of the theories of
procedural justice that fit existing doctrine, which provides the best justification for that
doctrine?”94
One caveat should be noted at once; I have presented Hercules’s method as a linear
two-step process, but this oversimplifies the theory for the purposes of simplicity and
92
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). Although I use Dworkin’s
framework, the argument that I offer here is independent of “law as integrity,” the name Dworkin
gives to his theory. My own views of general jurisprudence differ in important respects from
Dworkin’s views. Whereas Dworkin may require only a loose degree of “fit,” before proceeding
to justification, my view is that the criterion of fit should do most of the work if the task at hand
is that of a judge deciding a case. On the other hand, if the task is legislation, then justification
properly steps to the front as the primary criterion. Although important, this disagreement is not
crucial for the current project which is not to offer an interpretation of the due process clause, but
is, instead, the development of a theory of procedural justice.
93

See DWORKIN, Hard Cases in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 92.

94

By adopting the interpretive method as an expository device, I do not mean to endorse
Dworkin’s approach to constitutional interpretation as against its rivals, e.g. textualism or
originalism.
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clarity of exposition.95 Let us pause for a moment and examine the relationship
between the two criteria for evaluating a theory of procedural justice, the criterion of fit
and the criterion of justification. The criterion of fit measures the adequacy of a theory
by its ability to explain the shape of existing law. Thus, to meet the criterion of fit, a
theory of procedural justice must cohere with the constitutional text, the judicial
decisions, and the general shape of the civil dispute resolution system in the United
States. An adequate theory of procedural fairness should account for such basic
features of the system of civil procedure as the following: procedural due process
doctrine, personal jurisdiction, the rules of pleading and joinder, the system of
discovery, the basic features of civil trials such as the rules of evidence, standards of
appellate review, and the prior adjudication doctrines.
We should observe, however, that there may be features of the system of civil
procedure for which we should not seek an explanation in a theory of procedural
fairness. For example, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and some
aspects of personal jurisdiction doctrine can only be explained by the fact that ours is a
federal system, with rules for the allocation of power between the federal government
and the states. There may be aspects of civil procedure that are mostly a matter of
convention.96 Take the example of pleading. Not just any system of pleading would be
fair, but there may be a broad range of pleading issues that can be settled by
convention, e.g. whether there are to be pleadings beyond the answer or reply,97
whether some issues are to be raised in the answer or by motions, and a variety of
similar questions. The important thing is that the system of pleading should not unduly
interfere with decision on the merits as opposed to procedural technicalities.98
In sum, the criterion of fit demands that our theory of procedural fairness be a
theory that takes the current system of civil dispute resolution as its subject. The theory
must fit existing doctrine where fairness is at stake, but need not fit features that are
explained by other concerns such as federalism or those that are a matter of convention
or arbitrary within certain limits.
The second criterion is justification: what theory of procedural fairness offers the
best justification, i.e., the best argument of political morality, in support of our system
of civil dispute resolution? This essay approaches the criterion of justification in two
ways. First, we will assess proposed models of procedural justice using the familiar
95

For Dworkin, the line between fit and justification is not hard and fast: rather, the line
between fit and justification “is a useful analytical device that helps us give structure to any
interpreter’s” working theory. See Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 92.
96

Here, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction between conventional and natural justice. See
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes ed.
1984).
97
This is not to say that procedural justice does not imply some limits on pleading rules. A
system that required many, many levels of pleading, with technical requirements that operated as
a trap for the unsophisticated might run contrary to concerns for accuracy and efficiency.
98

Charles Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L.Q. 297, 308-20 (1938).
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tools of moral and political argument. This first method of assessment sticks close to
common sense, utilizing argumentative strategies that might be employed in a judicial
opinion or brief. The second approach to the criterion of fit is more theory-laden or
philosophical. An inquiry into procedural justice can step back from existing legal
practice and ask the following question of political philosophy: what conception of
procedural justice should be adopted in a just society?99
The second dimension of the inquiry into justification is related to the first.
Certainly our current practices and ideas about the reform of those practices will have
much to tell us about the ideal case of a well-ordered society that was regulated by the
best available conception of justice. But the two inquiries are not identical. In might
be the case that core features of the current procedural system would not be included in
the ideal case; for example, it might be argued that the best conception of procedural
justice in the ideal case would not include the adversary system.
I would like to make one concluding point about the jurisprudential framework
within which Procedural Justice operates. Although this framework is broadly
Dworkinian, it relies on only a subset of Dworkin’s ideas. Thus, I shall not rely on the
right-answer thesis, Dworkin’s claim that every case has a unique legally correct
answer. Nor shall I rely on Dworkin’s claim that judges may only rely on
considerations of fairness or principle, and thus, that reasons of policy or social utility
have no proper role in judicial interpretation. For the purposes of this essay, I want
neither to agree nor to disagree with Dworkin on these issues. Rather my intention is
simply to set these controversial features of Dworkin’s theory aside for the time being,
on the ground that their resolution is not necessary for the task at hand. Moreover,
although my argument is couched within the framework of Dworkin’s interpretivism—
I shall claim that a certain conception of procedural justice is superior to its rivals on
the criteria of fit and justification—this is not a necessary feature of my argument. The
normative and descriptive arguments that I make here can be made clearly distinct,
yielding an argument of political morality on the one hand and an argument of
descriptive legal theory on the other. A final caveat concerning the relationship
between Procedural Justice and Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity follows
immediately in the next Section.
B. The Role of Public Reason
A further question arises with respect to the dimension of justification: what sorts
of reasons count as good justifications for the law? One answer to this question is that
the laws should be justified by the best available moral theory, whether that theory is a
deontological theory like Kant’s, a consequentialist theory like Bentham’s
99
For the purposes of the second approach, I shall work within a roughly Rawlsian
paradigm. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(paperback ed. 1995). For a very brief summary of Rawls’s theoretical framework as I
understand it, see Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
549 (1994).
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utilitarianism, or a virtue-centered theory like Aristotle’s. On this account, when
Hercules constructs a theory of procedural fairness, he may ultimately be required to
resolve the great questions of moral theory, and decide whether utilitarianism,
Kantianism, virtue-ethics, or some other view offers the best general account of
morality.
The thesis that the deep premises of particular comprehensive moral doctrines are
good legal reasons is problematic for two reasons. First, the question as to which moral
theory is best is deeply controversial and as a practical matter no project in legal theory
will get off the ground if the deep questions of normative ethics must be resolved as a
preliminary step. Putting the same point somewhat differently, if a legal theory rests on
the deepest truths of moral theory, then they may properly be put at issue by cogent
attacks on the underlying moral view. Because the history of moral philosophy
suggests that the deep disagreements between those with theological and secular views
or between utilitarians and Kantians are unlikely to be resolved, at least any time soon,
the reliance on deep moral reasons would render practical progress in legal theory an
unreachable objective.
Second, given that deep moral consensus is not a practical possibility we must give
public reasons if our justifications for the law are to inform or persuade our fellow
citizens in general and the legal community in particular. This point involves more
than simply a matter of instrumental efficacy. Respect for our fellow citizens requires
that we give them reasons that are available to them; the legitimacy of a democratic
society requires that good and sufficient reasons for the legal order be available to the
citizenry at large.100 That is, it would be a denial of respect to give our fellow citizens
only reasons that conflict with their most deeply held moral and religious beliefs, and a
regime that cannot provide such reasons cannot claim democratic legitimacy. Public
reasons, which include common sense, the true and uncontroversial results of the
sciences (broadly understood), and values embedded in our public legal and political
culture, are available to our fellow citizens. Thus, when we assess a theory of
procedural justice by the criterion of justification we ought to ask whether the
justifications are of the right sort, i.e., if they are public reasons.101
The ideal of public reason to which I shall make appeal is similar to that offered by
John Rawls. In summary forms, its features are as follows:

100

See Christopher Bertram, Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity, and Democratic
Community, 107 ETHICS 563, 565 (1997); JEREMY WALDRON, Theoretical Foundations of
Liberalism in LIBERAL RIGHTS 61 (1993).
101
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 101; see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L. REV. 1453 (1996); Lawrence B. Solum,
Law and Public Reason, 95:2 APA NEWSLETTERS, Spring 1996, at 54 (1996); Lawrence B.
Solum, Inclusive Public Reason, 75 Pac. Phil. Q. 217 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Situating
Political Liberalism, 69 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 549 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an
Ideal of Public Reason, 30 U. SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and
Justice, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1083 (1990).
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1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Content of Public Reason: The ideal specifies public reason as reason which
relies on premises and modes of reason that are available to the public at large,
including (a) the general features of all reason, such as rules of inference and
evidence, and (b) generally shared beliefs, common-sense reasoning, and the
noncontroversial methods of science.102
Scope of Application: As a minimum, the ideal applies to deliberation and
discussion concerning the basic structure and the constitutional essentials.103
Persons Obligated: The duty of civility specified by the ideal creates
obligations (a) for both citizens and public officials when they engage in public
political debate, (b) for citizens when they vote, and (c) for public officials
when they engage in official action -- so long as the debate, vote or action
concerns the subjects specified in (2).104
Structure of the Obligation: The ideal requires (a) citizens and public officials
(i) to include public reasons in public political debate, but (ii) nonpublic
reasons may be included, provided that public reasons are offered in due
course,105 and (b) in special contexts, such as the decision of a legal dispute or
the passage of a bill, public officials should exclude nonpublic reasons from
official pronouncements such as judicial opinions or statements of legislative
purpose.106
Nature of the Obligation: The duty of civility implied by the idea is an
obligation of political morality, and the ideal does not justify legal restrictions
on public political discourse.107

If Hercules complies with this ideal of public reason, he will proceed as follows.
Because Hercules occupies the role of judge, he is bound by the strict requirement that
the ideal imposes on judges acting in their official capacity. That is, Hercules may
offer only public reasons for his decisions. Thus, Hercules’s theory of procedural
fairness may not rely on the deep and controversial premises of particular
comprehensive views, e.g. he may not rely on the truth of a religious doctrine, of
Kantianism, of utilitarianism, or of any other particular comprehensive view.
Hercules’s theory of procedural justice may incorporate values and principles drawn
from the public political culture. Importantly, the fact that a publicly available value or
principle is part of or supported by a variety of comprehensive doctrines does not
render that value or principle nonpublic. Quite the contrary, public reasons will
commonly find support in a variety of comprehensive doctrines, although the deep
foundations for the public reason may vary from doctrine to doctrine.
102

See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 99, at 212-13, 220.

103

See id. at 214; see also id. §5, at 227-230.

104

See id. at 215.

105

See id. at li-lii.

106

See id. at 235.

107

See id. at 216.
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To the extent that Dworkin’s own view does not incorporate an ideal of public
reason with content similar to that outlined above, my theoretical framework does
differs from his theory. Even if Hercules may voyage in the deep waters of ultimate
value or ascend to the airy heights of abstract moral theory, Procedural Justice will
remain on foot, relying for the most part on the familiar tools of legal theory and
practical political argument. I shall endeavor to limit the conceptual ascent to those
climbs that are necessary to counter rival views or to lay bare the bones of our shared
intuitions about procedural fairness.
C. Some Objections to a Theory of Procedural Justice
This Section considers three foundational objections to my project. The first
foundational objection, discussed in Subsection 1, is rooted in legal pragmatism: big
theories, like a theory of procedural justice, ought to be eschewed, in favor of mid-level
or low-level principles, on pragmatic grounds. The second foundational objection,
discussed in Subsection 2, is grounded in a radical critique of liberal legal theory: no
theory of procedural justice can succeed because existing doctrine is fundamentally
incoherent and can only be explained as a function of political struggle. The third
foundational objection, discussed in Subsection 3, based on concerns raised in critical
race theory and feminist jurisprudence, is that a supposedly neutral theory of
procedural justice must be incomplete, unless it explicitly incorporates the perspectives
of excluded groups.
My aim is not to lay these objections to rest; each of them raises large questions that
are outside the scope of this essay. Rather, my aim to suggest that such foundational
objections do not give us a priori reasons to turn aside from the project of developing a
theory of procedural justice. If we are successful in the project of developing such a
theory, then foundational questions can properly be raised, if they still seem cogent. At
this point, let us consider each objection in turn.
1. A Pragmatist Objection
A legal pragmatist might make the following argument against the usefulness of
developing a theory of procedural justice. We are not likely, the pragmatist begins, to
reach agreement at the most general and abstract level, about what procedural justice
requires.108 Some will adhere to a utilitarian theory of procedural justice; others to a
theory that is based on deontological (or rights based) concerns. Because ultimate
agreement on a general theory is not a realistic goal, we ought, for pragmatic reasons,
to seek instead agreement on relatively more particular and concrete principles. Rather
that a theory of procedural justice, we ought to be developing mid-level principles.109
108

See CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).

109

A mid-level principle might, for example, address questions such as: (1) should finders of
fact be lay persons or judges? (2) should there be a right of representation by counsel? (3)
should there be an extensive right to pretrial discovery? Mid-level principles address questions
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Utilitarians and deontologists may agree that our pleading system ought to provide
adequate notice and avoid the decision of disputes on the basis of technicalities, even
though they disagree on the reasons for these principles. We ought to be seeking
“incompletely theorized agreements,” to use Cass Sunstein’s felicitous phrase.110
This objection must be taken seriously. In the case of procedural justice, the
objection has an especially strong appeal for the following reason: most thinking about
procedure (certainly, most thinking by judges and lawyers, and much by legal scholars)
has avoided the most general and abstract issues of procedural justice. Rather, the
focus has been on relatively concrete and particular problems. For example, a great
deal of attention has been devoted to issues of detail, working out the precise
implications of the rules of procedure in relatively narrow contexts. At the next level
of conceptual ascent, there has been a great deal of focus on the middle level of
abstraction, e.g. on developing an adequate account of personal jurisdiction or of the
Erie doctrine. The practice of proceduralists provides a good reason to believe that
doctrinal detail and mid-level principles provide a better target for theorists than do
general and abstract principles of procedural justice.
The practice of legal scholars is reflected in judicial opinion. The Supreme Court
itself has stated, “We must bear in mind that no single model of procedural fairness, let
alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause. The very
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation.”111 And it is well to bear this injunction in
mind. The search for principles of procedural justice should not be confused with a
much less promising enterprise, the quest for a universal set of procedures applicable in
every factual and legal context. But the likelihood that this latter exercise would be
futile does not entail that the former task—the identification of general principles of
procedural justice—is without promise.
At this point, my claim is simply this: there is no way to settle, a priori, the question
whether a theory of procedural justice will be fruitful or not. Such theories must stand
on their merits—the reasons advanced in their favor, the answers to the objections
raised, and their utility as a tool for analysis. In other words, we ought to have a
pragmatic attitude about the usefulness of abstraction and generality in legal thinking.
If pragmatic considerations sometimes counsel against big theories, that does not entail
that such considerations will always so counsel. The only way for a pragmatist to
judge the value of a theory of procedural justice is to put it to work, and see if it pays.

that are relatively more particular and concrete that the questions addressed by the relatively
general and abstract principles developed here. See infra Part VI, “Principles of Procedural
Justice.”
110

See id. at 35 et seq.

111

Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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"Does such a theory have 'cash value'?” as William James famously put the question.112
If a theory of procedural justice can cut legal ice, then we have good reason to use it.
A bit more can be said about the pragmatist objection, however, especially in light
of the role of public reason, as sketched in Section B, “The Role of Public Reason,”
above,113 in the theoretical framework within which my theory of procedural justice is
developed. There are strategies and resources available to a theory of procedural
justice for coping with the problem of disagreement. We may not hope to get
utilitarians and deontologists to agree all the way down about anything, procedural
justice included. But a theory of procedural justice does not need to be expressed in a
way that takes sides in the great debates of moral theory or religious belief. Rather, we
may express the theory in terms of a set of principles, which might be affirmed for a
variety of reasons, including legal reasons, such as fit with existing doctrine, and
reasons of moral theory, such as those provided by utilitarianism, virtue ethics, or by
some version of deontology. In Rawlsian terms, we might seek an overlapping
consensus between those who affirm the principles for a variety reasons.114 As
Sunstein puts it, we can seek an incompletely theorized agreement.115 When we put the
case for the theory, I shall avoid reliance on particular comprehensive doctrines (e.g. on
utilitarianism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, or particular religious views) and instead rely
on public reasons, e.g. those reasons that are widely available to the public at large.116
2. A Radical Objection
Consider a more radical objection to the project of developing a theory of
procedural justice. The very idea of a theory that “fits” existing law, assumes that there
is some minimum degree of coherence in current procedure doctrine, but that
assumption is open to question. For example, it might be argued that existing doctrine
is strongly incoherent. The most extreme form of this claim would be the strong
indeterminacy thesis: as applied to procedure, the claim that in all civil disputes, there
is no outcome of any procedural question that cannot reasonably be seen as legally
correct. More concretely, a 12(b)(6) motion can properly be granted or denied with
respect to any conceivable complaint; any court can properly assert or reject personal
112

As James puts it, “Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea to be true,’ it
says, ‘what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the
truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief
were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms.’” WILLIAM JAMES,
Pragmatism in WRITINGS 1902-1910 573 (Library of America ed. 1987).
113

See supra p. 42.

114

See RAWLS, supra note 99, at 133-72.

115

See Sunstein, supra note 108.

116

See id. at 212-254. For clarification of Rawls’s position, see the “Introduction to the
Paperback Edition,” id. at l-lvii.
116

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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jurisdiction over any conceivable defendant; indeed, any procedural motion can be
properly granted or denied in any conceivable case. This form of the objection seems
too strong to be plausible. In procedure, as elsewhere, there are easy cases. Some
complaints clearly do state a claim upon which relief can be granted;117 others clearly
do not.118 If there are easy cases in procedure, then the strong indeterminacy thesis is
false in the procedural domain.119
But the strong indeterminacy thesis is not required for a radical critique of my
project to succeed. For a theory of procedural justice to fit existing doctrine, it will not
suffice for the doctrine merely to avoid total incoherence; rather, existing doctrine must
meet such minimum threshold level of coherence if the project is to succeed. This is
not to say that the project requires perfect coherence. Any plausible version of
interpretivist legal theory must admit that there are mistakes. Some cases or rules will
not fit the best available theory of procedural justice, and that with respect to them, the
theory will maintain that the decision should be overruled or the rule amended.120 But
if it turns out that the underlying principles of fairness that best explain the law of
personal jurisdiction are fundamentally inconsistent with those that explain the
opportunity to be heard, and that yet a third set of inconsistent principles best explain
pleading and joinder, then the interpretivist project will face severe obstacles.
Interpretivism assumes that the law is a seamless web, but what if it is not?
A theory of procedural justice will lack good confirmation on the criterion of fit if
there is moderately strong incoherence in existing doctrine. But once again, this
objection does not provide an a priori reason to reject the project of developing a
theory of procedural justice. If a theory can be developed and shown to fit existing
doctrine, then the charge of incoherence will have been shown to be false. Unless one
believes that there are good a priori reasons for believing that the law can never be
coherent, then once again the issue should be postponed until after we have a particular
theory of procedural justice in view.
3. A Perspectivialist Objection
Consider yet another foundational objection to the project of developing a theory of
procedural justice. It might be argued that such a theory is fundamentally misguided,
because it fails to acknowledge the perspectives of those who have been excluded from
the making and shaping of modern procedure doctrine, especially the perspectives of
117
The forms that accompany the federal rules provide paradigm cases of complaints that
should not be dismissed on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
118
A complaint with no allegations at all would seem to be an easy case for granting a
12(b)(6) motion.
119
See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987); Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy and Equity in RADICAL CRITIQUES
OF THE LAW (Stephen J. Griffin & Robert A. Moffat eds. 1997).
120

See DWORKIN, Hard Cases in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 92, at 118-23.
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women and persons of color.121 Surely, there is something right about this objection.
The method for theory construction that I have proposed is biased or tilted in the
following sense: by taking existing doctrine as fixed, as the data for which the theory
must account, the interpretive approach submerges the possibility that that existing
procedure institutionalizes systematic unfairness.122
But the perspectivalist objection does not justify abstention from the project of
theory building. First, the enterprise of articulating the notion of procedural fairness
implicit in existing practice has substantial value even if the perspectivalist objection is
correct: reconstructing the implicit ideal provides definition to a debate that would
otherwise be murky. Second, the truth of the perspectivalist critique cannot be
assumed in advance. After a theory of procedural justice has been articulated,
perspectivalist critics can put forth their arguments, which can then be judged on the
merits.
I have completed my sketch of a justification for the enterprise of developing a
theory of procedural justice. I recognize that this sketch will be unsatisfying to many
and that the issues that are raised by the objections to my project cannot be resolved in
brief compass of this article. My goal is more modest. I hope that I have laid my cards
on the table, so that the reader can evaluate the project with a sense of its foundational
assumptions and with some notion of the objections that might be raised. At this point,
I turn to the idea of procedural justice itself.
IV. VIEWS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
This Part surveys and critiques the notions of procedural justice that are implicit in
judicial opinion and legal scholarship. Section A, “The Idea of Procedural Justice,”
sets out the basic framework for the theory by setting out a general framework for
thinking about procedural fairness and delineating the subject matter the theory will
cover. Current thinking about procedural fairness has been informed by three ideas
121
See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (1994); see generally Lawrence B. Solum,
Virtues and Voices, 66 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 111 (1991). Cf. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of
Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (“Unfortunately, the myth of due process repeatedly
has been corrupted to enhance the position of the powerful. Consequently, due process is a myth
not only because it is a set of stories that transmit values, but also because it is a fantasy for many
who claim its protection.”).
122

The theory of procedural justice articulated in this Article can be seen as a response to the
perspectivalist critique in an important respect. By emphasizing rights of participation,
procedural justice can at least insure that the voices of excluded groups are heard when the rights
of individual members of such groups are at state. Cf. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to
the Value Of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990); Gerald
Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 452-55
(1994) (suggesting that improved community participation procedures would make
administrative agencies more responsive to poor and minority communities).
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laid out and critiqued in Section B, “Three Models of Procedural Justice.” The
accuracy model assumes that the aim of civil dispute resolution is correct application of
the law to the facts. The balancing model assumes that the aim of civil procedure is to
strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication. The participation
model assumes that the very idea of a correct outcome must be understood as a function
of process that guarantees fair and equal participation. Section C, “From the Three
Models to a Theory of Procedural Justice” suggests the ways in which the three models
can be integrated into a unified theory of procedural justice.
A. The Idea of Procedural Justice
In this section, I set out some very basic preliminary points about the idea of
procedural justice. In Section 1, “The Conceptual Framework,” I define the topic,
relating procedural justice to the related notions of corrective and distributive justice,
and then lay out three possible views of procedural justice—perfect, imperfect, and
pure. In Section 2, “The Limits of the Enterprise” I try to mark off the subject matter
of the theory, setting out those issues that I bracket or reserve for another occasion.
1. The Conceptual Framework
The notion of justice can be analyzed in many ways, but one good place to start is
with Aristotle. Aristotle divides the topic of justice into two main parts, which I shall
call corrective justice and distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns the division
of shares in social benefits and burdens; thus, many questions of tax policy are
questions of distributive justice. Corrective justice involves the rectification of
injustice, and thus includes a variety of topics from criminal law, torts, and contracts,
among many others.123 Supplementing Aristotle’s account, let us say that “procedural
justice” is concerned with the means by which social groups (including governments,
private institutions, and families) institutionalize the application of requirements of
corrective and distributive justice to particular cases. In the context of a modern
nation-state, procedural justice is concerned with the adjudicative methods by which
legal norms are applied to particular cases and it is also concerned with the legislative
processes by which the shares of social benefits and burdens are divided. In this essay,
I shall be concerned with the procedures of corrective justice, and in particular, with
the procedures of corrective civil justice, i.e. with civil procedure. A conception of
procedural justice specifies the conditions under which the application of the norms of
corrective justice to particular cases is fair.
Our approach to the idea of procedural justice may be made easier by using a
simple example. Consider the familiar procedure for dividing a cake: the person who
slices the cake picks last. What makes this a fair procedure? One answer to this
123
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1130b301131a9 (J. Barnes ed. 1984) (Page numbers are from the Bekker edition of Aristotle’s work.).
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question might be the following: there is an independent criterion of what constitutes a
fair outcome, equal slices for all, and the slicer-picks-last rule assures that we will get
to this outcome. Slicer-picks-last is fair because it guarantees accuracy. Or does it? If
we really wanted to assure perfectly equal slices, then we could use a compass and the
principles of plane geometry, with equal shares as a more reliable result. But this
strikes us as an undue amount of fuss to go through when slicing a cake. Perhaps, the
reason we believe that the slicer-picks-last rule is a fair procedure is that it strikes a fair
balance between the importance of the outcome and the cost of getting there: the rule
gets us close to equal shares most of the time at a reasonable price. Slicer-picks last
might be considered fair, because does a good job of balancing. Or is there something
more to the idea that the slicer-picks-last rule is fair? Maybe the reason we believe that
the slicer gets a fair share is because the slicer was the one who did the cutting; the
slicer’s participation in the cutting validates the outcome, even if the slicer ends up with
a smaller slice (or among the calorie conscious, a bigger slice).124 Slicer-picks-last
could be a fair rule, because of process independently of outcome.
These questions about the fairness of procedures for slicing a cake can be
generalized by setting out a framework for analyzing the idea of procedural justice. In
A Theory of Justice, John Rawls distinguishes three very general and abstract kinds of
procedural justice: (1) perfect procedural justice, (2) imperfect procedural justice, and
(3) pure procedural justice. Consider perfect procedural justice first. There are, he
writes,
two characteristic features of perfect procedural justice. First, there is an
independent criterion of what is a fair division, a criterion defined separately
from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And second, it is
possible to devise a procedure that is sure to give that desired outcome.125

124

Strictly speaking, this argument only works for a two-person cake slicing game. The
strategy can be generalized to a n person game. For example, if there are n potential cake
consumers (call them C1, C2 . . . Cn), the procedure would be as follows: C1 cuts a slice that C1
considers to be 1/n of the cake. If C2 believes the slice is 1/n or less, she passes. If C2 believes
the slice is more than 1/n, she trims the slice to equal what she believes is 1/n. This procedure is
repeated until Cn either trims or passes. The last person to touch the slice gets it. This procedure
is then iterated, so that in the second and subsequent rounds, each consumer cuts a slice that she
believes is 1/n of the original, until all of the slices have been distributed. Using this procedure,
each consumer C receives a slice that she believes is 1/n of the original cake, with one possible
exception. Cn may not believe that the last slice is 1/n of the original cake, because Cn might
rationally believe that she was in error when she failed to trim some or all of the prior slices (S1,
S2 . . . Sn-1). However, we might still believe that Cn has received a fair share of the cake,
because she had an opportunity to trim each of these slices (S1, S2 . . . Sn-1), and chose not to do
so. See JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 8 (1995) (describing
procedure in four person game). I owe thanks to David Leonard for calling my attention to the n
person version of the familiar rule.
125

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 85.
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Rawls argues that our rule for the slicing of cakes is an example of perfect procedural
justice. The person who slices picks last; Rawls believes that this procedure insures the
equal division of shares. "Equal shares for each" is the independent criterion of a fair
division; the slicer-picks-last rule is the procedure that reliably produces that outcome.
In the case of imperfect procedural justice, the first characteristic, an independent
criterion for fairness of outcome, is present, but the second, a procedure that guarantees
that outcome, is not. Rawls contends:
Imperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial. The desired
outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and only if he has
committed the offense with which he is charged. The trial procedure is
framed to search for and to establish the truth in this regard. But it seems
impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead to the correct
result. The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of evidence,
and the like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose consistent with the
other ends of the law. Different arrangements for hearing cases may
reasonably be expected in different circumstances to yield the right results, not
always but at least most of the time.126
Thus, imperfect procedural justice incorporates the notion of an independent criterion
for accuracy but adds the notion of “other ends of the law,” e.g., considerations of cost
that may be balanced against accuracy.
The final notion is “pure procedural justice.” Rawls writes:
[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the
right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome
is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been
properly followed. This situation is illustrated by gambling. If a number of
persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet
is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is.127
Pure procedural justice rejects an underlying assumption of both perfect and imperfect
procedural justice—the assumption that there is an independent criterion for what
constitutes the correct outcome. There are not criteria for the correct outcome except
for an ideal (or actual) set of procedures.
I shall take Rawls’s analysis as the beginning point for my inquiry into procedural
justice. That is, as we begin to unpack our notions of procedural justice, I shall ask
whether we are implicitly using the idea of perfect procedural justice, imperfect
procedural justice, or pure procedural justice, or some other notion.
126

Id. at 85-86.

127

Id. at 86. Rawls notes that this conclusion requires further assumptions, e.g. that the bets
are fair in the sense that the expected payoff of each bet is zero, that the bets are made
voluntarily, that no one cheats, that the players entered the game under fair conditions, and so
forth. Id.

52

Published by Digital USD, 2004

55

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
2. The Limits of the Enterprise
This essay develops a theory of procedural justice, and before I proceed any further,
I should say a few words about the limits of this enterprise. First, I shall limit my
consideration to civil justice, explicitly excluding consideration of criminal procedure.
This limitation may be arbitrary, but it is, I think, necessary, if the enterprise is to get
off the ground at all. Civil procedure is a large enough topic, indeed, perhaps too large
a topic. Moreover, the criminal system is different in a number of respects: the burden
of persuasion beyond reasonable doubt, the special protections for criminal defendants
provided (or formerly provided) by the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth
Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment.128 A
complete theory of procedural justice would address these differences between the civil
and criminal systems, but this essay does not attempt to develop such a complete
theory.129
There is a second limit on the enterprise of building a theory of procedural justice.
Procedural fairness may be the most central principle of civil procedure, but it is not the
only principle. Federal civil procedure in the United States, which I shall most
frequently use as an example, is shaped by concerns for federalism that are not matters
of procedural justice. For this reason, the theory that I shall offer does not fully
account for a variety of doctrines in which federalism (or some other principle or
policy) plays a shaping role. These topics include federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
the federalism component of the due process limits on personal jurisdiction, and much
of the Erie doctrine.
In addition, there is a third limit on the theory that is developed here. The theory of
procedural justice that is developed here is focused on adjudication as the application
of general rules to particular cases. Our investigation will be focused on the civil
action at the trial level. This focus elides an important aspect to the system of civil
adjudication—the role of the appellate courts in the development and modification of
the general and abstract rules themselves. This role is thematized by the way in which
the United States Supreme Court uses particular cases as the vehicle for announcing
general rules of Constitutional law. In cases like Miranda and New York Times v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court acts in a legislative capacity, creating a constitutional code
128

The civil-criminal distinction is the topic of a large literature. See Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325
(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1882 (1992); Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect
Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1993); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).
129

At various points in the essay, I will offer remarks that point toward an account of the
distinctiveness of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Part IV.B.2.b), “Deontological Constraints on
Balancing: Consideration of Cost and Recognition of Procedural Rights.”
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that supplements the actual text of the Constitution. A similar role is played by state
courts in cases governed by the common law. In cases like Li v. Yellow Cab or
McPherson, state courts of last resort create and modify general rules of contracts,
property, and torts—once again playing a role that is analogous to that played by
legislatures.
Because our focus will be on the application of general rules to particular cases, for
the most part, we will simply set the special problems and issues raised by judicial
lawmaking in civil litigation to the side. The theory offered here is not a theory of the
common law-making process or of constitutional adjudication. Moreover, my focus on
rule application puts to the side important questions regarding public-law litigation that
others may believe should be at the center of a theory of procedural justice.130 This
does not mean that the theory of procedural justice cannot and should not be extended
to these contexts; rather, those issues are simply put to the side in order to allow us to
focus on the core case of civil adjudication—the case in which the general rules are
fixed and application is the focus of the adjudicative process.131
B. Three Models of Procedural Justice
In this section, we examine three simple conceptions or models132 of procedural
justice that are at least partially implicit in current legal practice.133 Each model will be
measured against the criteria of fit and justification. For each model our questions will
be: does the model account for the shape of current doctrine and does it provide a
normatively attractive grounding for that doctrine?
130

In this regard consider, Owen Fiss’s concession that his theory may not apply to the
adjudication of “purely private disputes.” Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term —
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
131
In addition to the limits discussed in text, the scope of this article is limited in a variety of
other ways. For example, the discussion focuses on procedural justice in the public sphere and
does not consider the issue of procedural fairness in private associations. Cf. Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550, 526 P.2d 253, 260, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 252
(1974) (en banc) (holding that public policy requires certain private associations "to refrain from
arbitrary action" with respect to the admission, disciplining, or expulsion of members; "the
association's action must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair.").
132

I use “concept” and “conception” to refer the general idea of procedural justice on the one
hand as opposed to particular theories of procedural justice on the other. See Gallie, Essentially
Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTLELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956); see also RONALD DWORKIN,
Hard Cases in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 103 (1977).
133

I use three models, labeled “accuracy,” “balancing,” and “process” to discuss the major
families of ideas about procedural fairness. Similar distinctions have sometimes been mapped
with different terminology.
For example, Lawrence Tribe distinguishes between the
“instrumental” and “intrinsic” values of due process.
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 666 (2d ed. 1988), and Robert Bone distinguishes between outcomeoriented and process-oriented participation theories, Robert Bone, supra note 136, at 201, n.19.
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We can begin with the utopian hypothesis that the current doctrine is structured by
an implicit conception of perfect procedural justice—the accuracy model. This
hypothesis is shown to be inadequate on grounds of fit. Although a concern for truthseeking and accuracy does characterize existing procedure doctrine, there are a variety
of doctrines that cannot be explained on the model of perfect procedural justice:
examples include res judicata and other rules that protect the finality of judicial
decisions. Moreover, the accuracy model suffers from a crucial ambiguity, between
accuracy in particular cases and accuracy in the system as a whole.
The shortcomings of the accuracy model lead to a second hypothesis, that current
doctrine is best explained as structured by a conception of imperfect procedural
justice—the balancing model. Two variations of this hypothesis are explored. The
first variation is utilitarian or consequentialist: procedure doctrine might be seen as
structured by the balancing of accuracy and cost. The second variation is rights based:
it assumes that procedural justice requires attention to the fair distribution of the costs
imposed by the system of procedure. These two variations could be combined in a
variety of ways to produce other, more complex, versions of the balancing model.
We then consider a third hypothesis: that a conception of pure procedural justice
best fits and justifies existing doctrine: we shall call this the participation model. The
key notion is that it is the process itself and not outcome that defines procedural justice.
The question that naturally arises is, “What kind of process is intrinsically fair?” This
question can be answered in at least two different ways. The first answer uses actual
acceptability to the parties as the criterion for fair process. The second variation uses
the notion of acceptability under ideal conditions. Both variations of the participation
model suffer from serious flaws. Bluntly, because the participation model excludes all
consideration of accuracy and cost as criteria for procedural fairness, it purchases
conceptual purity at the price of plausibility
1. The Accuracy Model
The first model focuses exclusively on accuracy—the correct application of the law
to the facts.134 My exposition of this model begins with its utopian form—the ideal of
perfect procedural justice.
a) The Utopian Ideal of Perfect Procedural Justice
Consider the possibility that current doctrine is informed by the utopian ideal of
perfect procedural justice.135 Substantive law (e.g. the substantive provisions of the
134

See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics And Perfection, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 833, 833 n. 1 (1994) (“I will use the term "procedural justice" broadly to
suggest an assessment of the quality or success of procedural law in providing dispute-resolution
participants what we think they are due.”).
135
See DENNIS GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION
57-61 (1986); see also Susan Kneebone, Natural Justice and Non-Citizens: A Matter of
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Constitution, of statutes, of rules and regulations, or of common law) provides an
independent criterion for the correct outcome; Robert Bone has called this the rightsbased view.136 The procedural system is designed to insure that in each case, the
substantively correct outcome actually issues. Let us call the conception that
procedural justice is measured solely by the correctness of outcomes, “the accuracy
model.”
On the surface, it seems obvious that the system strives for correct outcomes.
Consider the basic structure of the civil litigation system. Courts frequently articulate
the telos of the civil litigation system as a “search for truth.”137 One federal court
opines: “the ultimate aim of the judicial system is to ascertain the real truth.”138 Liberal
pleading rules are designed to guard against erroneous resolutions on technical
grounds.139 Extensive discovery aims to provide the parties with all the relevant
evidence.140 Accuracy in fact-finding and in the application of law to fact is provided
by elaborate trial procedures,141 including cross examination,142 neutral judges143 and

Integrity?, 26 Melb. U. L. Rev. 355, 374 (2002) (characterizing Galligan as maintaining “the
main purpose of the doctrine of procedural fairness is to make the best (that is, the most accurate)
decisions in terms of substantive outcomes.”).
136

Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, And Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 598 (1993) (“A rights-based theory assumes that the
purpose of adjudication is to determine each party's legal rights accurately. Because rights
trump social utility, a deprivation of a right cannot be justified by direct appeal to the aggregate
social benefits the offending activity makes possible. Thus, if an erroneous result counts as a
deprivation of substantive right, procedures that increase error cannot be justified simply by
citing the aggregate benefits to all resulting from reduced litigation and delay costs.”).
137
See, e.g., Carroll v. The Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C, 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating “the search for truth . . . is at the heart of the litigation process.”); Millen v. Mayo
Foundation, 170 F.R.D. 462, 464 (D. Minn. 1996) (“Justice is the search for truth in an effort to
resolve conflict.”).
138

Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991).

139

See Mahler v. Drake, 43 F.R.D. 1, 3 & n. 8 (D.S.C. 1967) (“While . . . statement [that the
Federal Rules indicate a general policy to disregard technicalities and form and to determine
rights of litigants on the merits, and to that end are to be liberally construed] is generally
attributable to pleadings, it indicates the liberality in the search for truth as the ultimate of
justice.”).
140

See Burke v. New York City Police Dept., 115 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (“stating
that “the overriding policy is one of disclosure of relevant information in the interest of
promoting the search for truth in a federal question case.”); Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 91
N.J.Super. 377, 385, 220 A.2d 693 (App.Div.1966) (“The discovery rules are to be construed
liberally, for the search for truth in aid of justice is paramount. Concealment and surprise are
not to be tolerated in a modern judicial system.").
141

See Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “fundamental
fairness requires that plaintiffs have the opportunity to present their cases so that the trier of fact
can make a meaningful search for the truth.”); D’Auria v. Allstate Insurance Co., 673 So.2d 147
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juries,144 the rules of evidence,145 and representation by counsel.146 A multi-level
appellate system provides for the correction of errors made at the trial level.147 Even
statutes of limitations have been explained on the basis that they enhance accuracy.148
At least one commentator has suggested that the current system of procedural rulemaking is utopian in aspiration and fails to take costs into account.149 That the system
is not actually perfect does not entail that perfect procedural justice is not the ideal to
which it aspires; perfect procedural justice could be the animating principle of

(Fla. Ct. App. 1996) (Antoon, J., concurring) (stating “trials . . . function as forums for the search
of truth”).
142

See In the Matter of Grant, ---P.2d---, 1997 WL 186957, *4 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 1997) (Six, J.,
dissenting) (“As lawyers and judges, we acknowledge cross-examination as an aid in the search
for truth.”).
143
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 405 Pa. Super. 56, 91, 591 A.2d 1095, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (stating the judges must undertake “search for truth”).
144
Ray v. American Nat. Red Cross, 685 A.2d 411, 417 (D.C. 1996) (stating that purpose of
jury instructions is to aid “search for truth”).
145
Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, *699 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“The general purpose of the
Rules of Evidence is to facilitate the search for truth.”).
146
Cf. State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 599 (Conn. 1995) (Borden, J., concurring) (stating
that the right to counsel aids in the “search for truth”); President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 52-53 (1967)
(“Limiting the right to counsel 'gravely endangers judicial search for truth.”). But cf. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 256-68 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “as part of our
modified adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense
counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any,
relation
to the search for truth.”).
147
See United States v. Brown, 50 F.R.D. 110, *111 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that “appeals,
like trials, are a search for truth”); cf. Shiflett v. Com. of Va., 447 F.2d 50, 60 (3d Cir. 1971) (en
banc) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “at least one appeal is a necessary and desirable step
in the search for truth”).
148

See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259
(1979) (stating that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal
with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents,
or otherwise."). The qualifying term “even” in the text is meant to convey the obvious fact that
statutes of limitations operate to cut off claims that are meritorious, even when the particular
factual record would demonstrate that there is no risk of inaccuracy as a result of the passage of
time. Statutes of limitations, to the extent they are accuracy enhancing, aim at systemic
accuracy. See Part IV.B.1.b), “Systemic Accuracy versus Case Accuracy,” infra, p. 59. For a
thorough analysis of the various justifications for statutes of limitations, see Tyler T. Ochoa &
Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997).
149
See Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994).
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procedure doctrine, even though a residue of inaccuracy resists the system’s best
efforts.
But this hypothesis will not withstand serious scrutiny. This is because the
procedural system is replete with rules that explicitly aim at the insulation of error from
corrective action. One obvious example is appellate review. The clearly-erroneous and
abuse-of-discretion standards insulate trial judge decisions that are in error from
appellate review. Another example is the law of prior adjudication. The doctrines of
claim and issue preclusion prevent relitigation of particular legal theories and whole
causes of action, even when the prior litigation resulted in an inaccurate decision. This
idea has been expressed by the courts on numerous occasions. For example:
It has been said that res judicata makes black white and crooked straight. In
some cases its application produces a demonstrably incorrect result. The
principle that litigation must come to an end, however, is a very important one,
and the fact that some decisions will be incorrect in a way that can later be
demonstrated is a necessary price.150
The point is that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion cannot be explained on the
ground that they aim at accuracy of results. Although the current law of prior
adjudication may sometimes have the effect of preserving a prior determination of an
issue or claim that is correct from a subsequent reconsideration that would have
resulted in error, a prior adjudication doctrine that truly aimed at accuracy would have
a much different shape that existing doctrine: it might allow relitigation after a showing
of clear and convincing evidence that the prior decision was incorrect, for example.
Thus, the conception of perfect procedural justice fails to meet the criterion of fit.151
It cannot account for basic features of procedure doctrine. This utopian conception
150

Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 538, 589 A.2d 143, 165 (1991) (Stein, J., dissenting).
The most prominent expression of the idea is from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352 (1859):
Under the system of that State, the maintenance of public order, the repose of
society, and the quiet of families, require that what has been definitely determined by
competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this
principle implanted in her jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said, the res
judicata renders white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked. Facit
excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other evidence can afford strength to the
presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can detract from its legal efficacy.
Id. at 363-64; see also Taxing District of Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U.S. 493, 504, 9 S.Ct. 327,
331 (1889).
151

In text, I do not consider the possibility that the features of existing doctrine that cannot
be explained by the accuracy model should be viewed as “mistakes,” subject to eventual
correction through common law adjudication. See Dworkin, supra note 93. The best way to
approach this possibility is to compare the accuracy model with other available models, including
the balancing model and the principles of procedural justice that I introduce in Part VI.A, “The
Statement of the Principles,” infra p. 111. When the alternatives are on the table the question
will be, which theory best fits and justifies procedure doctrine as a whole. At this point, I offer
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fails on the criterion of justification as well: given that civil procedure imposes real
costs on litigants and society at large, it is difficult to argue that the smallest marginal
gain in accuracy is worth the largest investment of resources. Justice has a price, and
there is a point at which that price is not worth paying.152 Moreover, we have every
reason to believe that accuracy is subject to the law of diminishing returns. If we were
to make perfect accuracy our highest commitment, we would find that as we got closer
and closer to our goal, the cost of reducing the marginal rate of error would become
higher and higher. We will reach a point where society would be required to invest
enormous resources for the most infinitesimal gain in accuracy.
In sum, the accuracy model suffers from defects in both fit and justification.
Doctrines like prior adjudication suggest that the existing system of procedure does not
aim at accuracy alone, and the law of diminishing returns suggests that a system that
aimed at accuracy alone could not be justified as striking a reasonable balance between
competing claims on social resources.
b) Systemic Accuracy versus Case Accuracy
There is another difficulty with the accuracy model; the notion of accuracy is itself
ambiguous or underdeterminate.153 To begin the investigation of this point, note that
the accuracy of a procedure can be viewed from two perspectives. From the ex post
perspective, we can ask whether the result in a particular case is correct: call this kind
of accuracy “case accuracy.” From the ex ante perspective, we can ask whether a given
procedure will produce more or less accurate results for all future cases: call this kind
of accuracy “systemic accuracy.” Do these two kinds of accuracy track each other, i.e.
do procedures that maximize case accuracy also maximize systemic accuracy?154
the more modest claim that at theory of procedure that would call for wholesale revision of prior
adjudication doctrine is at least subject to a prima facie objection that it suffers from a substantial
problem of fit.
152

See Bone, supra note 136, at 599 (“Our current system tolerates procedural error even
when expensive procedures might reduce it, and we do not believe that a moral wrong or a
rights violation has occurred every time some procedure marginally increases the error risk.
Furthermore, if a substantive right implied a right to a perfectly accurate outcome, parties would
be entitled to demand that the community invest resources in procedure at a level that
maximized accuracy regardless of cost. Any system that recognized such a right could easily
find itself morally committed to a disastrous level of financing for adjudication.”).
153

On the notion of underdeterminacy, see Lawrence B. Solum, supra note 119.

154

It might be argued that systemic accuracy and case accuracy are extensionally equivalent,
e.g. that the procedure that maximizes case accuracy will always maximize system accuracy, for
the reason suggested by the following argument. Begin with the procedural rule that maximizes
systemic accuracy, and then consider the application of that rule to a particular case in which it is
believed that a different rule would maximize case accuracy. There must be some feature of the
particular case that accounts for the difference. But the rule that maximizes systemic accuracy
can always be modified so as to create an exception for that kind of case. Because systemic
accuracy is simply the sum of case accuracy for all future cases, a rule which incorporates the
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This is a difficulty question, and the answer, as one might expect, is “it depends.”
There are some contexts in which the procedure that would result in accuracy, ex post,
in the particular case would result in systematic, ex ante, inaccuracy. A clear example
of the potential conflict between systemic and case accuracy is provided by the effects
that statutes of limitations have on the accuracy of civil proceedings. On the one hand,
statutes of limitations are defended on the ground that they are accuracy enhancing.
For example, in United States v. Kubrick,155 the United States Supreme court argued
that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
documents, or otherwise."156 The use of the modal operator “may” is revealing.
Statutes of limitations create incentives to bring claims within the limitations period,
and the likely effect of this incentive is that early filing preserves the evidentiary record
and thus increases the likelihood of accurate adjudication. But in any particular case in
which the statute runs before the claim is filed, the result is that the claim is lost, even if
it is meritorious and even if an examination of the record in that particular case would
have revealed that evidentiary record was sufficiently preserved to insure a high
likelihood of accurate adjudication. In other words, statutes of limitations purchase
systemic accuracy at the price of a sacrifice of case accuracy.157
Another example is provided by the legal rules that deal with a party’s destruction
of evidence that is relevant to a civil proceeding. In Nation-Wide Check Corp. v.
Forest Hills Distributors, Inc.,158 Justice (then Judge) Breyer explained the two
exception will produce greater system accuracy that would a rule without the exception.
Therefore, systemic accuracy requires the exception, and the supposed divergence between
system accuracy and case accuracy disappears. This argument is a version of a familiar
argument, first made by David Lyons, for the extensional equivalence of act and rule
utilitarianism. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). Whatever the
merits of Lyons argument as applied to utilitarian moral theory, it does not establish the
extensional equivalence of case accuracy and systemic accuracy, because it does not take into
account the incentive effects that legal rules (as opposed to the ideal rules of rule utilitarianism)
have on future behavior.
155

444 U.S. 111 (1979).

156

Id. at 117.

157

The substance of this point is recognized by Tyler Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich. See
Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 148, at 477-79; see also Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of
Limitations—Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 134 (1955).
158
692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982); see also Blinzler v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 81 F.3d 1148,
1159 (1st Cir. 1996) (“When a document relevant to an issue in a case is destroyed, the trier of
fact sometimes may infer that the party who obliterated it did so out of a realization that the
contents were unfavorable. . . . Before such an inference may be drawn, there must be a sufficient
foundational showing that the party who destroyed the document had notice both of the potential
claim and of the document's potential relevance. . . . Even then, the adverse inference is
permissive, not mandatory. If, for example, the fact-finder believes that the documents were
destroyed accidentally or for an innocent reason, then the fact-finder is free to reject the
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different purposes that underlie the spoliation inference, a judge made rule of evidence
that permits a finder of fact to draw an inference against spoliator, i.e. a person who
destroys evidence:
The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one
not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense
observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant to
litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to have
been threatened by the document than is a party in the same position who
does not destroy the document. The fact of destruction satisfies the minimum
requirement of relevance: it has some tendency, however small, to make the
existence of a fact at issue more probable than it would otherwise be. See Fed.
R. Evid. 401. Precisely how the document might have aided the party’s
adversary, and what evidentiary shortfalls its destruction may be taken to
redeem, will depend on the particular facts of each case, but the general
evidentiary rationale for the inference is clear.
The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic and
punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference presumably
deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at
trial. The inference also serves as a penalty, placing the risk of an erroneous
judgment on the party that wrongfully created the risk.159
What Justice Breyer calls the “evidentiary rationale” expresses an aim at accuracy in
the individual case. Although the destruction of evidence may create uncertainty, the
system can respond to that uncertainty by drawing those inferences that seem most
likely under the circumstances. The “punitive” rationale is focused on systemic
accuracy: by deterring future acts of destruction of evidence, the system aims to
improve the long-run accuracy of the system as a whole. But the goals of case
accuracy and systemic accuracy may conflict in any particular case. When evidence is
negligently destroyed, for example, the careless failure to preserve evidence may not
support any inference that the material that was destroyed was unfavorable to the party
who destroyed it; hence, accuracy in the individual case would be undermined by
imposing a penalty for the destruction. From the systemic point of view, however,
imposing a penalty on the negligent destruction of evidence might create incentives to
preserve such evidence that would improve the long-run accuracy of the system as a
whole.

inference.”); Allen Pen v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir.1981)
(holding that without some evidence that documents have been destroyed "in bad faith" or "from
the consciousness of a weak case," it is "ordinarily" improper to draw an adverse inference about
the contents of the documents.).
159

Id.
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The question that arises for the accuracy model, then, at which sort of accuracy
should procedural justice aim? This question is a specific example of a question that
arises frequently in both the law and moral theory. In the law, we frequently draw a
distinction between case-by-case balancing, in which factors are balanced (for example,
by a trial judge) to decide a particular case, and systemic balancing, in which the
factors are balanced (usually and authoritatively by an appellate judge) to create a
general rule; the rule is then applied to decide particular cases.160 In moral theory, we
distinguish between two forms of utilitarianism, act-utilitarianism, which holds that an
action is right if and only if that action will maximize utility as compared to the
possible alternative actions, and rule-utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right,
if and only if that action is in accord with a general rule that would maximize utility if
the rule were generally obeyed.161 The general distinction, between rules or systems,
on the one hand, and acts or individual cases, on the other, is operating in the
distinction that I have drawn between case accuracy and systemic accuracy.
In the context of formulating a conception of procedural justice in general and
articulating the accuracy model of procedural fairness in particular, the tension between
case accuracy and systemic accuracy poses a problem that must be resolved. At which
sort of accuracy should we aim? If we aim at case accuracy, we achieve procedural
justice in the case before us, but we will sacrifice accuracy in future proceedings. If we
aim at systemic accuracy, we achieve a system that produces more accurate outcomes
in the aggregate, but in particular cases we are required to decide against the party that
is otherwise entitled to prevail: wholesale procedural justice is purchased at the price of
retail procedural injustice.
How can this dilemma be resolved? One way out would be to appeal to a general
moral theory for guidance. For example, we might appeal to a deontological view like
Kant’s for the proposition that one should never render an unjust decision at the
expense of an innocent litigant in order to achieve system benefits: we might choose to
pursue case accuracy, because case accuracy respects an important political right—the
right to an accurate determination of one’s legal rights. Or we might appeal to a
consequentialist view, like utilitarianism, and opt for systemic accuracy on the ground
that rules designed to produce system accuracy will produce the greatest good for the
greatest number.162 But, as I have already argued,163 the appeal to general moral
160

See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
Yale L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (using the terms “definitional” and “ad hoc” balancing to refer to the
distinction between rule-balancing and case-by-case balancing).
161

See Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 824-25
(1995).
162

The passage in text elides the important distinction between act and rule utilitarianism.
The way that rule utilitarianism supports system accuracy over case accuracy is clear: to the
extent that accuracy is a good consequence, rule utilitarianism counsels in favor of the general
rule that will promote the greatest accuracy in the long run. An act utilitarian analysis is more
complicated. One might argue that case accuracy is to be preferred on act utilitarian grounds,
because the act utilitarian focuses on the consequences of each individual act, in this case the
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theories to arbitrate between conceptions of procedural justice is inconsistent with the
ideal of public reason. Our resolution of the tension between systematic and case
accuracy will neither command widespread assent nor offer reasons that can be
accepted by the citizenry at large as legitimate if it depends on the truth of a particular
comprehensive moral doctrine.
The next question is whether we can resolve the question as to whether we should
aim at case accuracy or systemic accuracy without relying on a comprehensive moral
theory. Consider the following principle of political morality: each individual has a
presumptive right to adjudication of her entitlements based on an individualized
assessment of the merits of her own case. This principle of background morality
expresses a presumptive right and not an unqualified legal entitlement. This principle
of political morality does not need to rest on any particular moral or religious doctrine:
the notion that each of us ought to be treated as an individual by the law finds strong
support in the tradition of individual rights and liberties of our political culture.
This background right of political morality is not unqualified. For example, the
system may establish general procedural roles that aim at systemic accuracy, so long as
these rules satisfy the requirements of the rule of law, i.e., they are public and it is
possible, through the exercise of reasonable care, to comply with them. So, I may be
penalized for destroying evidence, to return to that example, if the rule against such
destruction is announced in advance and if the rule allows me the defense that I have
made reasonable good-faith efforts at compliance. In the case of a statute of
limitations, it is fair to cut off my legal claim if I was given reasonable notice of the
limitations period and the period was sufficient to enable me to bring my claim.
In light of this, consider the following three part hypothesis concerning the
relationship between case accuracy and systemic accuracy: (1) where systemic
accuracy and case accuracy are congruent, the system of procedure aims at both; (2)
where systemic accuracy would impair case accuracy, the system usually aims at case
accuracy; (3) systemic accuracy may be preferred over case accuracy, if systemic
accuracy can be obtained through general and public rules, so long as it is possible for
those affected to comply with the rules by reasonable good faith efforts.
Assuming then that we can offer a satisfactory account of the relationship between
systemic accuracy and case accuracy, the accuracy model stands as follows. Accuracy
is a plausible candidate as a component of an ideal of procedural justice, but it is not a
plausible candidate for a complete account of procedural justice. The thesis that the
system aims should and does aim at accuracy alone does not fit important aspects of the
existing system of civil dispute resolution and does not offer a normatively attractive
justification of that system. If taken alone, the accuracy model fails.

decision of a particular case. In the context of a system of procedural rules, however, the act
may be the promulgation of the rules, and hence the consequences to be summed would include
the benefits of accuracy of all future cases affected by the rule.
163

See Part II.B, supra, at 42.
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2. The Balancing Model
The next hypothesis is that the current shape of procedure doctrine is best explained
and justified by a conception of imperfect procedural justice. We assume that the
substantive law provides an independent criterion for what constitutes a just or fair
outcome. Acknowledging that perfection is impossible and that diminishing marginal
returns imply that approaching perfection will become too costly at some point, the
system aims at compromise, a balance between accuracy and its cost. Let us call this
notion of imperfect procedural justice, “the balancing model.” It is the nature of the
compromise or balance struck between accuracy and other considerations that provides
an ideal of imperfect procedural justice its content. Under what conditions will
accuracy be sacrificed? How should the costs of procedural justice be distributed?
One answer to these questions is utilitarian. We could simply weigh the costs of
procedure against the benefits and adopt the system of procedure that will maximize
utility. Another approach to the questions would emphasize rights-based constraints on
both the nature of the costs that may be imposed and on the distribution of those costs.
Each of these two approaches is examined in turn.
a) Consequentialist Balancing: The Mathews v. Eldridge164 Balancing Test
The consequentialist version of imperfect procedural justice finds substantial
support in the decisions of the Supreme Court that interpret the Due Process Clauses of
the United States Constitution. The most striking example is provided by the balancing
test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge:165
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.166
This approach is not confined to due process doctrine. It informs the Supreme Court’s
decisions in a number of doctrinal areas. 167 Consider, for example, the following
164

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

165

For scholarly commentary on Mathews v. Eldridge, see Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
166

424 U.S. at 334-35.

167

See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 2004 WL 232371, *26 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004)
(appyling Mathews balancing test to determine whether use of statistical sampling techniques to

64

Published by Digital USD, 2004

67

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
excerpt from a discussion of standards of appellate review, “Duplication of the trial
judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to
the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”168
An explicit appeal is made to a balancing of the benefits of accuracy with its costs.
Beginning with the emphasis on balancing in doctrine, we could construct a
utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice. This effort is complicated,
however, because there are many forms of utilitarianism; for our purposes, we might
consider ideal rule utilitarianism, in which an act is right if and only if it is conformity
with the system of rules, which if universally followed would produce the best
consequences.169 Let us make a further simplifying assumption: that all of the relevant
costs can be expressed as prices. The resultant approach will be roughly similar to
some law and economics approaches.
Consider for example, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of procedure. He
writes, “The objective of a procedural system, viewed economically, is to minimize the
sum of two costs. The first is the cost of erroneous judicial decisions.”170 The second
type of cost is “the cost of operating the procedural system.”171 Operating costs are
borne by the public, in the form of subsidies to the judicial system and by the parties in
the form of court fees, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs.
Can a utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice fit and justify the
general contours of existing procedure? Consider first the dimension of fit. On one
hand, the utilitarian conception seems to fit contemporary procedural due process
doctrine remarkably well. Matthews v. Eldridge and its progeny are all but explicit in
their utilitarianism. On the other hand, a broader survey of the legal landscape reveals
a number of problems.
The first problem of fit concerns the relationship between procedural and
substantive justice. The theoretical framework within which we are operating
postulates that the law is a seamless web.172 Our account of procedural justice must fit
within a larger theory that fits and justifies the law as a whole. The point is much
mooted, but there are grave doubts about the viability of utilitarian theory to account
assess damages in class action comports with due process); In re Travarius O. 799 N.E.2d 510,
*515, 278 Ill.Dec. 792, **797 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.,2003) (analyzing “the possible deprivation of a
parent's due process rights in termination and adoption proceedings by balancing the factors
enunciated . . . in Mathews); Yorktown Medical Laboratory v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.1991)
(applying Mathews balancing test to due process challenge to state’s use of sampling in an audit
of the laboratory's Medicaid payment claims).
168

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

169

See Lyons, supra 154; J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD A. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST (1973).
170

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (1992); see also Louis Kaplow, The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 307 (1994).
171
172

Id.
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 92.
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for the shape of existing legal doctrine. Indeed, from Bentham on, utilitarians are noted
at least as much for critique as for explanation. Large domains of law seem best
explained by rights-based accounts, including rights to privacy as well as freedom of
speech and religion.
The second problem of fit concerns the system’s reluctance to take utility into
account in a variety of situations. Matthews v. Eldridge is in a line of cases in which
plaintiff’s seek to extend traditional adversary procedures to administrative action, and
in that context, a utilitarian approach predominates. The same approach does not seem
to be followed when we turn our attention to the traditional pleading, discovery, and
trial system. It is true that some rules can be explained on utilitarian grounds, prior
adjudication doctrine and standards of appellate review may be examples. But what is
the utilitarian case for the elaborate machinery of discovery, trial by jury, the rules of
evidence, and so forth? And why do these procedures come (for the most part) as an
indivisible package? Why not Matthews v. Eldridge in reverse, a doctrine that would
eliminate procedures when it could be shown that their costs exceeded their benefits?
These rhetorical questions are merely suggestive, and much utilitarian work has been
done on the rules of evidence, the jury trial, and so forth. In this regard, it is important
to remember that the expensive machinery of the traditional trial is used in only a tiny
percentage of actual disputes, with negotiated settlement as the mode for resolution of
the vast majority. But even conceding these points, the problems of fit seem
overwhelming.
Despite the very broad statement of the holding in Matthews, the Supreme Court
has not, in practice, applied the balancing test, even in all cases in which the issue is
whether a hearing is required. A clear example is the Court’s decision in Richards v.
Jefferson County,173 in which the Alabama’s attempt to give claim preclusive effect to a
prior judgment in which the parties to be bound did not have an opportunity to
participate. Rather than balancing, the Court relied upon a categorical rule:
"The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to
be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated or had an
opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction. . . . The opportunity to be heard is an essential
requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings. . . . And as a State may
not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against
a party named in the proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard . . ., so it cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process,
give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party
nor in privity with a party therein."174
Indeed, Richards v. Jefferson County Court explicitly rejected the weighing of
consequences:
173

517 U.S. 793, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (1996).

174

116 S.Ct. at 1765 n. 4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Respondents contend that, even if petitioners did not receive the kind of
opportunity to make their case in court that due process would ordinarily
ensure, the character of their action renders the usual constitutional protections
inapplicable. They contend that invalidation of the occupation tax would have
disastrous consequences on the county . . . .175
But the Court did not accept the invitation to engage in a balancing of interests:
Of course, we are aware that governmental and private entities have
substantial interests in the prompt and determinative resolution of challenges
to important legislation. We do not agree with the Alabama Supreme Court,
however, that, given the amount of money at stake, respondents were entitled
to rely on the assumption that the [prior] action "authoritatively establish[ed]"
the constitutionality of the tax. . . .A state court's freedom to rely on prior
precedent in rejecting a litigant's claims does not afford it similar freedom to
bind a litigant to a prior judgment to which he was not a party. That general
rule clearly applies when a taxpayer seeks a hearing to prevent the State from
subjecting him to a levy in violation of the Federal Constitution.176
The important point is that the Court in Richards did not engage in Matthews v.
Eldridge balancing; rather, it relied on a general rule that guarantees an opportunity to
be heard, i.e. a right of participation.
Putting aside the dimension of fit, does the utilitarian version of the balancing
model provide the best justification for the structure of existing procedure doctrine?
This is a large question, to put it mildly. Certainly, utilitarian reasoning has played a
role in thinking about the law.177 Moreover, it seems overwhelmingly plausible to
believe that consequences do count in legal justification. Even the most ardent
adherents of rights-based approaches are unlikely to maintain that accuracy or
participation must be purchased at any cost, and the magnitude of the costs imposed is
itself relevant to questions of fairness. Thus, a utilitarian account captures at least part
of the story.
But does the utilitarian version of the balancing model tell the whole story? Does
utilitarianism provide the right kind of justification for the existing system of
procedure? Consider the following argument for a negative answer to these questions.
Recall the observation, made above, that ours is a pluralist society, in which there are a
variety of competing comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Although some
features of utilitarianism, such as the insistence that consequences do count, are the
subject of wide agreement, other features, most especially the utilitarian beliefs that
only consequences count and that all values can be reduced to a single metric, are
highly controversial. For this reason, utilitarian moral theory does not provide an
175

Id. at 1768.

176

Id. at 1769.

177

For a very explicit appeal to utilitarian norms, see Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental
Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT. TAX J. 407 (1995).
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appropriate justification for our system of procedure. The right sort of justification
must draw on public reasons, and in particular, on widely shared values that are
implicit in our public political culture. The utilitarian notion that consequences count
does provide a public reason, but the utilitarian premise that all rights ultimately
depend on maximizing some nonmoral good, is not a justification of the appropriate
sort.
b) Deontological Constraints on Balancing: Consideration of Cost and
Recognition of Procedural Rights
Consider then an alternative to the consequentialist model of imperfect procedural
justice. Is it possible to formulate a model of imperfect procedural justice that uses
deontological notions, such as fairness and rights, to give a systematic account for the
ways in which a system of procedure should aim for less-than-complete accuracy and
for the distribution of the costs imposed by such a system? This conception of
procedural justice would need to incorporate accounts of the fair distribution of
procedural burdens and of the correction of procedural injustice.
Begin with the most obvious burden imposed by imperfect procedural justice, the
risk of error. Does fairness have anything to say about the distribution of this risk? In
the civil context, the baseline notion seems to be that the risks of error should be
distributed equally. That is, neither plaintiffs nor defendants should enjoy an
advantage in any particular category of cases. The clearest expression of this notion is
found in the formulation of the burden of proof on most issues in civil litigation. The
preponderance of the evidence standard seems designed to spread the risk of error
evenly across potential litigants.178 Why? Consider the alternatives. Suppose that in
ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff were required to prevail “beyond reasonable doubt” or
by “clear and convincing evidence.” Such burdens would allocate the risk of error
unevenly—resulting in a higher loss rate for plaintiffs with meritorious claims than for
defendants entitled to prevail on the merits.
The risk of error is influenced by a large number of factors. The hypothesis is that
the criteria of fit and justification are best satisfied by a fairness-based conception of
178

Consider the following possibility, that the overall risk of error can be minimized by a
procedure that distributes the risk asymmetrically. For example, imagine that the baseline rate of
error in a particular context is .2 (and hence the accuracy rate is .8) with the risk distributed
equally between potential plaintiffs and defendants (each bearing a .1 risk of an erroneous
decision that goes against them and a .1 risk of an erroneous decision in their favor). Suppose
further that a procedural change would reduce the overall risk to .15 (and hence the accuracy rate
is .85), but that all of this risk would be borne by plaintiffs. If accuracy alone were considered,
then the procedural change would be preferred (.85 > .8), but if equal distribution of the risk of
error is of independent value, then the change might be ruled out on the ground that .15 risk or
erroneous decisions that disadvantage plaintiffs accompanied by a .0 risk of erroneous decisions
that disadvantage defendants is less fair than the symmetrical risk (.1 and .1) that was associated
with the baseline error rate.
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imperfect procedural justice, requiring an equal distribution of these risks across
plaintiffs and defendants from the ex ante perspective. This hypothesis would be
confirmed if it could be shown that existing doctrine avoids asymmetrical distributions
of the risk of error, except in those cases in which there are countervailing
considerations of fairness (or cost).179 This claim needs to be qualified: some
asymmetry may be unavoidable. The criterion of fit does not require that the doctrine
fit the goal specified by the criteria of fairness in the conception of procedural fairness
perfectly; if the current practice approximates the maximum degree of satisfaction of
the criteria that is practically possible, then the conceptions can be said to fit current
practice.
There is at least one way in which existing doctrine does not seem to spread the risk
of error equally across the various classes of litigants. In an adversary system, the
quality of representation may affect the risk of erroneous deprivation of substantive
rights. Given that the quality of representation depends on the ability to pay, current
civil procedure doctrine would seem to provide a systematic distribution of the risk of
error in favor of those who have the greatest share of social resources. Equal
distribution of the risk of error would seem to require the equalization of legal
resources,180 but current doctrine provides very little in the way of such equalization,
especially in cases without a clear market value. This evidence does not suffice to
settle the matter. It might turn out that inequality of legal resources is required by other
considerations of fairness, e.g. by fundamental economic liberties. These important
issues are outside the scope of this Article.
A fairness- or rights-based conception of imperfect procedural justice will have
implications for the distribution of other costs that are imposed by the system of
procedure. For example, liberal discovery may operate to increase accuracy, but it also
imposes burdens on both litigants and third parties. A rights-based approach would
attend to the question whether discovery would violate the preexisting moral or legal
rights of the parties, for example, rights to privacy. Rather than balancing the costs of
privacy invasions against the benefits in terms of increased accuracy, a rights-based
conception might look to the question whether the privacy right has been waived, and if
not, whether that right is more fundamental (or ranked higher in a lexical ordering) than
the interests of the parties in accurate adjudication.
The adequacy of a fairness-based conception of imperfect procedural justice is
more difficult to asses than is the adequacy of a utilitarian conception. Utilitarian
accounts are relatively simple in structure, and although the assessment of
179

Asymmetrical risks of error might also be justified where they were to the benefit of the
party that bears the higher risk of error. Thus, in a variation of the example provided above,
supra note 178, a change from a symmetrical risk of .1 for plaintiffs and .1 for defendants (total
= .2) to an asymmetrical risk of .05 for plaintiffs and .0 for defendants (total =.05) on the ground
that the risk of error disadvantaging plaintiffs is reduced (.05 < .1), even though it becomes
unequal (.0 ≠ .05).
180

See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF'S 303

(1988).
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consequences may be difficult in practice, it may well be possible to devise test cases
that will reveal the lack of fit between the utilitarian account and existing doctrine.
This simplicity is lacking in the case of fairness-based conceptions. A great deal of
argumentative work needs to be done in order to produce even the sketch of a fairnessbased conception of imperfect procedural justice, and until that work is done, it simply
isn’t possible to determine whether existing doctrine fits the conception. There is
another complication here, raised by the relationship between the criteria of fit and
justification. If fit alone were the criteria, a rights-based conception could turn out to
be empty and impossible to falsify. One could always gerrymander a conception of
procedural rights, according to which, one has exactly those rights that existing
doctrine embodies. The criterion of justification demands that the conception of
procedural justice provide a coherent justification for the shape of existing doctrine.
Thus, the criterion of justification rules out arbitrary, post-hoc procedural rights that are
tailored to the shape of existing law. In Part VI, “Principles of Procedural
JusticePrinciples of Procedural Justice,” we will examine an articulated theory of
procedural justice—albeit one that does not fit within the confines of the accuracy
model.
3. The Participation model
Let us now consider a third and final family of conceptions of procedural justice.
The participation model is based on the fundamental idea that procedural fairness
requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in the process
by which it is made.181 The idea that procedural fairness requires participation is a
familiar one. In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 182 Justice Marshall wrote that there are “two
central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken
deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in
the decision-making process.”183
The participation model is not well-defined, because it rests on uncertain and
varying foundations: for this reason, we will investigate four interpretations of the
model. The four interpretations are unified by the idea of pure procedural justice, that
is, by the idea that the fairness of a procedure is a function, not of some independent
criteria, but instead of the intrinsic features of the procedure itself. This entails that the
outcome of the procedure is fair, whatever it is, provided that the requirements of the
181

See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1489 (1991) (“Procedural fairness, however, is not subsumed completely by
substantive justice. Procedural fairness means that a legitimate decisionmaking process promotes
independent values of participation, deliberation, and consensus.”); Michelman, Formal and
Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1977).
182

446 U.S. 238 (1980).

183

Id. at 242. Justice Marshall cited Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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procedure have been satisfied. The first interpretation, considered in Part IV.B.3.a),
“The Gaming Interpretation,” briefly explores the notion that litigation should be
considered a fair game or contest that where the winner is entitled to prevail if she
played by the rules and is entitled under the rules to win. The second, considered in
Part IV.B.3.b), “The Dignity Interpretation,” emphasizes dignity and autonomy as a
function of the actual participation of litigants in procedures that affect them. The
third, considered in Part IV.B.3.c), “The Satisfaction Interpretation,” argues that
participatory process is justified by the greater level of satisfaction it provides to
litigants.
The fourth, considered in Part IV.B.3.d), “The Discourse Theory
Interpretation,” appeals to an ideal communication situation as the criterion of what
constitutes a just or correct outcome and then argues that civil procedure doctrine aims
at approximating this ideal.
a) The Gaming Interpretation
At the outset, we should dispose of the least plausible interpretation of the
participation model, which I shall call the gaming interpretation. The gaming expresses
two related, but somewhat inconsistent ideas about procedural fairness: one is captured
by the analogy between litigation and a game of chance, and the other is expressed by
the metaphor of the level playing field. Each of these two ideas is explored in turn.
The first idea is that civil litigation is like a game of chance. Gambling contests are
examples of pure procedural justice, so long as the rules are announced in advance and
enforced, because gamblers and athletes agree to the procedure. No procedural
unfairness can attach to one’s having bet heavily on three aces if one loses to four twos.
On this model, the side that wins a game of civil litigation game deserves its victory, so
long as all of the rules were followed.
As one might suspect, this theory has been advanced by its opponents, notably
Bentham184 and should properly be viewed as a straw man or a reductio of the
participation model. Jerome Frank provided a loose statement of this view:
Wigmore (following up a suggestion made by Bentham) suggested that ‘the
common law, originating in a community of sports and games, was permeated
by the instinct of sportsmanship’ which led to a ‘sporting theory of justice,’ a
theory of ‘legalized gambling.’ This theory, although it had some desirable
effects, ‘has contributed,’ said Wigmore, ‘to lower the system of administering
justice and in particular of ascertaining truth in litigation, to the level of a mere
game of skill or chance . . .’ in which lawyers use evidence ‘as one plays a

184

Jeremy Bentham used the analogy to criticize the idea of pure procedural justice as "a
maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench." 7
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1843),
quoted in Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971).
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trump card, or draws to three aces, or holds back a good horse till the homestretch.’185
The difficulty with the gaming interpretation of the participation model is that litigants
do not choose to file or defend lawsuits in the same way that gamblers choose to join a
poker game. If one’s legal rights have been violated and the violator refuses voluntary
alternative dispute resolution, then litigation is the only game in town. Even if it were
fair to analogize the filing of a civil action to entering a sporting event, the requisite
voluntary choice is missing in the case of civil defendants who can be compelled to
play against their will at the risk of a binding default judgment being entered against
them.
If I chose to play a game of poker and lose $10,000, that outcome can be said to be
fair, so long as everyone who played abided by the rules. Poker players chose to play
the game that is constituted by the rules of poker, and it would be very odd indeed if an
experienced player who lost at poker were to complain that she had been cheated on the
grounds that poker itself is unfair. But if I am forced to play a game of civil litigation
and lose $10,000, then there is a further question: were the procedural rules fair? This
question suggests another version of the gaming theory, captured by the metaphor of a
“level playing field” frequently used in judicial opinions.186
What is meant by a level playing field? A sporting contest is unfair if the field is
tilted, giving one side an unfair advantage. But the notion of unfair advantage must be
cashed out. In a sporting contest, a level playing field is required so that the skill of the
athletes will determine the outcome. But we do not believe that the skill of the lawyers
should determine the outcome of civil litigation, although we acknowledge that in fact,

185

JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 91 (1949); see also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,
102 (1977) (Fortas, J., concurring)(arguing a trial is “not a sporting event”); Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279. William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report,
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990).
186

U.S. v. O'Keefe, --- F.3d ----, 1997 WL 700484, *10 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 1997) (discussing
“level playing field between the prosecution and the defense”); United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, No.
97-323-01, 1997 WL 679104, *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1997) (“While we find it unnecessary to
identify an absolute constitutional right to a level playing field in these cases, we do find that if
the prosecution is able to use complete and accurate Taxol technology documents to measure for
the jury the dimensions of the secret involved, the defendants should be given the means to rebut
it.”); Saunders v. City of Philadelphia, NO. 97-3251, 1997 WL 400034, *6 (E.D.Pa. July 11,
1997) (stating “the public interest, we find, is best served where all parties have a level playing
field, as set forth in the apposite rules of civil and criminal procedure.”); Bilbo for Basnaw v.
Shelter Ins. Co., 96-1476, 698 So.2d 691 (La. Ct. App., Jul. 30, 1997) (“The effect of the
amendment [making summary judgment more freely available] is to level the playing field
between the parties in two ways: first, the supporting evidence submitted by the parties should
be scrutinized equally, and second, the overriding presumption in favor of trial on the merits is
removed.”).
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lawyer skill may play a role. As a normative matter, an ideal of procedural justice that
is fair to lawyer-contestants is completely unattractive.187
The gaming interpretation of the participation model is a nonstarter as a theory of
procedural justice, precisely because it does not recognize the cogency of the very
question it is supposed to address. Although the gaming interpretation cannot be
considered a serious candidate, it does enable us to see what is at stake in our
investigation of the participation model. We need an interpretation of what makes a
process fair that can address fact that civil litigation is not a freely chosen activity.
b) The Dignity Interpretation
The second interpretation of the participation model connects the independent value
of process with the dignity of those who are affected by legal proceedings.188 One way
of articulating this central notion is that everyone is entitled to their day in court. This
right to participation is justified by a background right of political morality, i.e. the
right of persons (or citizens) to be treated with dignity and respect. A procedure which
ensures parties an opportunity to participate in the process of making decisions that
affect them might be counted as a just procedure for this reason, independently of the
correctness of the outcome that results from the procedures.
Robert Bone describes a closely related notion as follows: “The ‘day in court’ ideal
in American adjudication is linked to a process-oriented view of adjudicative
participation that values participation for its own sake, not just for its impact on
outcome quality. Participation is important because it gives individuals a chance to
make their own litigation choices.”189 A variety of values are invoked in connection
187

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”).
188

The dignity argument is associated with its eloquent exposition by Jerry Mashaw. See
JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-253 (1985); see also Jerry
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885
(1981); Owen Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 978 (1993) (stating
“participation has a value in its own right, manifesting a public commitment to the dignity and
worth of the individual”); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-Face Confrontations
40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1357, 1391-93 (1991) (asserting that participation functions to enhance respect for the
dignity of litigants and reasoned and accurate decisionmaking); Richard Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA.
L.REV. 111, 193 (1978) ("It is this value of individuality -- of respect for personal integrity and
dignity -- that forms the core of inherent dignity. To ignore or deny its existence, or discard its
importance in the procedural due process equation, is to invite a regime hostile to the role of the
individual under the rule of law."). For a critique of the dignity theory, see Rutherford, supra
note, 121, at 42-47.
189
Bone, supra note 136, at 619; see also Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court"
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Robert G. Bone, Personal and
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with the day-in-court ideal, including equality, individuality, and autonomy, but the
most frequently invoked value is dignity, and I shall call the interpretation of the
participation model that is grounded in the notion that participation is essential for
dignity, the “dignity interpretation.”
The best account of the dignitary value of participatory process has been developed
by Jerry Mashaw. 190 Mashaw states the intuitive idea as follows:
At an intuitive level, a dignity approach is appealing. We all feel that process
matters to us irrespective of result. This intuition may be a delusion. We may
be so accustomed to rationalizing demands for improvement in our personal
prospects, in the purportedly neutral terms of process fairness, that we can no
longer distinguish between outcome-oriented motives and process-oriented
arguments.
***
Yet there seems to be something to the intuition that process itself matters.
We do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly. And, however
fuzzy our articulation of the process characteristics that yield a sense of
unfairness, it is commonplace for us to describe process affronts as somehow
related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being taken seriously as
persons.191
Mashaw argues that his dignitary theory of procedural due process provides both a
necessary and sufficient account of the due process clauses.192
There is something to the notion that a right to participation in decision-making
processes is valuable because it respects the dignity and autonomy of those who are
affected by the outcome of those processes. Certainly it is not wrong to say that
including those who are affected in the decision-making process is respectful of their
status as equal citizens (or persons) and of their autonomy. It is plausible to see dignity
as playing at least a supporting role in an account of procedural fairness.
But at this point the question is whether the dignity interpretation of the
participation model offers an independent model or theory of procedural justice. And it
is clear that it does not. First, participation alone is not sufficient to make for a just or
fair procedure. All the participation in the world won’t save a rump trial from a charge
Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U.
L. REV. 213 (1990).
190
See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.REV. 28 (1976).
191

Mashaw, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 190, at 162-63.

192

See id. at 169.
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of injustice. At the very least, the role of accuracy in our understanding of procedural
justice would need to be taken into account. Second, it is not clear that the value of
dignity provides reasons that are sufficiently weighty to counter the other values that
bear on procedural justice. By itself the value of dignity and respect is closely related
to the values that are served by proper etiquette or good manners. Indignity or
disrespect are not the sort of grave injuries that trump other values tout court, but the
dignity interpretation of the participation model would require precisely dignity to have
precisely that kind of force or weight. It does not suffice to say that dignity is a matter
of right, because the concerns implicated by the accuracy model (i.e. the underlying
substantive rights vindicated by the system of procedure) are also matters of right. And
if we were to ask whether the substantive rights served by accuracy trump the right to
be treated with dignity (or vice versa), it is difficult to make the case that the right to
dignity ranks so high that it always trumps other the other rights that are implicated in
procedural fairness. As a general theory of procedural justice, the dignity interpretation
is a nonstarter.
c) The Satisfaction Interpretation
The dignity interpretation is rooted in a rights-based or fairness-centered conception
of political morality, but the third interpretation of the participation model looks to a
more utilitarian measure of the value of process. The satisfaction interpretation of the
participation model uses participant satisfaction as the criteria for the evaluation of
process. A process that provides participants an opportunity to tell their story and
make litigation decisions may be more satisfactory to participants, even if the process is
less accurate or more costly than alternatives which afford less opportunity for
participation. Social psychologists have attempted to measure participant satisfaction
levels and other perceptions of various procedures.193
193

Social psychology has produced a large literature on procedural justice. See E. ALLAN LIND
& TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT &
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 24-25 (1990); Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 296, 300
(1986); Pauline Houlden, Stephen LaTour, Laurens Walker, & John Thibaut, Preference for Modes
of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 13 (1978); Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with
Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531
(1978); Stephen LaTour, Pauline Houlden, Laurens Walker, & John Thibaut, Procedure:
Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L. J. 258 (1976); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice,
Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); E. Allan Lind & P. Christopher
Earley, Procedural Justice and Culture, 27 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 227, 227-40 (1992); E. Allan
Lind & Robin I. Lissak, Apparent Impropriety and Procedural Fairness Judgments, 21 J. EXP.
SOC. PSYCH. 19 (1985); E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L.F.
Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort
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For the purposes of discussion, let us assume that social psychologists were able to
demonstrate that participation is satisfying to litigants and that the satisfaction which it
produces is not substantially dependent on the accuracy and cost of the process. Would
this social fact provide a good and sufficient reason for the participation model?
Stating the issue somewhat differently, would the fact that participatory process
produces high levels of satisfaction support a pure procedural justice theory of civil
litigation?
Once again, the answer to these questions is obviously “no.” To see this point
clearly, let us assume, for the moment, a utilitarian framework for evaluation of these
questions. We assume that participatory process has independent satisfaction value, S.
But there are other values to be weighed in a utilitarian calculus. The benefits of
accurate adjudication, A, and other external costs, C, and benefits, B, of the various
alternatives must be summed. On utilitarian grounds, we should prefer the alternative
with the highest utility score. For each alternative, i, the utility, is calculated as
follows: Ui = Si + Ai + Bi - Ci. But this is the balancing model, and not the participation
model. In order for satisfaction interpretation of the participation model to succeed on
utilitarian grounds, we would need to show that litigant satisfaction is the only
consequence that counts (i.e. that Ui = Si), but there is no basis for making such a
Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 953,
967, 968 tbl. 2 (1990); Norman G. Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness,
and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361 (1994); Austin Sarat, Authority,
Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 647, 649 (1993) (citations omitted) (reviewing Tom Tyler, Why People Obey
the Law (1990); Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our Model
of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 956 (1985); John Thibaut &
Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF.L.REV. 541 (1978); Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings,
46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 106 (1988);
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 1987 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 372
(discussing disputants' preferences for ADR processes over traditional court procedures); Tom R.
Tyler, Jonathan Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities:
The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedure, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 640-41 (1989)
(reporting data from interviews with 329 criminal defendants and concluding that perceptions of
procedural fairness affected attitudes towards judicial authority and government more so than did
outcomes and favorable sentences); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice,
Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply
to Gibson, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 621 (1991); Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind, & John Thibaut, The
Relationship between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA.L.REV. 1401 (1979); James L.
Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political
Tolerance," 23 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 469 (1989); J. Brockner and P. Siegel, Understanding the
Interaction Between Procedural and Distributive Justice in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 390 (Kramer
and Tyler eds. 1996).
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showing. Even if it could be demonstrated that litigants prefer participatory process, all
things considered, even when they are made aware of the accuracy effects and other
social costs and benefits, the would still not be sufficient, because civil proceedings
have effects on persons who are not litigants, e.g. accurate adjudication may produce
general deterrence, legal proceedings may be subsidized by public expenditures, and so
forth. Thus, litigant satisfaction cannot be the sole determinate of the utility of the
procedural system.
This simple utilitarian objection to the satisfaction interpretation is reinforced when
fairness concerns are brought to bear on our evaluation of this variant of the
participation model. Accuracy serves to insure that litigants prevail when they are
entitled to do so, and inaccurate outcomes deny litigants their rights. Even if some
litigants are more satisfied with a process that results in an erroneous outcome that
disadvantages them (but allows them to participate), this does justify denying other
litigants outcomes to which they have a right. This point could be overcome if it could
be shown that all (or almost all) litigants would consent to an erroneous judgment
against them in exchange for more participation, but it seems most unlikely that such a
showing could be made.
It is important to remember that these arguments against the satisfaction
interpretation of the participation model make a very narrow point—that satisfaction
with process is not the whole story about procedural fairness. This narrow point does
not entail the conclusion that litigant satisfaction is unimportant or that it should not be
considered in the evaluation and comparison of specific procedures. The proper
conclusion to draw is that the satisfaction interpretation of the participation model fails
as a stand-alone theory of procedural justice.
d) The Discourse Theory Interpretation
Consider then, a fourth interpretation of the participation model. This interpretation
argues for a deep, constitutive connection between participative process and correct
outcomes. Because this interpretation is most fully expressed in the discourse theory
offered by Jürgen Habermas, I shall call it the “discourse theory interpretation.”
Existing procedures do more than simply provide for participation. Trials, for
example, are conducted according to elaborate rules that insure that both sides have an
equal opportunity to present their case, i.e. to make arguments, to put on and question
witnesses, to introduce physical evidence, and so forth. Decisions are made by neutral
third parties. These features suggest that the procedural system might be conceived on
the model of the ideal communication situation as articulated by Jürgen Habermas.
Habermas has advanced what might be called a discourse theory of truth.194 On the
194
See THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS 291-310 (1978);
see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans. 1984 & 1987) (two volumes).
For an important recent secondary account, see Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) For a basic exposition
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discourse theory, we parse a truth claim as a claim that the proposition asserted as true
would be agreed upon under conditions of rational discourse, including the condition
that all participants have an equal opportunity to engage in, advance, or refute
arguments, question claims, and so forth.195 The key notion is that “ultimately there
can be no separation of the criteria for truth from the criteria for the argumentative
settlement of truth claims.”196 As applied to the context of a civil action, the idea is that
there is no criterion for a legally correct outcome other than the criteria for the
settlement of a civil dispute through fair procedures.197
How does the ideal communication conception of pure procedural justice fare,
when measured against the criteria of fit and justification? Initially, consider the
question of fit. Certainly, there is much that can be said for the notion that the
litigation system aims at the approximation of ideal discourse conditions. For example,
rules about the equality of communicative opportunity are built into a variety of
procedures, including discovery, trial, hearings, and so forth. There does seem to be a
basic notion that in order for a procedure to be fair, each side must be an equal
opportunity to present its case, question, rebut, and so forth.198
Other features of the ideal communication situation are modeled in existing
procedure doctrine. For example, as articulated by Habermas, the ideal communication
situation requires that the validity of norms be subject to challenge. One might see the
appellate system and the practice of judicial review for constitutionality as providing an
institutionalization of this requirement.
If we assume for now that the discourse theory interpretation of the participation
model satisfies the criterion of fit, the next question is whether it satisfies the criterion
of justification. Does the discourse theory offer the best justification for the general
shape of the existing system of civil procedure? This question is complicated by the
of Habermas’s theory, see Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 54 (1988-89). Another
important secondary source is Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice Be
Reconciled through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas's Proceduralist Paradigm of
Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791 (1996).
Thomas McCarthy's commentary is the best and most accurate introduction and guide to
Habermas' thought. See McCarthy, supra. Lucid summaries of Habermas' more recent work are
found in A. BRAND, THE FORCE OF REASON (1990); D. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS (1989); S.
WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS (1988). For a word on the problem of
understanding Habermas's language, see M. PUSEY, JÜRGEN HABERMAS 11 (1986). For a study plan
for approaching the corpus of his work in a systematic fashion, see id. at 124-25. For a brief
introduction, see Bernstein, Introduction, in HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 1 (R. Bernstein ed. 1985).
195

See McCarthy, supra note 194 at 306.

196

Id. at 303.

197

Cf. Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1164 (1987).
198
The idea of equality of litigation opportunity is very similar to the notion of a level
playing field. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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breadth of discourse, which contains within itself, a general account of what constitutes
an adequate justification. Consider then, a very brief summary of the central features
of Habermas’s theory.
Habermas's theory of communicative action borrows from speech act theory.
Persons use language to act—to coordinate behavior through rational agreement.
Promises, assertions, and orders are all examples of communicative actions. When one
engages in a speech act, one implicitly raises validity claims—to comprehensibility,
truth, sincerity, and right. When I ask you to close the window, I am explicitly making
a claim (1) to truth, that there is a window and that it can be closed, (2) to sincerity, that
my request is sincere (not a joke or irony or sarcasm), and (3) to right, that it is
appropriate for me to make such a request of you. Engaging in the request
pragmatically commits me to redeem any of these validity claims should you challenge
the claim. Redemption occurs in rational discourse: we seek to reach an agreement or
consensus on the challenged validity claim. Our search is rational in the sense that we
seek agreement based on the force of the better argument and we rule out coercion or
deception as the basis for agreement.
Habermas's theory can be understood as an attempt to develop a communicative
conception of rationality. Such a communicative conception contrasts with a subjective
(or Cartesian) view. According to the subjective conception, rationality is understood
as a property of an individual's isolated deliberation. The communicative conception
views rationality intersubjectively: rationality is a property of agreements among
persons. Thus, the operative notion of agreement is the idea of a rational consensus,
distinguished from the brute fact of bare agreement.
Habermas argues that a rational consensus is one that results purely from the force
of the better arguments, and not from constraints on communication. The absence of
such constraints can be elucidated in terms of the formal structure of the
communicative situation. A communicative situation is structured without constraint
only if it is open to all with the ability to communicate, it provides equal opportunity to
engage in communication, and the participants are motivated solely by a cooperative
search for truth or right. These conditions are met in the ideal communication
situation,199 which Habermas formerly labeled the “ideal speech situation.”
The ideal communication situation can be defined more precisely by identifying
three rules that formalize its conditions:
(1) Rule of Participation. Each person who is capable of engaging in
communication and action is allowed to participate.
(2) Rule of Equality of Communicative Opportunity. Each participant is given
equal opportunity to communicate with respect to the following:
a. Each participant is allowed to call into question any
proposal;
199
See T. McCarthy, supra note 194, at 306; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, REASON
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY, supra note 194, at 25.

AND THE
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b. Each participant is allowed to introduce any proposal into
the discourse; and
c. Each participant is allowed to express attitudes, sincere
beliefs, wishes, and needs.
(3) Rule against Compulsion. No participant may be hindered by
compulsion—whether arising from inside the discourse or outside of it—from
making use of the rights secured under (1) and (2).200
As Thomas McCarthy put it, the ideal communication situation can serve "as a
guide for the institutionalization of discourse and as a critical standard against which
every actually achieved consensus can be measured."201 To return to the Dworkinian
criterion of justification, discourse theory maintains that an adequate justification is one
that would be the subject of rational agreement under the conditions of the ideal
communication situation. This is the point expressed by the following passage, which
is laden with the theoretical vocabulary of Habermas’s theory: "Just those action norms
are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational
discourses."202
Thus, the formal model of the ideal communication situation might provide a route
to justification of the participation model. The argument could begin with the rule of
participation. The rule of participation formalizes the notion that an agreement cannot
count as rationally motivated if it can be demonstrated that it was only reached because
someone who would have disagreed was excluded from the process of deliberation. In
the context of litigation, the rule of participation would justify familiar principles of
procedural due process, e.g. the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The second step in the argument for the participation model from discourse theory
would focus on the rule of equality of communicative opportunity. This uptake of this
rule is that an agreement does not count as a rational consensus if it is reached under
conditions where one participant or group of participants is not allowed to engage in
the same quantity or quality of speech acts. Participants must have the same
opportunities to initiate and perpetuate communication. In the context of procedure
rules, the rule of equality of communicative opportunity is reflected in a wide variety of
rules that provide equal opportunity to engage in discovery, the presentation of
witnesses, cross examination, and so forth. Where local rules limit the number of
interrogatories, the rule is not that the plaintiff shall have 30 and the defendant 10. If
200
This formulation is based on one suggested by Robert Alexy and adopted by Habermas.
See J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, supra note 194, at 89;
Alexy, Eine Theorie des praktishen Diskurses, in Normenbegrudung und Normendurchsetzung
40-41 (W. Oelmüller ed. 1978); R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation 119-24, 193 (R.
Adler & N. McCormack trans. 1989). The names given to the three rules are mine.
201

T. MCCARTHY, supra note 194, at 309.

202

HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 194, at 107; see also William Rehg,
Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jürgen
Habermas, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1149-51 (1996) (discussing Habermas’s formulation).
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the amount of time allowed the plaintiff to present his case is limited to one day, the
defendant is likely to be allowed a roughly equal amount of time.203
Habermas himself has made the connection between discourse theory and rules of
procedure:
Rules of court procedure institutionalize judicial decision making in such a
way that the judgment and its justification can be considered the outcome of
an argumentation game governed by a special program. Once again, legal
procedures intertwine with processes of argumentation, and in such a way that
the court procedures instituting legal discourses must not interfere with the
logic or argument internal to such discourses. Procedural law does not
regulate normative-legal discourse as such but secures, in the temporal, social,
and substantive dimensions, the institutional framework that clears the way for
processes of communication governed by the logic of application
discourses.204
Habermas then works through a number of specific examples, drawn from German
criminal and civil procedure.205
In sum, a case can be made that an ideal-communication conception of pure
procedural justice fits the existing contours of procedure doctrine. Indeed, some
commentary on procedure is at least suggestive of a Habermasian view. Maguire and
Vincent, writing in 1935, made the following pronouncement, “Courtroom truth is what
a jury or judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”206
There are, however, a number of problems with the idea that process fairness is the
sole criterion for courtroom truth. One problem arises from the structure of most of
modern evidence doctrine. The rules of evidence seem to assume that there really is a
fact of the matter, and that the admissibility and exclusion of evidence should aim at
maximizing the likelihood that trials will result in fact-finding is accurate by the
independent criteria of what really happened. The basic structure of evidence law,
which is built around ideas of relevance and prejudice, is not structured around the
notion that equal opportunity to present evidence guarantees the emergence of truth.
At a commonsense level, the ideal communication conception of fair process
founder on a very practical objection. Although agreement that is reached under
nonideal conditions, that is, under conditions where one side was not given an
opportunity to present its side may be suspect, it does not follow that agreement
reached under ideal conditions is any guarantee of truth. The reason is simple: inputs
203

If inequalities are allowed, it will be because they are justified by a more basic equality,
e.g., that each side has been provided adequate time to present its case and that more time for one
side would be redundant.
204

Id. at 234-35.

205

See id. at 235-37.

206

Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 Yale L.
J. 226, 238 (1935).
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count. That is, even the fairest trial, conducted under conditions that closely
approximate those of the ideal communication situation, can yield an unjust outcome if
crucial information was not considered.207 Maguire and Vincent’s formulation built
this notion into the idea of courtroom truth: “Courtroom truth,” they said, “is what a
jury or judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”208 The notion that full
presentation of evidence is required for courtroom truth reflects the notion that inputs
count. As the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts put the
point:
Truth in the real world, that is, which, of necessity, may well differ from the
"truth" announced by the jury's verdict. Although the ultimate aim of the
judicial system is to ascertain the real truth, trial is nevertheless, in the scheme
of things, an imperfect method, and the "truth" memorialized by the jury's
verdict may not necessarily mirror actual truth.209
There is no guarantee of perfect accuracy, but system aims for accuracy and not simply
equal opportunity to engage in the presentation of evidence, the questioning of
witnesses, and so forth.
At this point, we can take stock of the participation model. We began with what is
virtually a reductio of the process view, the gaming interpretation; because litigation is
not a voluntary contest between litigants or lawyers, adherence to rules announced in
advance is not sufficient for procedural fairness. The second interpretation, which
emphasizes the dignity interest of litigants, at least gets off the ground, but dignity
enhancing process is not sufficient for fairness in the face of skewed outcomes. The
third interpretation, the satisfaction interpretation suffers from a similar defect; the
subjective satisfactions of participation cannot confer legitimacy on a system with
systematically distorted results. The final attempt to rescue a pure process view
attempts to remedy this defect by positing a constitutive relationship between accuracy
and fair process, but this view is inconsistent with the widely shared and firmly held
convictions of common sense.
C. From the Three Models to a Theory of Procedural Justice
What can we garner from out consideration of the three simple models of
procedural fairness? Some conclusions are uncontroversial. We have very good
reasons to believe that accuracy counts, even if the accuracy model does not tell the
whole story about procedural justice. We also have good reasons to believe that any
207
For Habermas’s view on the relationship between discourse theory and ideas about truth,
see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING, supra note 194, at 135-39; see generally
RICHARD L. KIRKHAM, THEORIES OF TRUTH (1995) (offering an introductory account of
contemporary philosophical thinking about truth).
208
209

Maguire & Vincent, supra note 206, at 238 (emphasis added).
Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991).
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plausible account of procedural justice must account for the costs of procedure,
although we may need to do further work to determine how the consequentialist and
deontological interpretations of cost should be incorporated. These lessons will be
reflected in the specification of the principles of procedural justice in the form of a
principle requiring that accuracy be maximized, subject several provisos, including one
aimed at striking a fair balance between accuracy and the costs of adjudication.210
The question that remains is whether the participation model makes any
contribution to our understanding of procedural justice that is not already captured in
the other two models. Our analysis of the participation model has, so far, been limited
to the question whether it provides the whole story, and we have concluded that it does
not. The question addressed in this part of the essay is whether process tells an
essential and irreducible part of the story. Even if fair process is not the sole criterion
for procedural fairness, it does not follow that the value of participation and equality of
litigation opportunity is measured solely by the contribution made to accuracy and/or
litigant satisfaction. Hence our next question must be: What is the value of
participation?
V. THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION
What is the value of allowing litigants to participate in civil adjudications that may
bind them? Most obviously, a procedure that provides for participation is likely to be
more accurate than one that does not. In addition, litigants may feel more satisfied by
adjudication that affords them the opportunity to tell their story in a meaningful way.
But the focus of the Part of the essay is not on accuracy or satisfaction. Instead our
focus will be on the connection between participation and legitimacy.
A good way to begin this inquiry is to recall what we have called the hard question
of procedural justice: How can we regard ourselves as obligated by legitimate
authority to comply with a judgment that we believe (or even know) to be in error with
respect to the substantive merits? The answer to this question cannot be accuracy—the
hard question arises only when litigants have a warranted belief that the outcome was
not accurate.211 Nor can the answer to this question be a subjective sense of
210

See infra Part VI.A, “The Statement of the Principles.” p. 111.

211

It might be argued that legitimacy can be conferred on an erroneous outcome by a process
that is accurate in the aggregate. Randy Barnett has advanced such a theory in the context of
constitutional legitimacy. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 9-86 (2004). Although Barnett’s theory suggests the view critiqued in
ths footnote, there is a crucial difference. Barnett’s theory answers the question: what makes a
constitution legitimate? He does not answer what we might call the hard question of
consitutional legitimacy: How can I regard a constitutional outcome as unjust when I am injured
by the outcome and it is fundamentally unjust?
Does systemic accuracy confer legitimacy on inaccurate outcomes? Consider a dissatisfied
litigant who answers this question in the negative: she argues that if accuracy is the measure of
legitimacy, then the erroneous outcome that injurs her is clearly illegitimate. The natural counter
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satisfaction.
Satisfaction that is merely subjective cannot confer normative
legitimacy—although it may provide the legitimacy that is required for the important
social goods of voluntary compliance and social stability. The full answer to the hard
question of procedural justice must include a normative theory of procedural
legitimacy. The Participatory Legitimacy Thesis—the central claim of this Part of the
Article—provides such a normative theory. Procedures that purport to bind without
affording meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate.
The central claim of this Part is set forth in Section A, “Participation Is Essential for
Legitimacy,” we investigate the claim that participation has a value that cannot be
reduced to accuracy, because a core right of participation is essential for the legitimacy
of adjudication. Next, in Section B, “Framing the Issue: Reduction or Dependence,”
we examine a framework for pinpointing the stakes in the debate over the value of
process and participation. Then in Section C, “Dignity, Equality, and Autonomy,” we
survey three justifications that have been offered for the proposition that participation
has a value that cannot be reduced to accuracy or cost. Finally in Section D, “Answers
to Objections,” we review a number of arguments that have been raised against the idea
that process counts quite apart from considerations of accuracy and cost.
A. Participation Is Essential for Legitimacy
This section lays out the case that a right of participation is essential for the
legitimacy of a final and binding civil proceeding. The aim of this Section is to narrow
our focus in two ways. First, the value of process that cannot be reduced to accuracy or
cost is connected with participation. Second, the normative foundation of the
irreducible value of participation must be found in the notion of legitimacy.
1. A Statement of the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis
Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication processes212—
that is the core idea, but the full statement of the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis is
more complex:
is to argue that she would have consented in advance to this procedure, because it gives her the
best chance of systemic accuracy. To this argument, she might have two responses. First, she
might argue that overall systemic accuracy does not guarantee maximum accuracy in particular
case types. If her case is of a type for which the general, transsubstantive rules of procedure are
less accurate than alternative rules, she could argue that she would not have consented. Second
and independently, she may argue that if hypothetical consent is the criterion, that she would not
consent on the basis of accuracy alone. In particular, she might argue that she would have
demanded both reasonable rights of participation and a reasonable balance between procedural
costs and benefits before she would have given her hypothetical consent.
212

Cf. Bone, supra note 136, at 625 (“A strong participation right can be justified only by a
normative theory of process value that grounds the value of participation in the conditions of
adjudicative legitimacy, such as respect for a party's dignity or autonomy.”).
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Because a right of participation must be afforded to those to be bound by
judicial proceedings in order for those proceedings to serve as a legitimate
source of authority, the value of participation cannot be reduced to a function
of the effect of participation on outcomes; nor can the value of participation
be reduced to a subjective preference or feeling of satisfaction.
The full statement adumbrates several important distinctions. First, legitimacy does not
require actual participation, only an option or right is required, because participation
may be voluntarily forsworn. Second, so far as legitimacy is concerned, it is the option
to participate at a meaningful stage that is crucial: temporary decisions that are not
binding may be unjust for other reasons, but they do not violate the fundamental
requirement of legitimacy. Third, the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis makes a claim
about the relationship between participatory legitimacy and outcomes: the value of
participation cannot be reduced to the effect of participation on outcomes. With these
distinctions in place, we can turn to the obvious question: What does it mean to say that
the legitimacy of civil dispute resolution depends on affording those who are to be
bound a right of participation?213
2. The Analogy with Legislation
We can approach the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis by first examining an
analogous case, the case of legitimacy in the exercise of legislative power. For the
exercise of legislative power to be legitimate, the legislation must be the outcome of a
process that satisfies norms of democratic participation214 (and perhaps other norms as
well). These norms include the requirement that citizens have either the right to vote
213
The connection between legitimacy and participation has recently been explored by
Christopher Peters. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev.
312 (1997). Many other commentators who have noted the connection between the legitimacy of
adjudication and participation. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 4 (1949) (“Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. It indicates in part
the hold which the law process has over the litigants. They have participated in the lawmaking.
They are bound by something they helped to make.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure,
98 Yale L.J. 945, 951 (1989) (book review) (“One other value [to due process] might be to assure
an individual participation in decisions affecting him or her, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of
the ultimate decision.”); John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's
Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859, 874
(noting connection in context of Ninth Circuit’s summary disposition procedures). Cf. Peter
Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 202-03 (1983) (noting connection between participation
and legitimacy in context of criminal procedure).
214

See generally Kenneth Ward, The Allure and Danger of Community Values: A Criticism
of Liberal Republican Constitutional Theory, 24 Hastings Const. L.Q. 171, 188-89 (1996)
(discussion connection between participation and democratic legitimacy in republican theory).
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directly on legislative proposals or to vote for representatives to whom the citizens
have delegated legislative authority.215 The norms of democratic participation also
include the requirement that citizens have a right to freedom of expression regarding
legislative matters and the election of government officials.216 If these norms are not
satisfied, then the outcome of the legislative process is not regarded as legitimate.
The connection between participation and legitimacy is a strong one. First,
legislation that is imposed by an unelected authority is illegitimate even if the particular
laws that are passed are good ones, as measured by appropriate standards of political
morality. Second, undemocratic legislation is illegitimate, even if the undemocratic
process (benevolent dictatorship) reliably produces excellent laws.
Third,
undemocratic legislation is illegitimate, even if the legislation would have been
approved by citizens had they been afforded an opportunity to do so. Rights of
democratic participation are essential to the legitimacy of legislative processes.
It might be thought that legislative process demonstrates that process is
unimportant, because there is no individual right to a hearing before a legislature passes
a statute or an agency makes a rule, even if the statute or rule will have a substantial
effect on one’s interest.217 But this argument is off the mark, at least if the target is the
proposition is the proposition that participation in the process never matters to
procedural fairness. For example, the right to an equal vote matters aside from
outcomes. Edmund Burke’s virtual representation theory218 counts, in our political
culture, as a paradigm case of bad political theory: we take the slogan, “No taxation
without representation,” as an expression of a fundamental political value of great
importance. A right of participation in the form of an equal vote in the election of
representatives is thought to be a prerequisite for the fairness or justice of the
legislative process. The case of legislation illustrates the general proposition that a
right of participation may be essential to legitimacy, quite apart from its effects on
outcomes.
3. The Importance of Legitimacy
Why is legitimacy important? Citizens are not obligated to regard illegitimate laws
as authoritative and consequently they have no content-independent obligation of
215
See Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the
Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 792 (1992) (“Democratic government
derives its legitimacy from the formal consent and ongoing participation of the governed, who
are considered the ultimate source of political authority.”).
216

Cf. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 882 (1963) (discussing relationship between democratic legitimacy and right of
participation); cf. also John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and
Equality, 85 Ky. L.J. 9, *45 (1997) (commenting on Emerson’s position).
217

See supra note V.D.6, “The Counter-example of Legislation.”

218

HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174-76 (1967) ("Virtual
representation exists where the substantive content and effect occur without election.").

86

Published by Digital USD, 2004

89

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
political morality to obey such laws, except such obligation as is imposed by the
correspondence of the laws with the independent requirements of political morality.219
Given human nature and pluralism in matters of politics, religion, and morality, there
will inevitably be disagreement about the justice or goodness of particular laws. The
consequence of such disagreement under circumstances of illegitimacy is that citizens
should frequently regard themselves as morally obligated or authorized to disobey
particular laws. This does not necessarily entail general social disorder. The state may
be able to coerce obedience to illegitimate laws—although depending on social
circumstances, such coercion may require the repressive use of state power. But even
if normative legitimacy is not required for social stability, it is nonetheless a very great
social good. A society in which citizens can reasonably regard themselves as having a
content-independent obligation to obey the law is better than a society in which the law
begins with a presumption of illegitimacy.
As it is with legislation, so it goes with adjudication. The exercise of adjudicative
power to bind an individual must be legitimate for the adjudication to be authoritative
and hence to create content-independent obligations of political morality to obey
judicial decrees and to respect the finality of judgments. This conclusion is strongly
supported by our investigation of the nature of procedure in Part II, “Substance and
Procedure.” The upshot of that investigation was the entanglement thesis, including the
idea that procedure transforms general and abstract conduct rules into particular and
concrete action guiding legal norms. The requirement of legitimacy for substantive
law reflects the action-guiding role of conduct rules. The entanglement thesis
establishes that procedure performs a similar function—guiding action in particular and
concrete factual contexts.
More plainly, adjudication is lawmaking.
The
particularization that procedure provides is required for the law to do its work of
guiding action, because of the three problems identified at the outset of our discussion:
(1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Not only does procedure
guide primary conduct, procedure must guide conduct for substance to guide action.
Moreover, in the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we regard the
legitimacy as a political good. The goodness of legitimacy flows from an intuitively
appealing principle of political morality: each citizen who is to be bound by an official
proceeding for the resolution of a civil dispute should be able to regard the procedure
as a legitimate source of binding authority creating a content independent obligation of
political morality for the parties to the dispute.220 The notion that the procedures for
the adjudication of civil disputes should be legitimate is not controversial. We hold to
this notion for important reasons of principle and policy. As a pragmatic matter, it is
219

Thus, one may have an obligation to obey an illegitimate law against murder, because the
content of the law is itself required by political morality.
220

Note the modal qualification: citizens should be able to regard adjudication as legitimate.
There may be citizens who will not believe that adjudication is legitimate, even when all of the
objective conditions for legitimacy have been met. This may result, for example, from the
clouding of judgment that results from self interest.
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important that citizens be able to regard procedures as legitimate so that we may secure
their voluntary cooperation with the system of civil justice;221 great social evils would
attend a system that was required to resort to sanctions and incentives to secure the
compliance of citizens who regarded the system as illegitimate and hence did not
regard the system as a source of binding authority or moral obligation.222 This
argument of policy is complemented by one of principle: as a matter of political
morality it would be unjust to coerce compliance with the judgments of a civil justice
system which could not be regarded by reasonable citizens as legitimate.
As in the case of legislation, the legitimacy of adjudication depends on affording
those who are to be bound a right to participate, either directly or through adequate
representation.223 As in the case of legislation, adjudication is not legitimate if the

221

This point is strongly associated with the work of Tom Tyler. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler,
Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 219, 231 (1997) (stating “people defer to rules primarily because of their judgments about
how those rules are made, rather than their evaluations of their content. Judgments about the
fairness of decision-making authorities have been found to be more central to a rule's legitimacy,
and to people's willingness to accept it, than are judgments of decision favorability. In other
words, people are willing to defer to laws and legal authorities on procedural justice grounds.”).
For more work by Tyler and others on the connection between participation and perceptions of
legitimacy, see supra note 193 (collecting sources); see also Raymond Paternoster, Robert
Brame, Ronet Bachman, Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 165 (1997) (stating “being
treated fairly by authorities, even while being sanctioned by them, influences both a person's
view of the legitimacy of group authority and ultimately that person's obedience to group
norms”); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 40203 (2000) (stating “the use of procedures regarded as fair by all parties facilitates the
maintenance of positive relations among group members, preserving the fabric of society, even in
the face of the conflict of interest that exists in any group whose members have different
preference structures and different beliefs concerning how the group should manage its affairs”).
222

Of course, psychological legitimacy would suffice for this purpose. So, for example, we
might be able to achieve psychological legitimacy through the use of manipulation, coercion, or
deception. But if we reject the use of these techniques on grounds of political morality, the
alternative is that we offer a sound justification for the normative legitimacy of adjudication.
223
See Peters, supra note 213, at 347 (“most judicial decisions are to a very great extent
products not of the unilateral decree of a judge or panel of judges, but rather of a process of
participation and debate among the parties to the case that greatly restricts the decisional options
available to the court. In this sense, judicial decisions resemble the decisions made by a democratic
legislature after debate and a fair hearing at which all relevant views have been aired.”); Martin H.
Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 Def.
Couns. J. 18, *24 (1996) (observing with respect to aggregative procedures in mass tort
litigation, “The unease about the suggestion must be attributed to different concerns--the belief
that the legitimacy of a democratic system and the dignity of those who make up society require
the actual participation of the citizenry in the governing process. It is arguable that a similar
dignitary legitimacy analysis dictates that a defendant have the opportunity to litigate each

88

Published by Digital USD, 2004

91

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
norms of participation are violated, (a) even if the outcome of the particular
adjudication would be considered right by independent norms of political morality, (b)
even if the procedure was generally reliable, and (c) even if the outcome would have
been the same had the required participation actually occurred.
Why is a right to participation required if citizens are to regard civil procedures as
legitimate? To see the answer to this question clearly, we must return to the hard
question of procedural legitimacy. When we seek to identify the conditions for the
legitimacy of adjudication, we should assume the point of view of a citizen who is to be
bound to a judgment that she has good reason to believe is in error and is adverse to her
interests or wishes. For her, the question is, “Can I reasonably regard a procedure that
did not afford me a right to participation (to observe and be heard) as a legitimate
source of final binding authority that creates an obligation of political morality for me
to comply with the outcome of the procedure?” If the answer to this question is “no,”
then we should affirm the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis.
Let us take up the point of view of a citizen who is to be finally bound by a decision
she regards as erroneous. From her perspective, it is clear that being barred from
participation undermines the legitimacy of civil adjudication. If I do not participate in a
procedure that purports to bind me with finality, it is always open to me to object that
the procedure was defective because an element of my case was not even considered by
the tribunal through no fault of mine. For example, I may complain that salient facts
were not presented or that a relevant legal principle was overlooked. I might argue that
the tribunal did not hear my claim that the law applied was invalid on constitutional
grounds, or I might contend that the tribunal failed to evaluate my contention that my
case was an exceptional one in which equity required an adjustment of the legal rule.
The right of participation is the right observe, to make arguments and present evidence,
and to be informed of the reasons for a decisions. Without these participation rights, I
cannot be assured that the proceeding considered my view of the law and facts.
On the other hand, if I have been given the right to participate in the proceeding and
chosen not to make a potentially salient argument (e.g., to present evidence, make legal
arguments, challenge the validity of the law, or argue for an equitable exception), then I
may not reasonably complain that the proceeding was illegitimate on the ground my
arguments were not considered by the tribunal, since I will be the author of the decision
not to present them. By participating or waiving the right to participate, I become an224
“author” of the proceeding; the choice of what arguments will be advanced on my
behalf becomes my choice. As Christopher Peters has observed:
[J]udicial decisions are to a very great extent products not of the unilateral
decree of a judge or panel of judges, but rather of a process of participation
and debate among the parties to the case that greatly restricts the decisional
plaintiff's damages, even if one were to assume that the end result of such a process would be
roughly equivalent to the result of a sampling procedure.”).
224
“An author” but not “the author”—judges, juries, and other litigants are also “authors” of
a civil action and its outcomes.
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options available to the court. In this sense, judicial decisions resemble the
decisions made by a democratic legislature after debate and a fair hearing at
which all relevant views have been aired.225
One point deserves special mention before we proceed. A citizen who could be
finally bound may wish to raise points that either cannot or likely will not have any
affect of the outcome of the proceeding. An important example of this involves what
we might call principled dissent from legal norms. Even if I have no viable legal
argument against a legal norm that binds me, I may have an interest in making (or even
attempting to make) arguments that the norm is illegitimate. In the United States, such
arguments may don constitutional garb, because many arguments of political morality
can be dressed in the clothes of equal protection, due process, or freedom of speech.226
But such arguments need not be legal, and even if legal, may be raised as a matter of
principle and not because they have a realistic possibility of success.227 Some citizens
may regard themselves as morally obligated to express their principled dissent from
legally valid norms.228
This discussion allows us to clarify three aspects of the Participatory Legitimacy
Thesis. First, a right or option to participate is required for final and binding
adjudication to be legitimate—the claim is qualified by the terms “right or option,”
“final,” and “binding.” Second, the legitimacy which participation confers upon
adjudication cannot be reduced to accuracy enhancing effects or to subjective
preferences, feelings of satisfaction, or even to perceptions of legitimacy. Third, we
have yet specified the institutional form of the minimum right of participation that is
the subject of the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis.
4. Three Thought Experiments
So far, the case of the participatory legitimacy thesis has rested on abstract
consideration of political philosophy. The abstract can be supplemented by the
concrete—a pair of thought experiments designed to elicit first our intuitions and then
our considered judgments about the relationship between procedure and legitimacy.
Before I go any further, I want to make two concessions about these thought
experiments. The first concession is that my thought experiments may not succeed in
225

Peters, supra note 213, at 347.

226

In addition to the constitutional arguments in text, more unconventional arguments may
be made on the basis of the Ninth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend 9, or privileges and
immunities, U.S. CONST. amend 14.
227

At this point, critics might argue that such arguments are aimed at success in the court of
public opinion or in the courts of the relatively distant future. This may be the case, but it need
not be so. A citizen might regard herself as obligated to register dissent, even if she believes that
she has not likelihood of success.
228
This point would assume a greater significance in a system that permitted jury
nullification.
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pumping from you the same intuitions they pump from me,229 but I would ask you to
bear in mind that reasonable people do share my intuitions. The second concession is
that bare intuitions are not sufficient to make my case. Let my stipulate that the term
“intuition” describes our initial, unreflective reaction to a thought experiment. Further
stipulate, that such intuitions, if confirmed by reflection and deliberation, can be said to
constitute “considered judgments.” The purpose of the thought experiments is to
provide a combination of intuition and supporting grounds that will yield good and
sufficient reasons for us to reach considered judgments about procedural fairness.
Exclusion from a Meeting. Imagine that you are a faculty member excluded
(without good cause) from a faculty meeting on a topic that concerns you, or a judge
excluded from a meeting of your judicial council, or a lawyer excluded from a firm
meeting, or a law review editor excluded from a meeting of the editorial board.
Suppose further that you are fully satisfied with the outcome of the meeting and that
the meeting did not impose excessive costs or otherwise violate any rights, except your
right to participate. Indeed, as a matter of subjective preferences, we can imagine that
you had quite a nice time during the period of your exclusion, a much better time than
you would have had in a dreary meeting. Is your exclusion from the meeting unfair or
unjust, despite the fact that you agree with outcome and that the balance of costs and
benefits favored your exclusion? My considered judgment is that your exclusion
renders the meeting illegitimate with the consequence that you are not required to
regard its outcome as authoritative in the sense that its outcome is legitimate. Of
course, if you agree with the outcome, you may choose to abide by it nonetheless.
Star Chamber. Suppose that we had a reliable procedure for producing accurate
criminal verdicts that excluded the defendant and her counsel from the secret
proceedings; the exclusion is complete, the defendant may not participate in any way,
even through the submission of written arguments to the court (let us call the tribunal
providing this perfectly accurate procedure “Star Chamber”).230 Would a defendant
convicted through such a process have any ground for complaint? The objection
cannot be that the process was unreliable; by hypothesis, Star Chamber is demonstrably
reliable, and if convicted, the hypothetical defendant will know that she is, in fact,
guilty. Nonetheless, many will share the intuition that secret proceedings from which
the defendant is excluded are unfair despite their hypothesized accuracy; upon further
reflection it seems likely that this intuition may well turn into a considered judgment.
The features of Star Chamber that seem objectionable are its secrecy (most
especially the exclusion of the defendant) and the inability of the defendant to have a
say, to raise objections, ask questions, and so forth. Suppose that we vary the
hypothetical to isolate these features. Would Star Chamber be objectionable if the
defendant had the right to observe the proceeding but not participate in any other way,
either directly or through an agent or representative? By hypothesis, nothing she could
229

On the role of thought experiments as intuition pumps, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW
ROOM 12 (1984).
230

See supra note 1.
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say could make the proceeding more accurate, although we may hypothesize that her
participation might increase the likelihood of an erroneous decision. My considered
judgment is that this procedure is still unfair to the defendant; indeed, in some ways,
the requirement that she remain silent is more horrifying that the requirement that she
remain outside the room. What about having a say without access? It is difficult to
imagine a case in which the defendant is still excluded, but does have the right to have
a say; having a meaningful say requires knowledge of the proceeding, at least to the
extent necessary to identify what concerns are relevant to the decision-makers
deliberation. The hypothetical variation of Star Chamber in which the defendant is
allowed to submit a written or videotaped statement but not to know anything about the
rest of the proceedings strikes me as unfair, although a slight (or perhaps substantial)
improvement over the case in which she is both excluded and silenced.
Guardian ad Litem. Imagine now that you are being sued in an ordinary civil case.
You are disputing a debt with a creditor. You are a competent adult; you have no
disability that would render you unable to make your own decisions regarding the
lawsuit. Nonetheless, the court denies your request to participate directly and instead
appoints a guardian ad litem to act as your surrogate in the litigation. Your guardian is
competent and makes good decisions. There is no reason to believe that the proceeding
will be any less accurate because of the guardian’s decisions on your behalf.
Moreover, as far as your preferences are concerned, this is not a bad deal. You do not
derive utility from the litigation process, and quite enjoy spending your time in other
ways. Now suppose that you lose, and furthermore, that you know that a mistake has
been made. My intuition is that under these circumstances, you would have good
reason to deny the legitimacy of this proceeding. Your participation was feasible, and
there was no compelling reason of cost or competency to deny you the right to
participate.
The point of the three thought experiments is to suggest that our intuitions about
particular and concrete cases cohere with the general and abstract considerations of
political theory. Given this reflective equilibrium, we have good and sufficient reason
to accept the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis.
B. Framing the Issue: Reduction or Dependence
Discussion of the value of participation has generated unnecessary confusion
because of a failure to distinguish two possible relationships between the value of
process and participation on the one hand and the value of accuracy (or other costs and
benefits that might be balanced) on the other. I shall call these two relationships
“reduction” and “dependence.” Before we proceed any deeper into the controversy
over the value of process in general and the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis, this
distinction must be clarified.

92

Published by Digital USD, 2004

95

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
1. Reductionist Programs
One possible relationship between the value of process and other values, such as the
value of accuracy, is captured by the idea of a reductionist program. For example, it
might be argued that all of the value of participation in civil proceedings can be cashed
out in terms of the contribution that participation makes to accuracy. The thesis that
the value of participation can be reduced to the value of accuracy suggests that the
reason we value participation is not that under normal circumstances, participation
enhances accuracy. Phrased in terms of the three models, this reductionist strategy
suggests that the idea of fairness identified by the participation model can be reduced to
that specified by the accuracy model.
Another reductionist program suggests that the value of participation can be
explained in terms of the satisfaction that participation provides to litigants. This
reductionist program treats the value of participation as simply another social cost or
benefit that can be weighed against others such costs, including the social costs of
inaccurate adjudication and the social costs of participatory procedure. A more
complex reductionist program would combine both the accuracy strategy and the cost
strategy, the value of participation—this complex reductionist program would claim—
can be reduced to the accuracy effects of participation plus any utility that would be
derived from the satisfaction of subjective preferences for participation.
2. Arguments for Dependence
Reductionist strategies should be distinguished from another kind of claim about
the relationship between the value of process and participation on the one hand and
accuracy or cost on the other hand. It might be claimed that the value of participation
is not independent of its effects on participation. Dependence does not entail
reducibility, although reducibility does entail dependence. This point is vitally
important, but it has not been obvious in debates over the value of participation.
Consider the implications of this distinction for the relationship between the
Participatory Legitimacy Thesis and reductionist programs. The thesis that a right of
participation is essential for the legitimacy of final, binding adjudication does not rest
on the claim that the value of participation is independent of effects on outcomes or
accuracy. But the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis is inconsistent with the proposition
that the value of participation can be reduced to accuracy.
Why dependence? Final binding adjudication is not legitimate unless a minimum
right of participation is afforded to those with a substantial interest in the controversy.
If this claim is true, does it follow that the value of participation is independent of the
effects of participation on outcome? The answer to this question is “no.” This
conclusion can be established through the following thought experiment: suppose you
are offered a right to participate in a proceeding, but the proceeding is structured so that
your input cannot have an effect on the outcome. Would this right of participation be
sufficient to legitimate the proceeding? No. It is not just having a say that counts.
Meaningful participation must be part of the process, and not a wheel that turns but
93
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moves nothing else.231 Meaningful participation requires that your input to the
proceeding be considered, that what you say plays a role in the deliberative process of
the decision-maker. In this sense, the value of participation is dependent upon possible
effects on outcomes, and hence is in some sense dependent upon possible impacts on
accuracy.232 Thus, there is good and sufficient reason to believe that the legitimacy of a
procedure is not independent of the procedures effect on outcomes. Put another way,
the legitimacy of a procedure depends, at least in part, on its accuracy.
Does this form of dependence entail the further conclusion that the Participatory
Legitimacy Thesis can be reduced to a claim about the relationship between
participation and accuracy? The answer to this question is clearly no. The reduction of
legitimacy to accuracy would require the truth of one of the following two
propositions: (1) if legitimacy and accuracy are not a matter of degree, then it would
have to be the case that accuracy is both a necessary and sufficient conditions for
legitimacy, or (2) if legitimacy and accuracy are a matter of degree (scalar), then it
would have to be the case that the degree of legitimacy of a procedure is an increasing
function of the accuracy rate of the procedure. Neither of the two propositions follows
logically from the fact that legitimacy depends on accuracy.233
So far, we have only dealt with dependence of legitimacy on the possibility that
outcomes will be affected by participation. What about the claim that the value of
participation can be reduced to a feeling of satisfaction or some other psychological
effect of participation. This point may have some force as applied to the dignity theory
of the value of participation,234 but as applied to the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis
this objection is far off the mark. The Participatory Legitimacy Thesis is a claim about
the normative legitimacy of adjudicatory procedures and not primarily a claim about
the psychological acceptability of such procedures. If psychological legitimacy were
the only value at issue, then one might argue that its value could be reduced to specific
costs and benefits, such as the psychological benefit to litigants of being satisfied with
the resolution of their disputes or the social benefit of perceived legitimacy in
promoting voluntary compliance with the law.

231

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶271 (3d ed. 1999) (stating “a
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism”).
232

But see Rosenfeld, supra note 194, at 794 (“In contrast, procedural justice as a means to
vindicate the dignity of the accused is largely independent from, though it cannot squarely
frustrate the application of, the above mentioned relevant substantive norms.”).
233
That is to say, that x depends on y does not entail either that x is the case if and only if y
or that x is a increasing function of y. That is: ¬{D(x,y)→[(x↔y) v (I(x,y)]}, where D is the
dependence function and I is any increasing function.
234

See infra Part V.D.1, “Reductionism One: The Reduction to Subjective Preference.”
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C. Dignity, Equality, and Autonomy
The value of participation derives from the idea of legitimacy. Our focus on
legitimacy contrasts with much of the prior literature which has suggested three rival
explanations—based on dignity, equality, and autonomy—for the irreducible value of
legitimacy. Each of these three rival explanations has a contribution to make,
especially when considered in relationship to legitimacy. Considered in isolation,
however, dignity, equality, and autonomy do not provide an adequate explanation of
the value of participation.
We have already addressed dignity in the context of the participation model of
procedural fairness.235 At that point, our question was whether the notion that the role
of a participatory process in respecting the dignity of litigants could be used as a model
that would, by itself, explain and justify the civil procedure landscape; our answer was
“no.” Does dignity offers a sufficient explanation of the intuitions that participation
has irreducible (but not necessarily independent) value that were elicited by our thought
experiments. The answer to this question is “no.” When participation is an entitlement
(whether produced by law or by less formal social norms), then denying someone the
right to participation is an insult to their dignity. If I am entitled to attend the meeting
and you exclude me, then you have violated my entitlement and in so doing you have
insulted me. On the other hand, if I am have no right to attend the meeting and you
exclude me, dignity requires that I gracefully accept the exclusion—no insult to my
dignity may be taken. The point is that dignity does not create the right to participate—
it is a reflection of that right.
A second rival to legitimacy as the ground of a right to participation is the notion of
equality.236 Procedural justice has been even been defined as "the right to treatment as
an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, but
235

See infra, Part IV.B.3.b), “The Dignity Interpretation,” p. 73.

236

See generally Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30
ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10681 tan 62 (2000) (quoting Rachlinski); William Rehg, Against
Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jurgen Habermas, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1147 (1996) (stating “inasmuch as a procedure expresses a recognition of one's
equal status as a citizen regardless of how insightful one's judgment on a given issue,
participation in the procedure can reinforce group solidarity, at least to some degree.”); Massaro,
supra note 188, at 902 (“Procedure therefore not only should promote rationality through
unbiased and accurate decisionmaking, but also should show respect for persons by allowing
equal, active participation in decisions affecting their interest.”); Rutherford, supra note 121, at
74 (“The right to participate is meaningful only if a person can participate on an equal footing.”);
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 484 (1986) (“One value that might conceivably be
fostered by procedural due process is the goal of equality.”). Although various writers have seen
connections between equality and the value of participation as a component of procedural justice,
William Rubenstein’s investigation of the role of equality in procedure omits this topic
altoghether. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1865 (2002).
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to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how these goods and
opportunities are to be distributed."237 But equality alone cannot do the work of
explaining a right to participation. Once rights of participation are defined, then
equality comes into the picture. If others are afforded a right of participation but I am
arbitrarily denied this right, then I have been treated unequally and have a right to
complain—this is equality before the law, an important sense of the abstract idea of
equality. Equality also plays a role in theories of distributive justice. It might be
argued that an equal right to participate in litigation is a component part of
distributional equality. But once again, equality comes to the scene after we have
settled the prior question whether there is a right to participate in litigation. If no such
right exists, then the norm of distributional equality is consistent with giving the right
to none—as it would also be with giving the right to all. Equality simply does not do
the necessary work.
The third rival to legitimacy is based on the notion of autonomy.238 As Robert Bone
has written, “According to [the Kantian process-based] theory, certain elements of civil
process, such as individual participation and rational decision making, are implicit in
what it means to respect human dignity and autonomy.”239 But if considered in
isolation, the value of autonomy simply won’t do the necessary work. On the one
hand, the concept of autonomy is too general to provide a particular right to
participation in adjudicative process. On the other hand, legal process necessarily
involves limitations on autonomy rights. The sphere of civil litigation is not the private
sphere where individual autonomy holds sway—quite the contrary, civil litigation is the
public sphere where individual autonomy is necessarily qualified by the need for
coordination of individual action.
But when the idea of autonomy is considered in relationship to legitimacy, then a
role for autonomy (as well as dignity and equality) does become apparent. Legitimacy
237

Jeffrey Rachlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in STRATEGIES
339, 347 (Barton H. Thompson Jr. ed., 1995).

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

238
The association between procedural fairness and autonomy is a common theme in the
literature. See, e.g., Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 647, 670 (1998) (stating
“procedural fairness may be viewed in three component parts: litigant autonomy, dignity, and
participation”); Jason Richards, Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme Court Stems the
Crimson Tide of Res Judicata, 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 691, 716 (1998) (“Central to litigant
autonomy is participation. For the due process right to be meaningfully individual, a litigant must
have the opportunity to tell his story, to try his case. Consistent with the traditional respect
afforded the individual litigant, the opportunity to be heard must be more than the opportunity to
intervene in another individual's suit.”); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 954 (1995) (stating “participation of the parties is considered a key
element of due process because of our belief in individual autonomy”).
239
Bone, surpa note 6, at 509; see also, Bone, surpa note 136, at 619-20 (assuming that “the
intrinsic value of participation is historically tied to respect for individual autonomy”).
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itself is important because we respect the dignity of citizens as equal and autonomous.
If we rejected the idea that citizens were autonomous and equal, then the value of
legitimacy would not apply to them. Dignity, equality, and autonomy are fundamental
political values. The idea that they connect in some way to the value of participation
was sound. The error was to believe that any one of these values directly provides the
value of participation—legitimacy plays that role.
D. Answers to Objections
At this point, we have stated the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis, and clarified the
relationship it bears to attempts to reduce the value of process to effects on outcomes.
We can now proceed with an analysis of some of the arguments that have been made
against the claim that participation has irreducible value.
1. Reductionism One: The Reduction to Subjective Preference
One powerful critique of the value of participation has been offered by David
Rosenberg.240 Rosenberg’s argument, which is specific to the mass-tort context, is
complex and subtle, but we can understand the core of his objection by attending to the
following points. First, Rosenberg argues that in the mass-tort context, the primary
purposes of the law are deterrence and compensation; deterrence does not require
individual participation and may be better served without it241—at bottom, deterrence
rests on accuracy and not on any independent process values. Second, Rosenberg
contends that the value of participation is a “subjective taste for particularized
process”242 which litigants should be and are willing to trade for lower product
prices.243 These arguments rely on further premises, for which Rosenberg provides a
variety of arguments. Importantly, Rosenberg argues that collectivization will result in
more accurate outcomes by transferring resources from redundant case-by-case
Rosenberg also argues that
adjudication to collectivized proceedings.244
collectivization is less costly than individual participation; collectivization and
insurance will result in a higher ex ante welfare level for those who are injured.245
Accepting Rosenberg’s factual premises and conclusions, his argument boils down
to the following. Considering the policy goals of deterrence and compensation,
240
David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass
Exposure Cases, supra note 4.
241

See id. at 213, 237-248.

242

Id. at 256 n.110.

243

See id. at 213.

244

See id. at 237. Rosenberg argues that determination of causation and liability issues
involves high cost, that plaintiff’s lawyers will underinvest in litigating these issues, and that as a
result defense lawyers will have a systematic advantage.
245

See id. at 245-48.
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collectivization should be preferred over a right to participation because
collectivization is both more accurate and less costly than the alternatives. Thus, both
the accuracy and balancing models favor collectivization over an individualized right to
participation. Moreover, because the value of participation can be reduced to the
“subjective taste for particularized” process it follows that the value of participation can
be fully achieved by allow those who wish to opt out of collectivization by paying the
full cost of a particularized proceeding.246 “Plaintiff’s are never made better off by
being vested with a property right—which absent the entitlement they would not and
could not pay for—to an inefficient day in court, to personal control over their claims,
and to other anti-collectivist procedures.”247
Has Rosenberg made a convincing case against the irreducible value of process in
general or the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis in particular? Despite the powerful
arguments advanced, the answer is an obvious “no.” Rosenberg’s argument is
question-begging, because it assumes the very conclusion for which Rosenberg is
attempting to argue. The assumption that there is no right of political morality to
individualized participation is smuggled into Rosenberg’s argument in four moves.
First, Rosenberg assumes that the purposes or functions of adjudication can be reduced
to the purposes of functions of the substantive law being applied, i.e. that the function
of tort adjudication is reducible to the function of substantive tort law. Second,
Rosenberg assumes the validity of the balancing model by stating the functions or
purposes of tort compensation as deterrence and compensation. Third, Rosenberg
assumes that the value of participation can be reduced to a subjective preference which
can be balanced against the costs and benefits of accurate adjudication and the costs of
individual participation. Fourth, Rosenberg then shifts the burden asking why
individuals should “desire the particularizing process for its own sake that is, unrelated
to any instrumental reasons, such as providing cost-effective improvements in
accounting or replacement value of compensation awards.”248
None of these arguments are decisive, however, if the Participatory Legitimacy
Thesis provides support for a background right of political morality to a minimum level
of participation. It is as if Rosenberg had argued against a right to the freedom of
speech by arguing that the purpose of the political system was to maximize utility, that
the value of self-expression was reducible to a subjective preference to make noise, that
democratic processes can maximize utility by collectivized lobbying, and that therefore,
there is no possible explanation for the non-instrumental value of an individualized
right to free speech. Yes, if all the premises were true, the conclusion would follow,
but look at how much has been packed into the premises.
To the extent that Rosenberg has a positive argument against the irreducible value
of process and participation, it rests on the assumption that the value of particularized
procedures can be reduced to the subjective preferences of consumers for such
246

See id. at 256 n.110.

247

Id. at 256-57.

248

Id. at 256.
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procedures. If this were true, then Rosenberg would have made a convincing case for
the balancing model and against an independent role for a background right of political
morality to a minimum level of participation. If Rosenberg’s case for reducing the
value of participation to subjective preference rests on the assumption that some
version of utilitarian moral theory is true, then Rosenberg’s argument should be
rejected on the ground that it does not provide an appropriate public reason. Most
citizens are not utilitarians, and the public at large would reasonably reject the premise
that all values are subjective preferences whose intensity can and should be measured
by willingness to pay (even corrected for wealth effects).
To the extent that Rosenberg does not rely on subjective-preference utilitarianism,
then his argument boils down to a question, “what is the non-instrumental value of
participation?” Rosenberg is certainly entitled to ask the question, but posing the
question does not demonstrate that there is no answer.
2. Reductionism Two: The Reduction to Accuracy Objection
Louis Kaplow has raised another objection to the irreducible value of process;249 as
we shall see, Kaplow’s objection is closely related to Rosenberg’s. I shall call
Kaplow’s argument the “reduction to accuracy objection,” and at the outset it is
important to recall the distinction between reduction and dependence. It is not
completely clear whether Kaplow intends to make the claim that the value of
participation can be reduced to the effects of participation on accuracy or whether he is
only arguing for the non-independence claim. I shall return to the significance of this
distinction at the end of my consideration of Kaplow’s argument.
Kaplow begins with the question whether what he calls “process value” is
subsumed in the value of accuracy, raising the question in the following form:
One suspects that claimants who object to not being heard are those who
are, for example, denied benefits. If only losers complain, however, one
should be suspicious that the complaint is motivated by a concern for the
result, and thus an objection to a lack of process may implicitly be an
instrumental argument. An entirely plausible reason to object to not being
heard is that one may believe (perhaps feel certain) that the decision was
adverse precisely because the decision-maker was deprived of information one
had to offer. Thus, the decision may have been inaccurate. Alternatively, one
may suspect that the decision-maker would be more favorable when the
claimant appears personally, independent of any additional information made
available, suggesting a favorable shift in the implicit burden of proof.250

249

Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 307, 389 (1994).
250

Id. at 390-91 (footnotes omitted).
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In a footnote, Kaplow observes that “one does not often hear stories of individuals who
win complaining that they did not get their day in court.”251 Although Kaplow may be
wrong about this—the evidence suggests that there is a very strong preference for
participation252—the real problem with his argument is that it elides the hard question
of procedural legitimacy. The most important task for a theory of procedural justice is
to offer those who suffer from inaccurate and binding decisions a reason to regard
themselves as legitimately bound.
Kaplow argues that the hypothesis that process value is independent of
accuracy can be tested:
To test this, one must consider a hypothetical situation—one probably too
far removed from the typical disappointed applicant's mind for him to take
seriously—in which the applicant is heard but it is certain that the decision
would be unaffected by the hearing. Would individuals value appearing if they
knew in advance that they would be ignored or that they would be "heard" but
that hearing them could have no effect whatever on the decision?253
Kaplow has devised a hypothetical that produces the intuition that process does not
matter apart from outcome.254 But has the hypothetical been structured so as to frame
the issue correctly? Certainly a hearing in which one knows in advance that one will
be ignored, is not a hearing in which one has a meaningful opportunity to participate.
A meaningful right to be heard requires that the adjudicator not turn a deaf ear.255
Likewise, if the adjudicator listens but the participation “could have no effect,” then
there is no meaningful right of participation. The modal operator “could” is crucial to
Kaplow’s argument, because it builds the hypothetical in such a way that it is
impossible for the input to change the outcome,256 and hence suggests that the input is
not really part of the process at all.257
251

Id. at 390 n. 249.

252

See supra note 193 (collecting social psychology literature on preference for
participation).
253

Id. at 391 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).

254

A set of hypotheticals that produce opposing intuitions is offered in Part IV.V.A.4, “Three
Thought Experiments,” infra at 90.
255

There is an important distinction between turning a deaf ear and listening in
circumstances where there is no reason to believe that there is any substantial likelihood that
one’s mind will be changed, but this distinction is lost if one measures the difference by the
probability that listening will result in a different decision. One can have an open mind, and yet
believe that is most unlikely that one’s mind will be changed.
256

See Wittgenstein, supra note 231.

257

Kaplow’s hypothetical can be more precisely formulated in possible worlds semantics,
which cash out the notion of possibility in terms of relationships between the actual world and
possible worlds. It may be important to pin down the precise sense of “could” that Kaplow
means to invoke. We can do this by introducing the notion of accessibility relations between the
actual world and other possible worlds. Something “could” happen in the logical sense if it does
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Kaplow then goes on to explicate his thought experiment, but in a way that shifts
our focus from the question as to whether there are any intrinsic process values to the
quite different question as to whether the subjective preferences for process are
sufficiently weighty to justify their costs:
From one perspective, this is simply an empirical question that could be
tested directly. There is indirect evidence relevant to how much people value
such appearances for their own sake. One type of evidence noted previously
is the high rate of settlement in most civil litigation. Another is the form of
dispute resolution typically specified by contract, and these often are of a
simple sort. Of particular relevance for Mathews v. Eldridge, individuals'
private disability contracts presumably do not provide for personal
appearances in formal hearings. Moreover, in such instances, individuals
who agree to summary procedures forgo not only the benefits of greater
personal involvement per se but also any positive effect such involvement may
have on the accuracy of outcomes. Finally, it is important to recall . . . that
individuals' incentives to promote their interests in claims proceedings, by
personal appearance or otherwise, tend to be socially excessive. Thus, even if
individuals, at the time disputes arose, did value further participation and were
willing to pay for it, satisfying such preferences may be socially
undesirable.258
None of the evidence that Kaplow adduces is sufficient to establish the conclusion that
process has no irreducible value or that there is no background right of political
morality to adequate equal participation.
Consider each argument in turn. First, “the high rate of settlement in most civil
litigation” may be evidence against a subjective preference for participation, but it is
simply irrelevant to the question whether the right to such participation is justified on
grounds of political morality: no one is arguing for a duty to participate or a
requirement that every case go to trial. Moreover, Kaplow’s understanding of what is
meant by participation is implausibly narrow. Kaplow asserts that “in a settlement,
both sides forfeit the opportunity to appear personally and participate, implying that
settlement destroys value for both parties if participation is indeed valuable to them,”259
happen in at least one logically accessible possible world, and all possible worlds are logically
accessible—a logically impossible world does not exist. Something “could” happen in the
physical sense if it does happen in at least one nomologically accessible possible world, e.g. in at
least one world that obeys the general laws of science. Historical accessibility is the relationship
between the actual world and worlds that share the history of the actual world up to the present
moment. One interpretation of Kaplow’s remark is that he asking whether anyone would value a
right of participation in proceeding P at time T1 if they knew that in no nomologically and
historically accessible possible world in which they participate and prevail in P. See generally
Lewis, supra note 63, Kripke, supra note 62, Leibniz, supra note 61, Divers, supra note 60.
258

See Kaplow, supra note 249, at 391-93 (footnotes omitted).

259

Id. at 392 n. 254.
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but, in the usual or typical case, one does have an opportunity to participate in
settlement negotiations, either in person or through an agent. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine settlement process that completely eliminates party participation—perhaps a
mediator could make a settlement proposal without consulting with the parties and each
party would then have to accept or reject the settlement without comment. It is true
that settlement involves a different form of participation than does an adversary
hearing, but this hardly suffices to establish that there is no irreducible value to
participation at all.260
Second, even if it were true that “individuals' private disability contracts
presumably do not provide for personal appearances in formal hearings,” such
contracts are entered into voluntarily. Instances of the waiver of a right that is subject
to waiver do not provide evidence that the right itself lacks a foundation in political
morality. Moreover, one does have a right to an individualized hearing when one
purchases private disability insurance:261 that right is provided by the substantive law of
contract and insurance creating a cause of action for the wrongful denial of benefits.
The case in which such a right is not present would be one in which the insurance
company required its insured to consent to entry of judgment against them in case of a
dispute over the policy—a procedure that would be analogous to the cognovit note.
There is no evidence that insurance contracts contain such provisions, and it is not clear
that such contracts would comport with due process.
Third, as to the assertion that “individuals' incentives to promote their interests in
claims proceedings, by personal appearance or otherwise, tend to be socially
excessive,” this argument assumes a utilitarian framework for the resolution of the
question. If we assume utilitarianism first, we will be able to make a convincing case
for a utilitarian version of the balancing model, but this argument would simply beg the
question. The balancing model is, in a sense, already built into a utilitarian framework.
Kaplow expresses his argument somewhat differently when he poses the following
hypothetical: “[O]ne could have two systems, known to produce identical outcomes,
but in only one is the applicant heard. By charging differential fees, one could measure
the value individuals associate with the procedure.”262 But this hypothetical assumes
that the irreducible value of procedure must be of a sort that can be measured by
260
To avoid misunderstanding, we should note the difference between the adjudicatory and
legislative contexts with respect to settlement. It is true that in a sense one waives one’s right to
participation in a formal process in the course of settlement, whereas normally one cannot waive
one’s right to vote in bargaining (among interest groups or among legislators). But this
difference between the two contexts does not establish that there is no irreducible value to
participation, because, as is pointed out in text, the waiver of the right to formal process does not
waive the right to participate in determination of the outcome of adjudication.
261

Kaplow is likely correct in assuming that there is not right to a formal hearing before
one’s claim is denied, but this is not decisive. The notion that there is an irreducible value to
process and participation does not entail that this value is sufficient to justify a hearing before
benefits are denied.
262

Kaplow, supra note 249, at 391 n. 253.
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willingness to pay—in other words, this argument is the subjective preference
argument that has already been considered above. Moreover, the assumption that the
two systems are “known to produce identical outcomes,” is simply a variation of the
hypothetical in which it is assumed that participation cannot affect the outcome.263
This leads to my final observation about Kaplow’s argument. The modally
restricted hypotheticals, in which participation cannot affect outcomes, may support the
contention that the value of participation is not independent of effects on outcomes, but
such hypotheticals do not a support a reduction of the value of participation to effects
on outcomes. If we bear in bind the distinction introduced above, in Part V.B,
“Framing the Issue: Reduction or Dependence,”264 it becomes apparent that Kaplow’s
arguments, whatever its merits if directed against a claim of independent value for
participation, does not engage the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis, which claims
irreducible but not independent value.
3. Reductionism Three: The Reduction of Participation to Other Values
Most arguments against the independent value of participation do not directly
address the relationship between participation and legitimacy. There is, however, a
brief discussion, also by Kaplow.265 Kaplow’s argument proceeds by the method of
separation of cases. As I read it, Kaplow argues that there are four possible variations
of the argument that participation is required for legitimacy: (1) participation provides
legitimacy because it enhances accuracy;266 (2) participation creates the appearance of
legitimacy because it creates a perception of accuracy;267 (3) participation provides
legitimacy because it respects the dignity of litigants;268 and (4) participation provides
legitimacy because it prevents the abuse of power.269
Of course, the validity of Kaplow’s argument depends on whether he has correctly
identified the basis of the legitimacy argument. Kaplow is remarkably candid about his
own doubts on this score. In the first footnote of this discussion he confesses: “This
subsection does not explore what legitimacy means or why it might be valuable. Of
263

See supra, text accompanying note 253, at p. 100.

264

See supra, Part IV.V.B, “Framing the Issue: Reduction or Dependence,” p. 92.

265

See Kaplow, supra note 3, at 395-96.

266

Kaplow argues that in this case, legitimacy reduces to accuracy. See id. at 395.

267

Kaplow’s remarks on this case are underdeveloped: “If the procedures do not produce
more accuracy, but citizens mistakenly think that they do, there arises a familiar problem in
governance that there is no point in attempting to illuminate here. (As an analogy, one might ask
whether the government should adopt a highway plan that results in more loss of life because
most citizens mistakenly believe otherwise.).” Id. at 395 n. 263. Kaplow might argue that it
would be wrong for government to decieve citizens—although given his welfarist framework, he
could not rely on any deontological prohibition on deception.
268
269

Id. at 395 & n. 264. Kaplow refers back to his own critique of the dignity argument. Id.
Id.
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course, given the resulting ambiguity of the subject, one is unavoidably more uncertain
about the relevance of any analysis of it.”270 Without any analysis of what legitimacy is
and why it is valuable, one wonders how Kaplow could possibly believe that he has
produced any arguments against the thesis that participation is required for legitimacy.
Interpreting Kaplow charitably, we might construe his argument as the claim that
the concept of legitimacy is itself so ambiguous that its value must reduce to something
else. If this is Kaplow’s actual claim, it is radically underdeveloped. What is
ambiguous about legitimacy? If the problem is truly ambiguity, i.e. multiple possible
meanings, why can’t the ambiguity be resolved by choosing the best conception of
legitimacy? Perhaps, Kaplow means instead that legitimacy is fatally vague, but once
again he has no argument for that proposition either. Crucially, the Participatory
Legitimacy Thesis is not reducible to any of Kaplow’s four interpretations, and hence is
not open to his objection.
4. The Moral Harm Objection
An objection to the independent value of participation from a deontological
perspective has been developed by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin considers the argument
that process has what Lawrence Tribe calls “intrinsic value”271 Tribe’s argument was
that what I have called a background right of political morality to participation is
justified by the “idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted
about what is done with one.”272 Dworkin counters, “The language about talking to
people rather than dealing with them, and about treating them as people rather than as
things, is of little help here, as it generally is in political theory. For it does not show
why the undoubted harm of faceless decisions is not merely bare harm, and statements
about what treatment treats as a person are at best conclusions of arguments and not
premises.”273 This argument rests on Dworkin’s distinction between two kinds of
harm, which he calls “bare harm” and “moral harm.”
Dworkin defines moral harm, as follows:
[T]he violation of a right constitutes a special kind of harm, and people
may suffer that harm even when the violation is accidental. We must
distinguish, that is, between what we might call the bare harm a person suffers
through punishment, whether that punishment is just or unjust—for example,
the suffering or frustration or pain or dissatisfaction of desires that he suffers
just because he loses his liberty or is beaten or killed—and the further injury
that he might be said to suffer whenever his punishment is unjust, just in

270
271
272
273

Id. at 395 n. 262.
Tribe, supra note 133, at 503-04.
Id.
Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 92, at 102.
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virtue of that injustice. I shall call the latter the “injustice factor” in his
punishment, or his “moral” harm.274
Moral harm does not depend on any psychological state; rather it “is an objective
notion which assumes that someone suffers a special injury when treated unjustly,
whether he knows or cares about it, but does not suffer that injury when he is not
treated unjustly, even though he believes he is and does care.”275
Thus, Dworkin’s argument is that the proponents of an irreducible value for process
and participation have not given an explanation as to why exclusion (or other process
flaws) gives rise to moral harm. Given his definition of moral harm, this amounts to an
argument that no explanation has been given as to why the denial of a right of
participation is unjust. Dworkin’s argument then, at bottom, is like Rosenberg’s, but
with a deontological twist. It does not present a positive case against the thesis that
process has irreducible value, but it does question the sufficiency of the arguments
raised on behalf of that thesis. If it can be shown that a denial of participation is unjust,
then that denial will give rise to moral harm, and Dworkin’s objection will be
answered. The Participatory Legitimacy Thesis is, in fact, an argument that shows that
denial of a right to participation does inflict moral harm—understood in Dworkin’s
special technical sense.
5. The Objection from the Inseparability of Substance and Procedure
Yet another argument against the participation model is suggested by an argument
made by Larry Alexander, in a somewhat different context, the question whether there
are independent rights to procedural due process. He argues that “because the
procedure for applying a [substantive] rule [of law] can always be viewed as part of the
substance of the [substantive] rule itself, a concern for procedure apart from substance
verges on incoherence.”276 This argument rests on concealed premise that is false. The
premise of the argument is: The procedure for applying a substantive rule of law can
always be viewed as part of the substance of the substantive rule itself. Let’s assume
that this premise is true. From this premise Alexander draws the conclusion: A concern
for procedure apart from substance verges on incoherence.
Alexander’s argument is still incomplete. It assumes some like the following: If X
can always be viewed as part of Y, then the distinction between X and Y is incoherent.
But of course, this premise is false. Seahorses can be viewed as part of the ocean, but it
is not the case that the distinction between seahorses and the ocean is incoherent. We
have already established that the entanglement of substance and procedure does not
entail that the distinction between these two concepts is incoherent. Indeed, the point
of the thought experiment of acoustic separation between substance and procedure is
274
275

Id. at 80.
Id.
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Larry Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 341-43 (1987).
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can be stated in language similar to Alexander’s: The procedure for applying a
substantive rule of law can always be viewed as distinct from the substance of the
substantive rule itself. Alexander’s argument (if reconstructed) is logically valid but
unsound because it rests on a false assumption.
Nonetheless, Alexander makes an important point. Sometimes substantive rules are
adopted with specific procedures attached—some administrative schemes are of this
sort. But our primary question is “what is a fair procedure,” and the fact that
procedures sometimes vary with substance does not moot that question. Indeed,
Alexander’s formulation of his point assumes that we can recognize the difference
between a substantive rule and the procedures for applying it. Moreover, it is
undeniably a fact that many procedures are transsubstantive277 in many, if not all,
contexts. Procedures frequently come in largely undivided clumps, for example the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Administrative Procedures Act. Whatever the
merits of Alexander’s argument in the context in which he advanced it, the argument
does not establish that the notion of an irreducible value to process based on a
background right of political morality to participation is incoherent.
6. The Counter-example of Legislation
Yet another argument against the irreducible value of participation has been put
forth by Robert Bone. Bone suggests that the argument for a right of participation
grounded on respect for the dignity of litigants proves too much, because it would
create a right, not present in law, to direct participation in the legislative process: “A
277
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Transsubstantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989); The term "transsubstantive" was
originates with the late Robert Cover in For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading
of The Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). Of course, the question whether or not procedural rules
ought to be transsubstantive is a live one. For a variety of viewpoints, see Stephen B. Burbank,
Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 693, 716 -17 (1988); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079-81 (1989); Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M.
Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive
Procedure, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 989, *1028 (1995); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 526 -27 (1986); Linda Silberman, Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175 -78
(1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's New-Old
Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's ‘Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78-84
(1994) (favoring nontranssubstantive discovery rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin
Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 27 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2042- 43, 2048 -51
(1989); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501
(1992).
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state that sets the legal driving age at sixteen, for example, is not required on dignity
grounds to give each person an individualized hearing before deciding that the person’s
age disqualifies her for a license.”278 Bone is right to observe that rights to
participation do not have the same implications for legislation as they do for
adjudication. Both legislation and dispute resolution implicate procedural justice, but
the general idea of procedural fairness operates differently in the two contexts. When
the context is the legislative process, a right to participation is expressed in the right to
vote, the principle of one person, one vote, and the freedom of expression, including
the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. These rights are rights to
individual participation in the legislative process, but they take into account the
impracticability of rights of direct participation by citizens on the floor of a legislative
body. In different contexts, individual rights of participation assume different forms.
One way to see the error in Bone’s argument is to examine its flip side. Suppose
that the question was whether there is a group right to participate in the legislative
process by democratic election of representatives. It might be objected that such a
group right is absurd, because if such a right existed, then it would entail that
democratic majorities have the right to participate in the decision of individual cases by
the passage of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. This argument is an
enthymeme—it includes an unstated assumption that the form of a right to participation
cannot vary with context. But this unstated premise is obviously false—participation in
lawmaking can take a different form in adjudication and legislation. The same goes for
Bone’s argument. Once the missing premise is stated, it becomes clear that the
argument, while valid, is unsound.
As we have already noted, the notion that there is an irreducible value to process is
the subject of wide agreement once we move to the realm of democratic politics. One
might argue that correct outcomes are all that really matters and the democratic process
is valuable only insofar as it contributes to correct outcomes. But surely the more
widely held view is that an undemocratic regime violates an important human right,
even if it legislates as well as or even better than a democratic regime. The example of
legislation establishes that the form participation may vary with the procedural context,
but it does not establish that process has no value apart from outcomes.
7. The Argument that Representation Supercedes Participation
Another objection to the idea that participation is essential for legitimacy is
suggested by an argument made by Owen Fiss. The core idea is that representation
supercedes participation as the basis for procedural legitimacy. Fiss’s version of the
argument addresses doctrine, but his argument can be transformed into an argument
about procedural justice. Fiss claims,

278

Bone, supra note 189, at 281.
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[W]hat the Constitution guarantees is not a right of participation, but rather
what I will call a "right of representation": not a day in court but the right to
have one's interest adequately represented. The right of representation
provides that no individual can be bound by an adjudication unless his or her
interest is adequately represented in the proceeding.279
Importantly, Fiss formulates his claim in terms of the representation of interests and not
of individuals:
[T]he representation that I speak of is not a representation of individuals but a
representation of interests. It is not that every person has a right to be
represented in structural litigation, but only that every interest must be
represented. If an individual's interest has been adequately represented then he
or she has no further claim against the decree. The right of representation is a
collective, rather than an individual right, because it belongs to a group of
persons classed together by virtue of their shared interests.280
Corresponding to Fiss’s argument about the due process clause, we can construct a
parallel (Fissian) argument about procedural justice.281 That is, we could argue that it
is adequate representation of interests (and not participation) that confers legitimacy on
adjudicative procedures.
The Fissian argument that representation supercedes participation has some obvious
attractions. Much hangs on what counts as adequacy. For example, if adequacy is
measured by contribution to accuracy, then the argument for supersession is simply a
restatement of the argument that participation reduces to accuracy. If “adequacy”
reduces in this way, the Fissian supersession objection is an old argument in a new
bottle. We can, therefore, put this possibility to the side.
It might be argued, however, that representation (and not participation) creates
legitimacy that is not reducible to accuracy. By way of analogy to the case of
legislation, it could be argued that individuals do not have an individual right to
participate in the legislative process itself;282 representative democracies are legitimate
so long as interests are adequately represented. Moreover, it might be argued that even
in the case of traditional litigation, various types of litigants are represented by others.
Thus, wards are represented by guardians, beneficiaries by trustees, and the mentally
disabled by guardians ad litem. At first blush, it might seem that the Fissian objection
279

Owen Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, supra note 188, at 970-71 (1993).

280

Id. at 972.

281

Of course, the argument that I will present is not Fiss’s own—although it is inspired by
his argument. To the extent the argument has merit, Fiss deserves the credit, but if the argument
fails, the fault is mine. If Fissian suggests too strong a connection between Fiss and the
argument, “quasi-Fissian” could be substituted.
282

See supra Part V.D.6, “The Counter-example of Legislation.”
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runs smack into the fact that in ordinary cases, there is an individual right of
participation. Parties ordinarily represent themselves, and representation is the secondbest substitute for participation. At this point, however, the Fissian objector would
have a powerful counter: the case in which individuals directly participate might be
seen as a special case of adequate representation. In some cases, an individual is
simply the most efficient and accuracy-enhancing representative of her own interests.
If this Fissian maneuver worked, then we would have undergone a classic duckrabbit283 shift in perspective. Before the shift, we saw participation as the norm and
adequate representation as the exception. After the shift, we come to see that
representation is the norm and participation is simply a special case.
But the Fissian duck-rabbit maneuver will not work. Participation is not plausibly
seen as a special case of adequate representation. The Fissian conjuring trick is to
redefine the object of adequate representation, “not a representation of individuals but a
representation of interests.”284 Fiss may well be right that when group rights are at
stake, then the relevant interests are the interests of groups, but in individual litigation,
the interests at stake are the interests of individuals. But now the interests drop out.
We are concerned about individual interests, because we are concerned about
individuals. Interests themselves have no moral standing. Individuals represent
themselves, not because they are the best or most efficient representatives of their own
interests; individual represent themselves, because they are human persons, who act on
their own behalf, define their own interests, and speak for themselves. If it looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.
8. The Contractarian Objection
The contractarian objection is based on the idea of hypothetical consent.
explained by Robert Bone, the idea is:

As

The ex ante argument supposes that a procedure is fair to a party if a rational
person in the position of the party would have agreed to the procedure before
the dispute arose. In deciding whether to agree, a rational person weighs the
costs and benefits that he expects from the procedure.285
283

The duck-rabbit is from Wittgenstein. See Wittgenstein, supra note 231, at 194.

The duck rabbit can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit. Most readers should be able to force a
perspective shift at will.
284

Fiss, supra note 279 at 972.

285

Bone, supra note 6, at 496. Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg are strongly associated with
this argument. See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice--Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, supra note 7; Bruce
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As applied to the value of participation, the idea is that a rational person would choose
to forgo the option to participate if that option would neither be cost beneficial nor
accuracy improving. Because Bone has provided a thorough and convincing treatment
of the general form of the contractarian objection,286 we can confine ourselves to a
single point. Whether rational persons would bind themselves to process without
participation will depend on the structuring of the initial choice situation. For example,
if the choice situation is structured so that the interests of the rational persons are solely
in economic payoffs, preference-satisfaction, or objective welfare, then they will be
willing to forgo rights of participation that do not produce these payoffs. On the other
hand, if rational persons are conceived as having an overriding interest in having
reasons to consider themselves as legitimately bound by erroneous decisions, then they
will choose to participation over accuracy and cost. In other words, the contractarian
argument can easily become question begging. For this reason, the real work of
contractarian accounts of procedural justice consists in the arguments that justify the set
up of the initial choice situation.
9. The Ineffability Objection or the Absence of an Explanation
At this point, we are in a position to observe that several of the objections to the
irreducible value of process share a common form. Although they are cast in the guise
of affirmative reasons to believe that there is no irreducible value to process, they turn
out, on close inspection, to rest on a burden-shifting move, i.e. on questions rather than
arguments. In the absence of clear explanation as to why process should count aside
from cost or outcomes, the claim is that there is something mysterious or ineffable
about the claim that participation itself has intrinsic value. For example, Robert Bone
asserts that “[t]he conventional understanding of American adjudication supposes that
it is primarily a means to the end of producing outcomes that conform in some close
way to the substantive law.”287 But if this is so, Bone argues, “then the demands of
dignity should be satisfied in most situations by outcomes meeting the quality
standards.”288 If we assume that accuracy alone is important, then “it is difficult to see
what institutional value there could possibly be in guaranteeing participation beyond
what is needed for”289 accurate decisions.
The ineffability objection, in its various forms, founders when confronted with the
Participatory Legitimacy Thesis. Legitimacy may be an abstract idea of political
philosophy but it is not ineffable. Indeed, the idea that political processes should be
legitimate is one of the most familiar and widely-accepted views in all of political
Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging, Olin Discussion Paper No. 285,
available at http:// www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/.
286

See Bone, supra note 6.
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Bone, supra note 189, at 281.

288

Id. at 281-82.

289

Id. at 282 (emphasis added).

110

Published by Digital USD, 2004

113

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
theory. It is certainly no more controversial than the utilitarian assumption that only
consequences count or the welfarist idea that subjective preferences are the sole
criterion of goodness. Legitimacy is no more obscure than the deontological idea of
autonomy. Quite the contrary, the idea of legitimacy, as a matter of practical politics,
enjoys greater comprehension, acceptance, and argumentative potency than these rival
notions. Indeed, the ability of ordinary folk to see the connection between legitimacy
and participation is well confirmed by social science.290 It is a strange irony of
contemporary academic discourse that the straightforward and obvious value of
participation has come to be seen as obscure. This irony is compounded when we
realize that rival accounts of procedural justice rest on deeply controversial
assumptions.
In sum, my assessment of the state of play is this: although there is a convincing
argument that outcomes count, there is no convincing argument for reductionism. That
is, none of the critics has given good and sufficient reason for the proposition that
participation lacks independent value. Indeed, sensitive critics of the view that process
counts, because some level of participation is required by a concern and respect for
individual dignity, admit to lingering doubts about their own critiques.291
VI. PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Accuracy, cost, and participation must all play a role in a theory of procedural
justice. But if such a theory is to be sufficiently specific to do actual work as a
standard against which an actual system of procedure can be measured, then the
relationship between accuracy, cost, and participation must be ordered and articulated.
In this Part, we restate the conclusions we have reached so far in the form of two
principles of procedural justice.
A. The Statement of the Principles
Consider the following formulation for a set of principles which express a
conception of civil procedural justice:
I.

The Participation Principle: The arrangements for the resolution of civil
disputes should be structured to provide each interested party with a right to
meaningful participation, as specified by the following conditions and
provisos:
A.

290

The Interest Condition. The right to participation should extend to all
persons who will be the subject of final binding adjudication and to

See supra note 193 (collecting social psychology literature).

291

See id. at 287; see also Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure in A MATTER
PRINCIPLE, supra note 92, at 102-03.
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all other persons with a substantial interest that as a practical matter
would be finally determined.
B.

II.

The Scope Condition. The right of participation should include the
following minimum:
1.

Notice. The arrangements for civil dispute resolution shall
include advance notice to the individuals specified in the
interest condition

2.

Opportunity to Be Heard. The arrangements for civil dispute
resolution shall afford an equal and meaningful opportunity
to present evidence and arguments that are relevant to the
dispute.

C.

The Impracticability Proviso. In the event that actual notice or an
opportunity to be heard is impracticable, the absent interested
individual shall be provided with an adequate legal representative and
the proceeding shall be structured so as to give full and fair
consideration to the interests of the absent individual. Represented
persons should be afforded practicable opportunities to challenge the
adequacy of representation.

D.

Fair Value of Procedural Justice Proviso. Such arrangements shall
insure the fair value of the basic liberties, including the right to
reasonable attorneys’ fees in suits for relief from violation of such
liberties.

The Accuracy Principle: The arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes
should be structured so as to maximize the likelihood of achieving the legally
correct outcome in each proceeding, subject to the following provisos. A
procedure may depart from the maximization of accuracy only for the
following reasons:
A.

The Substantive Rights Proviso. In order to insure that the process of
adjudication does not unfairly infringe on the substantive rights
guaranteed by the basic liberties, such as the rights of privacy and
freedom of speech.

B.

Fair Distribution of the Risk of Inaccurate Adjudication Proviso. In
order to provide for a fair distribution of the risk of inaccurate
adjudication.
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III.

C.

Systemic Accuracy Proviso. In order to maximize systemic accuracy,
so long as the procedures are announced in advance and create
general rules with which parties can comply by making a reasonable
good faith effort; procedures may also be arranged so as to maximize
systemic accuracy where the arrangement will not result in
inaccuracy in particular cases.

D.

Costs of Adjudication Proviso. In order to insure that the systemic
costs of adjudication are not excessive in relation to the interests at
stake in proceeding or type of proceeding.

Ordering of the Principles and Provisos. These principals shall be satisfied in
lexical order, such that satisfaction of the Participation Principle shall take
priority over satisfaction of the Accuracy Principle. The Provisos to the
Accuracy Principle are also ranked in lexical order; in cases of conflict, the
first proviso shall take precedence over the rest, the second proviso shall take
precedence over all but the first, and so forth.

Before proceeding further, we should observe that these principles require
interpretation and exposition if they are to serve as the foundation for a fully developed
conception of procedural justice.
B. The Principles in Relationship to the Three Models
The principles bear a direct relationship with the considerations raised in
connection with the three simple models of procedural justice discussed in Part IV.B,
“Three Models of Procedural Justice.” Each principle attempts to capture the core
intuition or considered judgment that underlies one or more of the models, and the
complex structuring of the principles attempts to remedy the deficiencies of each and
the inconsistencies of all by providing a proper lexical ordering and enumeration of
exceptions.
Consider first, the relationship between the accuracy model and the Accuracy
Principle. That principle expresses the accuracy model and attempts to rectify the
deficiencies of that model. Recall that the first deficiency was that the accuracy model
suffers from a general problem of fit, because a variety of procedural rules do not aim
at accuracy; for example, the rules of claim and issue preclusion prevent the relitigation
of a claim or issue, even when it can be shown that the prior adjudication was clearly
wrong. The Accuracy Principle acknowledges that accuracy may be balanced against
costs in the Costs of Adjudication proviso.
A second deficiency of the accuracy model was that it failed to distinguish between
systemic accuracy and case accuracy. The Systemic Accuracy Proviso resolves this
ambiguity and attempts to strike a fair balance between systemic accuracy and accuracy
in the particular case. On the one hand, the basic statement of the Accuracy Principle
expresses the judgment that procedural justice aims to resolve the case that is being
decided accurately; the baseline notion is that case accuracy takes priority over system
113
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accuracy. Our notion of procedural justice requires the fair treatment of individuals,
and making systemic accuracy the baseline would fail to take the differences between
individuals seriously.
On the other hand, there are situations in which systemic accuracy can be promoted
without treating the individual unfairly. Where a rule promoting systemic accuracy is
announced in advance and parties can reasonably comply with the rule, imposing a
case-accuracy distorting sanction is not unfair to those affected—the opportunity to
comply places the responsibility for the distortion on the party who disobeyed the
procedural rule.
The balancing model is expressed in two of the provisos to the Accuracy Principle.
The Costs of Adjudication proviso reflects notion, expressed in the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test, that the maximization of accuracy must be balanced against the
costs of adjudication. The Violations of Substantive Rights proviso expresses the idea
that so-called balancing should not be limited to the costs of adjudication, but should
include considerations of fairness and respect for basic substantive rights. These
provisos express the core intuitions of the balancing model.
The participation model as refined by our investigation of the value of participation
is reflected in the Participation Principle. This principle recognizes that procedural
legitimacy requires a basic right of notice and opportunity to be heard in all cases in
which these basic rights of participation are practicable. The lexical ordering of the
principles expresses both (a) the notion that a concern for accuracy does not trump the
concerns for legitimacy that underwrite the requirements of notice and an opportunity
to be heard, and (b) the notion that once these requirements are met, a fair procedure
should aim at legally correct outcomes.
C. The Principles in Relationship to the Structure of Existing Doctrine
The principles and their ordering rule do not map perfectly onto existing doctrine,
and this should not be surprising. The structure of existing doctrine has been
determined by a pattern of historical development, and much of contemporary
procedure is frozen legal history. Nonetheless, the substance of the two principles is
reflected in the general contours of the procedural law of the United States.
1. The Participation Principle
The central idea of the Participation Principle—that notice and an opportunity to be
heard are essential to procedural fairness—is frequently found in judicial opinions:292
292

See Kaggen v. I.R.S., 57 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that
“basic considerations of procedural fairness demand an opportunity to be heard”); Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 579 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Sloviter, J., dissenting)
(stating that “the principles of procedural fairness embedded in the Constitution . . require
adversary proceedings including notice and an opportunity to be heard unless the events occurred
within the view of the court”); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230,
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“The principle is as old as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be
personally bound until he has had his day in court.”293 And some tribunals have gone
so far as to make explicit that this aspect of procedural fairness may not be balanced
against other concerns.294
There is, however, a potential problem of fit, in this respect, between the
Participation Principle and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge. It
might be argued that Mathews adopts the balancing model, and hence that existing
doctrine implicitly assumes that all rights of participation, even the minimal rights of
basic notice and some opportunity to hard may be denied, if the balance of costs against
the benefits of an increased likelihood of correct adjudication favors this result. It
could be further argued that support for this theory is found in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,295 in which the Supreme Court allowed the rights of
contingent beneficiaries to a trust to be adjudicated without any actual notice to
them.296
As we have already seen, however, these arguments fail on closer inspection.297
Mathews and Mullane are fully consistent with the Participation Principle. Mathews
does not stand for the proposition that all participation can be denied, if the balance of
costs and benefits would favor this result. Instead, Justice Powell’s opinion for the
Court states, “This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required

1244 (3d Cir. 1975) (“One of the basic tenets of American jurisprudence is that procedural
fairness requires that each party have notice of the issues involved and an opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”); In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 67 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Notice is a central tenet of procedural fairness and assures justice and fair
dealing by giving creditors an opportunity to present and contest the status of their claims.”);
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, *208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (equating
“procedural fairness” with “notice of the charges brought against the individual and an
opportunity to respond to those charges”); Milenkovic v. Milenkovic, 416 N.E.2d 1140, 1148
(Ill. Ct. App. 1981) (“The essence of due process is procedural fairness, as embodied in the
elements of notice and opportunity to be heard.”); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211
(Utah 1983) (“Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way
are at the very heart of procedural fairness.”)
293

Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 231, 239 (1867).

294

See Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014, (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“We cannot accept
defendants' contention that the essential elements of fundamental procedural fairness-- advance
notice of any serious charge and an opportunity to present evidence before a relatively objective
tribunal-- must be dispensed with entirely because of the need for summary action or because
the administrative problems would be too burdensome.”); accord Lathrop v. Brewer, 340 F.Supp.
873, 880 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F.Supp. 878, 885 (D. Mass. 1971).
295

339 U.S. 306 (1950).

296

Id. at 317-18.
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See Part IV.B.2.a), “Consequentialist Balancing: The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing
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before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest,”298 and “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner."299 As Justice Frankfurter put it in his concurring opinion in
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,300 “The essence of due process is the
requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.’”301 Similar language appears in Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Mullane.302 Thus, the broad language of Mathews is consistent
with the proposition that the Participation Principle, as expressed in the rights to notice
and some opportunity to be heard, is lexically prior to the Accuracy Principle and its
cost of adjudication proviso. More technically, in Mathews itself, application of the
balancing test resulted in the denial of a right to a pretermination hearing,303 but there is
no suggestion in the opinion of the court that deprivation of benefits that constitute a
property interest for the purposes of the due process clause could be accomplished with
no hearing at all, without running afoul of the due process clause.
The interest condition triggers the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. In
particular these rights are triggered for “persons who will be the subject of final
binding adjudication and to all other persons with a substantial interest that as a
practical matter would be finally determined.” This triggering condition is reflected in
the rights of participation generally afforded by existing law. For example, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19 contemplates dismissing an action if a party who cannot be
joined “might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties”304 and favors
joinder of an absent party if “the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest.”305
Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 afford a right of intervention (which of
course, just is a right of participation) “when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
298

424 U.S. at 333.

299

Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

300

341 U.S., at 171-172, 71 S.Ct., at 649. (Frankfurter, *349 J., concurring).

301

424 U.S. at 328.
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339 U.S. at 312 (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); id. at 314 (“An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).
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Id. at 340-41.
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FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).

116

Published by Digital USD, 2004

119

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 2 [2004]

Procedural Justice
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.”306
The third specification of the Participation Principle requires the fair value of
procedural justice: “Such arrangements shall insure the fair value of the basic liberties,
including the right to reasonable attorneys’ fees in suits for relief from violation of such
liberties.” This proviso is included to reflect the idea that the system of procedure
should be structured so that that inequalities of litigation resources can operate so as to
deprive individuals of the fair value of their basic liberties, such as the freedom of
speech. This idea is reflected in current law by the provision of attorneys’ fees for
successful lawsuits challenging the violation of an individual’s basic federal rights.307
This is, of course, a large topic unto itself. For the purposes of this article, which
focuses on procedural justice at a high level of generality, we can simply note that this
proviso is added for reasons that would take our investigation far a field of our core
concerns, and hence that a detailed investigation ought to be postponed until another
occasion.
2. The Accuracy Principle
The second principle is the Accuracy Principle. This principle requires that civil
procedures be structure “so as to maximize the chances of achieving the legally correct
outcome in each proceeding” subject to four provisos. The question whether the
existing system of civil procedure does maximize accuracy is a very large one—
deserving of its own article or monograph. What is clear is that participants in the
system—judges and those who draft rules of procedure—believe that the system is
designed with accuracy as a primary goal. We have already examined the evidence for
this proposition in our discussion of the accuracy model: the current system of
procedure is understood as engaged in a search for truth.308
The first proviso allows for a departure from accuracy where an accuracy enhancing
procedure would lead to the violation of another fundamental right. The first proviso to
the Accuracy Principle allows for departures from accuracy that “insure that the
process of adjudication does not unfairly infringe on the substantive rights guaranteed
by the basic liberties, such as the rights of privacy and freedom of speech.” This
proviso is reflected in the structure of current doctrine in a variety of ways. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) allows a trial court judge to limit discovery by entering a
protective order;309 one reason for granting such an order is to protect substantive
rights, such as the right to privacy.310 Similarly, various privileges (marital, priest306

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).

307

28 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.

308

See Part IV.B.1, "The Accuracy Model;” see also supra note 138 & 139 (collecting
sources identifying the search for truth as the goal of the system of adjudication).
309

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).

310

See Dominick C. Capozzola, Discovering Privacy, 26-NOV L.A. Law. at 28 (2003).
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penitent) protect substantive rights when the search for truth collides with
confidentiality.311
The second proviso to the Accuracy Principle allows departures from the goal of
case accuracy that have purpose of providing for a fair distribution of the risk of
inaccurate adjudication. In civil litigation, the goal of fair distribution of the risk of
error is reflected in the preponderance of evidence standard for the burden of
persuasion, and departures from the standard are justified on the ground that a shift
would more fairly allocate the risk. Thus, the Supreme Court has justified departure
from the preponderance standard in child custody cases on the ground that a fair
distribution of the risk of error requires the departure.312 Another example is provided
by the requirement for clear and convincing evidence that a party signing a cognovit
note expresses a waiver of the right to notice that is “voluntary, knowing, and
intelligently made.”313 Here, inequality in the risk of error serves to protect the
constitutional right to notice, which the Participation Principle suggests is a prerequisite
for procedural fairness. In this case, the stakes are unequal (the monetary recovery on
the cognovit note versus the protection of the fundamental dignity of the individual)
and hence an unequal distribution of the risk of error is not inconsistent with fairness to
the parties.
The third proviso allows departure from the goal of case accuracy in order to
maximize systemic accuracy, if the procedures are announced in advance and create
general rules with which parties can comply by making a reasonable good faith effort.
We explored the tension between case accuracy and systemic accuracy in connection
with the accuracy model.314 The existing procedural landscape reflects the systemic
accuracy proviso in myriad ways. Statutes of limitations and discovery sanctions, for
311

See Bruce P. Brown , Note, Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of ResearcherSubject Communications, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 1009, 1028 (1983).
312

See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765-66 (1982) (2002) (“Even accepting the
court's assumption we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard fairly
distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of that standard reflects the judgment
that society is nearly neutral between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous
failure to terminate those rights. For the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to
terminate is preservation of an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the
consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family. A
standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally between those two outcomes does not
reflect properly their relative severity.”).
New Mexico Law Review Spring, 2002
313
Overmyer, 405 U.S. 174, 185-86, 187, 92 S.Ct. at 782, 783 (1972) (assuming without
deciding that the same standard of proof applies to waiver in the civil context as in criminal
cases, and citing criminal cases); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir.1993) (citing
Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187, 92 S.Ct. at 783; Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930
F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1252, 111 S.Ct. 2892, 115 L.Ed.2d 1057
(1991)).
314

See supra Part IV.B.1.b), "Systemic Accuracy versus Case Accuracy.”
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example, frequently lead to an inaccurate result in the particular case, but are justified
at least in part on the basis of the contribution they make to systemic accuracy.315
The fourth proviso authorizes departure from the goal of accuracy to insure that the
systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in relation to the interests at stake in
proceeding or type of proceeding. We have already discussed this proviso at length; it
is reflected in procedural due process cases like Mathews and Mullane. These cases
have enshrined the fourth proviso as a basic component of due process jurisprudence.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION
In this Part, we apply the Two Principles of Procedural Justice and the Participatory
Legitimacy Thesis to the central problem of contemporary civil procedure in the United
States—the problem of aggregation. Traditional procedure—especially the civil action
and individual trial—has been challenged by the advent of the mass wrong—asbestos,
tobacco, systemic misrepresentation, and so forth. In response, lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars have advocated a variety of techniques for aggregation. These
techniques have included expanded use of the class action and its close cousins,
sampling and the theory of virtual representation. This Part addresses the question
whether and how the technologies of aggregation can be squared with the Participation
Principle.
A. Technologies of Aggregation
Individual participation is costly, and so the system of procedure is under pressure
to aggregate. The system has responded to these pressures with a variety of procedural
innovations—technologies of aggregation. Three such techniques are (1) the class
action, (2) the doctrine of virtual representation, and (3) sampling or aggregated trials.
The class action is the most familiar technology of aggregation.316 Class actions
aggregate by allowing an individual named party to act as a representative of a class.
From our perspective, it is important to distinguish between two types of class actions.
317
In a mandatory class action, class members have no choice regarding their
membership in the class, and hence may not preserve the right to individual
315

See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed
Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors Of Child Abuse, 12
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 145, 166 (2003).
316

Cf. John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1419,
1423 (2003) (discussing class action as aggregation device).
317

Richard L. Marcus, Slouching toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1602
(2003) (distinguishing opt out and mandatory class actions); Richard A. Nagareda, The
Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 153
(2003) (“The operation of the class action today as a rival to the conventional institutions of
public lawmaking cries out for a normative account of the distinction drawn between mandatory
and opt-out class actions, for the distinction defines the binding effect of class settlements.”).
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participation in any proceeding that will bind them.318 In an opt-out class action,
individual class members may elect out of the class, and hence to preserve the right of
individual participation.319 A civil action may not proceed as a class action until the
class is certified; a judicial determination that the named party (or parties) is an
adequate representative is a prerequisite for certification.320
The doctrine of virtual representation provides a second technology for
aggregation.321 One way of understanding virtual representation is as a class action
without the formalities. The individual litigant in the first action acts as the
representative of a party with similar interests in a subsequent action, but no class is
certified and the representative relationship is only recognized after the fact when the
doctrine is asserted in the subsequent action. Virtual representation is always
mandatory. Because the first action does not proceed on a class basis, there can be no
notification of absent parties that they have a right to opt out.
A third technology of aggregation is sometimes called “sampling” and also called
“aggregate trial.”322 The idea is to take representative cases, try them, and then use the
results as factual findings in cases that were not tried. The most famous example is
Cimino v. Raymark,323 an asbestos case tried during 1990 in Texas. Cimino involved
2,298 plaintiffs. In an initial phase, various "common issues" were resolved: these
issues included which products contained asbestos, which products were dangerous,
which defendants manufactured which products, and so forth.). The plaintiffs were
then divided into five injury categories. From these five categories, 160 cases were
randomly selected and presented to two separate juries. The results were then applied
to the plaintiffs whose cases were not tried.324 Without substantial changes in current

318
See Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 Emory L.J. 709, 716
(2003).
319
320

See id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.

321

See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural And Ethical Implications Of
Coordination Among Counsel In Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 458 (2000) (discussing
virtual representation as informal aggregation); see generally Bone, supra note 189; F. Carlisle
Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 Ill. L. Rev. 580 (1936);
Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual Representation as a Justification
for the Preclusion Of A Nonparty's Claim, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1303 (1994).
322

See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits
of Aggregation and Sampling in The Trial of Mass Torts 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992). See
generally Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation
in Mass Tort Trials: Justice Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 43 (1998).
323

751 F. Supp. 649, 653, 664-65 (E.D. Tex. 1990) , aff'd in part and vacated in part, 151
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
324

See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 322, at 45-46.
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doctrine, sampling is voluntary, not mandatory325—although the use of mandatory
sampling has been suggested.326
B. The Participation Problem
Technologies of aggregation can create a problem of participation. Consider, for
example, the following hypothetical.327 Suppose that a mandatory class action as the
solution to the problems created by a mass tort. We might imagine such a class action
in response to a harmful substance (“the chemical”) that affects hundreds of thousands
of individuals—think of tobacco or asbestos. To simplify the example, suppose that
exposure of those affected by the chemical is relatively uniform and the persons who
were exposed are easy to identify. The plan for the class action is to proceed in two
phases. In phase one, a trial will be held on various issues such as breach of the
relevant standard of care and causation. In phase two, a quasi-administrative procedure
will distribute the damage award, if any, to the members of the class. Let us further
suppose that the named parties will get a hearing on class certification and the
adequacy of representation, but that no collateral challenges to either certification or
adequacy are permitted. Absent class members will be finally bound by the decision;
the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata will apply. What this means is that
class members will be bound by the decision, (a) whether it is correct or erroneous, (b)
whether it is for the plaintiffs or the defendant, (c) whether the absent parties claim is
substantially the same as that of the class members or not, and (d) whether
representation was in fact adequate or not.
What opportunities for participation would this procedure afford? The answer to
this question is “virtually none.” In the hypothetical, a mandatory class actions would
afford absent class members neither the right to opt out of the class and pursue their
own individual lawsuits nor the right to be represented by counsel in the class
proceeding. Class members might be permitted to participate in the class certification
hearing by making an appearance or by letter, but once the certification decision is
made, this right drops away. Class members would not be allowed to participate
directly via a collateral challenge to the judgment (e.g. by filing another lawsuit)
because of the doctrine of claim preclusion.
325

The Fifth Circuit held that the plan devised by the District Court in Cimino violated the
defendant’s right to a trial by jury, 151 F.3d at 302; the same argument would invalidate
sampling imposed against the wishes of plaintiffs.
326

Cf. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What
Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
199, (1999) (raising question “whether mandatory statistical sampling violates a plaintiff's due
process rights”).
327

Let us put to one side the question whether such a class action would be permitted by
existing law. Under Rule 23, if the described class action were certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
then opt-out and participation rights would be afforded under Rule 23(c)(2). If the class were
certified under Rule 23(b)(1), then the participation in the class would be mandatory.
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Should we be concerned about the absence of a right to participate? Both the
accuracy model and the balancing model suggests that the answer to this question could
be “no.” If we determine that the aggregate level of accuracy would be enhanced by a
mandatory-class action as compared to individual trials, then the accuracy model gives
us no reason to prefer a system of individualized trials. From the perspective of the
balancing model, the case against individualized trials is likely to be even more
compelling. Individualized participation is expensive as compared to a mandatory
class action. The balancing model would allow rights of individual participation if they
are cost justified, either by enhancing accuracy or because of a subjective taste for
participation. Hypothetically, let us suppose that rights of individual participation
would neither be accuracy enhancing nor cost justified.
If we accept the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis, however, then it is not clear that
our hypothetical mandatory class action meets the requirements of procedural justice.
The first principle of procedural justice, the Participation Principle states, “The
arrangements for civil dispute resolution shall afford an equal opportunity to the
affected individual to present evidence and arguments that are relevant to the legal
rules and equitable considerations which should govern the dispute as a matter of
substantive law.” Given the hypothetical facts we have described, there is a prima
facie case that the mandatory class action would violate the Participation Principle.
Persons who will be finally bound are given no opportunity to participate.
However, the first principle of procedural justice does include an impracticability
proviso: “In the event that actual notice or an opportunity to be heard is impracticable,
the absent interested individual shall be provided with an adequate legal representative
and the proceeding shall be structured so as to give full and fair consideration to the
interests of the absent individual.” The application of the impracticability proviso to
any actual mass tort case will depend on the facts. It is certainly possible that affording
equal rights of individual participation would be impracticable. Consider two
scenarios. On one hand, if the effect of affording such rights was to consume the
resources available for compensating plaintiffs, then the result would be self-defeating.
On the other hand, if affording a right of participation is consistent with substantially
just outcomes, then the case against such a right is much weaker. It is true that rights of
participation may impose costs, but legitimacy is the kind of value that warrants the
expenditure of significant resources.
Returning to the hypothetical, let us hypothesize that affording rights of
participation is practicable. For example, we might assume that allow opt out rights,
while adding costs without appreciable accuracy gains, would not produce costs that
would neither bankrupt the defendant nor be wildly disproportionate to stakes involved.
This hypothetical provides a test case for the two principles of procedural justice—as
compared to the rival theories offered by the accuracy model and the participation
model. The two principles would require that class members be afforded opportunities
for participation that are practicable. Both the accuracy model and the balancing model
would require that such right be denied.
In the context of this hypothetical, the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis provides
reasons of political morality to affirm the two principles and reject its rivals. Does this
result cohere with our intuitions and considered judgments about the hypothetical?
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Readers must answer this question for themselves. My guess is that many readers will
agree that participation is required for legitimacy under these circumstances. But I am
also certain that readers strongly committed to consequentialist theories, such as
welfarism or utilitarianism, would reject the conclusion that practicable participation is
required as a matter of procedural justice for situations in which their costs exceed their
benefits. We might ask these readers the following question: do you have any reason
for denying the right to practicable participation that does not depend on some version
of the controversial proposition that only consequences count? If not, then the
argument may reach dialectical impasse at precisely this point.
C. Structuring Aggregation to Allow Participation Rights
One of the lessons of the mandatory class action hypothetical is that rights of
participation are not necessarily inconsistent with aggregation. Individualized litigation
is not the only alternative to aggregation. There are a variety of modalities of
participation that are consistent with technologies of aggregation. Briefly, these
modalities include the following:









Opt-out rights. We can allow absent class members to opt out and
pursue individual litigation.
Participation rights. We can offer class members to enter an
appearance in a class action. The Participation Principle does not
require that these participation rights be attached to a right to hold out
(i.e. to veto settlement or other agreements between the class
representatives and the other parties).
Certification hearings. Even if a class members are not allowed to
participate directly in the litigation, it may nonetheless be practicable
to provide a right to participate in the class certification process,
including, for example, the right (1) to argue for a more limited class
definition, (2) to advocate the creation of subclasses, or (3) the right
to argue against the adequacy of representation.
Settlement hearings. If a class action settles, raising familiar
questions about conflicts of interest between class counsel and class
members, absent class members can be given rights of participation
in settlement hearings.
Issue hearings. The concept of allowing limited participation by
class members in specific hearings need not be confined to
certification and settlement. At crucial stages of the litigation, class
members could be afforded the right to submit written briefs, make
oral presentations, and even to present evidence.

The enumeration of exemplary modalities of participation helps dissolve a false
dichotomy—the choice between individual litigation with maximal rights of individual
participation and aggregation without any rights of individual participation at all. The
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Participatory Legitimacy Thesis requires meaningful participation, but it does not
require individualized litigation. As Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck conclude,
“When well done, the aggregated trial does not deny any of the instrumental values of
due process, particularly from the viewpoint of defendants. Moreover, the value of
procedural participation, central to legitimate judicial process, is not necessarily
compromised in aggregated trials for either class members or defendants.”328
D. Aggregation If Participation Rights Are Impracticable
There may be actual cases in which individual rights of participation in any
meaningful form are impracticable. In these cases, the Principles of Procedural Justice
permit participationless mandatory aggregation—as would the accuracy model and the
participation model. It might be argued, however, that these special cases undermine
the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis. We can express this argument in the form of a
dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is based on the premise that the Participatory
Legitimacy Thesis implies that aggregation without participation is always illegitimate.
If this premise is true—the argument continues—then the Participation Principle is
incorrect and should be modified by deleting the Impracticability Proviso. The second
horn of the dilemma is based on the opposite premise, i.e. that the participatory
legitimacy thesis implies that aggregation with participation is sometimes legitimate. If
this premise is true—the next step of the argument would go—then it undermines the
participatory legitimacy thesis itself. If a binding decision can be legitimate without
participation for reasons of practicability—so the argument maintains—then such
decisions can also be justified by other practical considerations, such as accuracy and
cost.
Although the dilemma expresses a real concern, it relies on false assumptions. The
first horn of the dilemma assumes that aggregation without participation is always
illegitimate, but this assumption is incorrect. Ought implies can. Normative
legitimacy, like other normative concepts, does not demand the impossible or the
impracticable. Moreover, legitimacy is not an “all or nothing” concept: procedures
with full rights of participation may confer a greater degree of legitimacy than
procedures with minimal participation. The second horn of the dilemma assumes that
impracticability (as a ground for denying rights of participation) cannot be
distinguished from accuracy and cost. This assumption is false. Impracticability as a
reason for denying rights of participation is substantially different that marginal
improvements in accuracy or cost.
When rights of participation are impracticable, there is, in theory, a choice for the
design of a system of civil adjudication. One option is to require impracticable
participation and hence to deny rights by making remedial procedures unavailable.
This option is unattractive, both because it produces inaccurate outcomes and because
the rights of participation it affords are illusory. The other option is to adopt
328
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participationless procedures that provide the most accurate outcome available at a
reasonable cost. The theory of procedural justice embodied in the Participation
Principle requires the second option. When participation is impracticable, then
accuracy and cost should shape procedural design.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The real work of procedure is to guide conduct. It is sometimes said that the
regulation of primary conduct is the work of the general and abstract norms of
substantive law—clauses of the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law
rules of tort, property, and contract. But substance cannot effectively guide primary
conduct without the aid of procedure. This is true because of three problems: (1) the
problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. The solution to these
problems is particularization by a system of dispute resolution—in other words, a
system of procedure. A theory of procedural justice is a theory about the fairness of the
institutions that do the job of particularization.
A theory of procedural justice must answer to two problems. The easy problem of
procedural justice is to produce accurate outcomes at a reasonable cost. Of course,
what is easy in theory may be difficult in practice. A very high order of art and science
may be required to design actual systems of civil adjudication that achieve accuracy at
a reasonable cost while minimizing collateral violations of substantive rights. But the
practical problems of procedural architecture should not obscure the obvious:
procedural justice aims at accuracy and efficiency. In the abstract, these goals are
shared by both the theorists and practitioners of procedural design.
The hard problem of procedural justice marks the point at which consensus about
shared goals gives way to controversy. The hard problem of procedural justice goes
deep. Procedural justice is necessarily imperfect, because perfect accuracy is
unattainable and approaching the unattainable would be unjustifiably costly. The fact
of irreducible procedural error is that even the best system of civil procedure that
human ingenuity can design will make mistakes. This fact gives rise to the hard
problem of procedural justice. How can litigants who will be finally bound by a
mistaken judgment regard themselves as under an obligation to comply with the
judgment? Framing the hard question of procedural justice suggests the key to the
answer. The participatory legitimacy thesis makes clear what outcome reductionism
obscures: because a right of participation must be afforded to those to be bound by
judicial proceedings in order for those proceedings to serve as a legitimate source of
authority, the value of participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of
participation on outcomes; nor can the value of participation be reduced to a subjective
preference or feeling of satisfaction.
Solving the hard problem of procedural justice clears the way to the formulation of
principles of procedural justice. The Participation Principle requires that the
arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes be structured to provide each interested
party with a right to adequate participation. The Accuracy Principle requires that the
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arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes should be structured so as to maximize
the chances of achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding. Together, the
two principles provide guidance where guidance is needed, both for the architects of
procedural design and reform and for judges who apply general procedural rules to
particular cases.
A theory of procedural justice is one thing; the practice of procedural design and
application is another. We are tempted to sacrifice procedural fairness on the altar of
substantive advantage. This temptation is strong and persistent—after all, much good
can be done. Desirable outcomes can be reached; costs can be minimized. We can
easily rationalize the sacrifice of procedural justice from a consequentialist perspective:
the measurable marginal benefits of participationless procedure may exceed the
marginal costs. In the end, however, these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure
without justice sacrifices legitimacy. Law without legitimacy can only guide action
through force and fear. Procedure without participation may command obedience, but
it cannot win principled allegiance. When we sacrifice procedural justice on the altar
of substantive advantage, we risk a very great evil. But when we regard ourselves as
bound by the principles of procedural justice, we produce a very great good—we give
citizens a principled reason to respect the outcomes of civil process.
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